COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION—
AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Ramesh Kumar **Arora** (1940)

To
My Family
With Affeciion

Foreword

THE PAST seventy-five years have been marked by a growing output of literature on public administration and the related subjects of management and organization theory. With few exceptions this literature has originated in the United States of America, where the federal systems of government, a relatively open social system, and rapid technical change provide fertile spawning beds for reform movements and experimentation.

Not fully recognized even by the writers is the close relationship between theoretical concepts and generalizations on one hand and the social and technical problems of the culture in which they develop on the other. In the field of public administration, for example, recent critics of the politics-administration dichotomy that dominated much of the literature of the early twentieth century fail to recognize that it was a logical construct designed to combat the petty politics and patronage by which parties and factions were furthering their own interests with little or no concern for the objectives and operating effectiveness of governmental services. Later emphasis on human relations coincided with the rise of labour unions and the manpower shortages of the 1940s. Then came the scientific emphasis of atomic energy and computer technology, which reflected in the rigid mathematical demands of later behavioural sciences, P.P.B.S., and systems analysis. Recently the concern for social equity and "war on poverty" brought a renewed acceptance of values and normative theory as basic features of the so-called "new public administration". In brief, the development of American administrative theory reflects the changing character of technology and the social and economic problems associated therewith.

In the field of comparative public administration, again under the leadership of American writers, the theoretical models have largely reflected an awareness of political and economic

problems in developing nations. Shortly after President Truman announced the "Point Four" programme of assistance in 1949, a survey commission to the Philippines reported that economic and technical improvements would not be forthcoming in that nation unless an effective and efficient system of public administration was established. Within a few years the United States was providing funds and professional personnel to organize institutes of training for public administration in many parts of the world, and was pressing for the establishment of "modern" personnel, budgeting and planning agencies in nations that had sought technical assistance. The United Nations was likewise engaged in building more advanced administrative systems, but on a smaller scale.

Bureaucracies of the less industrialized nations did not respond as expected, however; and within a short time academic critics were pointing out that the American patterns of improvement were "culture bound" and therefore out of keeping with the traditions and felt needs of nations that the United States programmes were designed to assist. Thus a wave of research and theory building developed in the field of comparative public administration, with anthropology as the guiding discipline for many of the new studies. Later the comparative study of public administration began to blend with studies of comparative politics, especially when applied to the field of "development administration".

To a large degree the study of comparative politics and development administration remained separate from American post-World War II studies of organization theory. In the latter field sociologists and social psychologists had assumed leadership in research, with political scientists playing a secondary role. Comparative research, on the other hand, was left almost entirely to political scientists. One common thread of the two areas was a reliance, though somewhat critically at times, upon the model developed by Max Weber, German sociologist of pre-World War I days. Despite the fact that Weber was known to few students of political science until about 1940, one can hardly claim expertise in public administration or organization theory today without having cited Max Weber on several occasions.

Certainly the leading writers on comparative public administration have relied heavily on his work. For that reason Dr. Arora builds his analysis of later writers on the foundation of the Weberian bureaucratic model.

Thus far, however, the study of comparative administration has not acquired the endogenous character of American studies of organization and management. In the United States the early patterns of organization and control, though expressed in terms of conceptual generalizations, were essentially the products of a search for solutions to problems and needs perceived by citizen committees and students of government. In the comparative field, by contrast, the limited success of transplanted pattern solutions did not evoke a search for new explanations by leaders or researchers in the nations directly concerned. Instead the new theoretical framework can be said to have developed externally, primarily with American academicians, and with emphasis on analysis rather than on problem solving. Hence, despite the fact that the term "development administration" suggests a search for means to improvement of administrative operation, as well as of the productive capacities, of the nations concerned, the study of comparative administration has not brought forth locally conceived pattern solutions comparable to those that characterized American administrative ideas of the earlier years. Also, we have little empirical evidence of any operational effectiveness of generalizations in the comparative field. The driving force has been external, suggesting technical assistance and advice, rather than being indigenous to the cultures for which improvements are sought.

Dr. Ramesh Arora's concern for the interrelation of theories of organization, including those of European and American writers, with the growing body of theoretical concepts relating to comparative public administration, seems to be a necessary forerunner to their application in the search for effective administrative and economic productivity in developing nations. The fact that this study is the work of an Indian scholar and is published in India should be a significant indicator of its practical usefulness. Administration is an art as well as a field of scientific study; and while the generalizations may be cross-

cultural in large part, the art of applying them for the development of a particular national system needs the stimulation of intensive conceptual analysis by leaders among thinkers and writers of that nation. Such, it is hoped, will be the major contribution of this volume by Dr. Ramesh K. Arora.

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Introduction

SINCE THE end of World War II, there has been a vast outpouring of books, monographs, research reports, journal articles, conferences, institutes, and teaching courses associated with the emergence of comparative public administration as an academic field. As with most academic disciplines, this field extends upon work done in other areas, especially "American" public administration, and sociological theory. Some of its concepts have been developed by its "own" students, while many pre-existing ideas and models have also been used to build an intellectual tradition within the field. To some degree, then, there has emerged a core of conceptual apparatus associated with comparative public administration.

The present work is an attempt to study the environmental conditions which have led to the emergence of this field of comparative public administration and to the development of some of its major conceptual constructs. It is also aimed at exploring the essential elements of these conceptual constructs with the purpose of evaluating the extent to which they have accounted for the interactions between the administrative system and its social environment. From a dynamic perspective, this work is also interested in the degree to which these conceptual constructs are designed to account for socio-administrative change in the context of such interactions. Briefly, then, an attempt is made to analyse the "ecological"[1] and "developmental"[2] elements of some major conceptual constructs of comparative public administration in the overall context of the environment in which such constructs have been developed. Thus the approach of this study is ecological from two perspectives: it is concerned with the social environment in which the core concepts in the field have emerged; and it is interested in the utility of these concepts in the cross-cultural analysis of socio-administrative development.

Chapter I contains a brief survey of some of the major phases in the development of modern administrative thought with

special reference to the context of environmental factors which influenced this development. Likewise, it is argued that the "traditional" government and administrative studies should be seen to provide a foundation for many later conceptual innovations in comparative public administration. These later innovations are viewed in the context of the factors which led to a greater interest in the study of cross-cultural administrative systems after World War II. This approach stresses various organizational attempts to promote the study of comparative public administration in the United States on a large scale, thus influencing the conceptual development of the field.

Chapter II gives a brief conceptual overview of the field of comparative public administration. It points to the emphasis on theory-building in the field and to the resulting multitude of conceptual constructs lacking a common paradigm.[3] An introduction to the essential elements of certain prominent approaches in the field has been provided in this chapter. Among these, the three most important approaches are: the bureaucratic system approach based on Weberian analysis, the general system approach, particularly that of Fred Riggs, and the development administration approach. This classification provides a perspective upon the major "models" and "foci" in the literature in comparative public administration, which is almost in line with the thinking of such scholars as Ferrel Heady and Dwight Waldo.[4] Later chapters extend upon the analysis begun here.

Chapter III deals with the basic components of Max Weber's bureaucratic system in the light of his methodology of constructing ideal-types and his analysis of authority systems. A brief assessment is then made of the great influence which Weber has exerted in the field of comparative public administration, with particular reference to the use of "bureaucracy" in recent literature.

Weber's analysis contained a fairly extensive discussion of the interaction between the political system and its bureaucracy. Considering the significance which this subject has received in the ecological study of public administration in a cross-cultural context recently, Chapter IV focuses upon Weber's analysis of the phenomenon and upon that of some contemporary scholars, particularly Riggs.

From a more systemic perspective, the non-political aspects of social ecology must be incorporated in any study of comparative public administration. Chapter V addresses this problem through an analysis of Riggs's "prismatic" model of society. Riggs has stressed the socio-cultural, economic, and political environment of administration with special emphasis on non-Western societies, but his prismatic model precludes the analysis of dynamic developmental problems.

Issues pertaining to the developmental aspects of administration and the administrative aspects of development are discussed in Chapter VI. This analysis, then, is devoted to the developmental focus in comparative public administration, demonstrating the dynamic ecological perspective which is involved in such studies.

Finally, Chapter VII concludes the present work with a resume of the ecological and developmental elements in the early administrative theory, in Weber's administrative analysis, and in contemporary comparative public administration. This analysis is made in the overall context of the "ecology of ideas".

Briefly, the general premises and propositions of the present study may be stated as follows: Because comparative public administration is cross-cultural in character, it must utilize conceptual constructs which are both ecological and developmental. In the body of this work, the major approaches of comparative public administration are examined in regard to the incorporation of these perspectives. Considering the approaches in terms of their historical development, this study examines the emergence of these perspectives in the literature. Assuming the need to respond to the universal challenge of rapid and fundamental change, this study develops the thesis that the ecological and developmental perspectives of comparative public administration require further strengthening.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] For a general discussion on the ecology of public administration, see Chapter V.
[2] The concept of development has been dealt with in Chapter VI.
[3] On the problems pertaining to paradigm-construction, see Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
[4] For a discussion on the classification of the literature in comparative public administration, see Chapter II.

CHAPTER 1
The Evolution

A N O V E R V I E W of the circumstances which led to the evolution of the study of comparative public administration is provided in this chapter. For this purpose, an examination will be made of the comparative elements in the early studies on government and administration. Those factors, then, will be analysed which promoted an interest in the cross-cultural administrative analysis in the post-World War II era. In this context, the contribution of the Comparative Administration Group will be assessed in the furtherance of the study of comparative public administration in recent years. Taken together, the discussion will provide a brief survey of the context in which comparative administrative thought developed.

Ideally speaking, an orderly comparison is requisite to the process of systematic explanation. Non-comparative *ad hoc* description. and explanation adds relatively little to the scientific development of a discipline. Emile Durkheim has asserted that *"one cannot explain a social fact of any complexity except by following its complete development 'through a social species.*"[1] According to this view, a systematic explanation cannot be thought of without the rigorous use of a comparative approach. Samuel Eisenstadt has suggested more specifically that a comparative approach, "despite some claims to the contrary, does not imply a specific method in social research, but rather a special focus on cross-societal and cross-institutional analysis."[2] Research with such an approach could take a variety of forms, e.g., it could be inter-cultural, cross-national but intra-cultural, or intra-national in scope and cross-temporal in dimension. Edward Shils, on the other hand, has observed that "an inquiry may be considered comparative if it proceeds by the use of an analytical scheme through which different societies *may be systematically compared* so that, by the use of a single set of categories, their identities and uniqueness may be disclosed and explained."[3] While these

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emphases differ in their specifics, they place great importance in the systematic aspects of comparative research.

The recent emphasis on comparative analysis in social sciences has primarily involved expanding the domain of social inquiry beyond earlier narrow cultural bonds. The "comparative revolution" is further serving the purpose of restructuring theoretical constructs in a more "scientific" way. More fundamentally, the comparative perspective is providing a "basic intellectual outlook that helps one overcome natural inclinations to view the world through egocentric and ethnocentric lenses,"[4] and, in this way, is also stimulating the process of expanding the universe of social analysis.

Though the efficacy of comparative analysis has been recognized in all of the modern social sciences, the earliest disciplines to take the lead in developing such a perspective were anthropology and sociology. In fact, comparative social analysis was intertwined in the development of modern sociology, whose founding fathers, such as Herbert Spencer, Vilfred Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber, were primarily comparative sociologists. However, in the case of public administration, because of several environmental factors, the comparative focus was slow to develop.

The Comparative Elements in Early Administrative Theory

Public administration as an aspect of government activity has existed ever since the emergence of the political system. However, as a field of systematic study, its development has come only recently. In the eighteenth century, the cameralism, concerned with the orderly management of government affairs, became an area of special interest for German scholars. In the United States, Hamilton and Jefferson had drawn attention to certain aspects of public administration, but it was Woodrow Wilson's essay, "The Study of Administration,"[5] which is now considered to be the symbolic beginning of its academic study in America. Wilson argued that certain administrative practices of Europe could be borrowed by the United States, without adopting the autocratic spirit of the former. This interest reflected a concern for administrative reform when the spoils system had become a cause of political and administrative disorder in

America. Other civil service reformers, such as Dorman B. Eaton, had also advocated the introduction of British personnel practices in the United States. The interest of the civil service reformers indicated that the American scholars were willing to look at the administrative practices of foreign countries.

An important step in the development of American administrative thought was taken by Frederick W. Taylor, who initiated the Scientific Management Movement in the early twentieth century. Taylor's "principles" of Scientific Management[6] were the outcome of a response to the challenge of greater productivity, which in itself was the result of the process of the technological routinization that marked the maturation of the Industrial Revolution in the United States. "Taylorism" had a considerable influence on American administrative theory. Taylor's efforts were in tune then with popular interest in the development of a science of administration. His philosophy of "one best way" was conceived to be a scientific methodology of careful observation, measurement, and generalization. Scientific Management, in fact, became an international movement in the 1920's, and the ideas were applied by Lenin in the administration of Soviet industrial enterprises. Thus Taylor's principles of Scientific Management had cross-national applicability to the extent that they were found consistent with the objectives of large-scale production. These principles responded to particular types of needs and environment, and thus their utility for comparative analysis must be seen in the context of such environmental influences.

Scientific Management stimulated a further interest in governmental reforms in the United States, and the early period of the twentieth century is a testimony to this influence. It popularized the search for universal generalizations on administrative procedure, and particularly emphasized the concepts of economy and efficiency. A concern with the principles of administration was evident in the writings on public administration that followed the maturation of the Scientific Management Movement.

The two important textbooks on public administration, by Leonard White and William Willoughby,[7] published in 1926 and 1927 respectively, and other writings on public administration in the 1920's and 1930's generally adopted a "management" approach to public administration, and also showed a heavy

concern with the enterprise of building a science of administration through the articulation of certain "universal" principles of administration.

Willoughby, one of the foremost proponents of early public administration, wrote in 1919 that administration is, "if not a science, a subject to the study of which the scientific method should be rigidly applied."[8] Later, he observed that there are "fundamental principles of general application analogous to those characterizing any science, . . . and these principles are to be determined and their significance made known, only by the rigid application of scientific method."[9] The cross-cultural character of the principles was stressed by another leading scholar of the traditional public administration—Leonard White. White observed: "A principle, considered as a tested hypothesis and applied in the light of its appropriate frame of reference, is a useful guide to action in the public administration of Russia as of Great Britain, of Irak as of the United States."[10]

The emphasis in the above statements by Willoughby and White seems to be upon the *desirability* of applying scientific method in public administration, the *possibility* of having scientifically-tested principles, and the *potential utility* of such principles.

The lack of available funds for social scientists to do research abroad, the relative isolation of the United States during this period, and apparent appropriateness of these principles to the environment in which they developed are only a few among various reasons which did not stimulate or allow the rigorous testing of the generated hypotheses in the cross-cultural context in the pre-World War II period. The "orthodoxy" of the principles of administration represented an initial stage in the development of the administrative sciences, which proceeded as if, what Thomas Kuhn has called, a "paradigm" of administrative studies had been achieved.

Later, studies in Human Relations added new elements in the understanding of administrative behaviour. Various dimensions of informal organization were recognized as important variables in the internal organizational environment, but little study was done of the interaction between the internal and the broader external environment. For reasons already noted in the context of principles of administration, the Human Relations movement

could not develop a cross-cultural perspective. This movement to a large extent was a response to the specific needs of an industrial society in a particular period of economic stress.

The governmental response to the great economic depression was the New Deal of the 1930's. The New Deal expanded the role of public administration in the management of the American economy, and during this period of "planned" economy, public administration in the United States became relatively goal-oriented. This was particularly true of the new public organizations devoted to large-scale socio-economic development such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. Goal-orientation, including administrative concern for urban development, was indicative of the sprouting of "development administration" in the American administrative practice in the pre-World War II period. Likewise, the resultant interest in the relationship between the political system and its administrative system in the writings of several scholars[11] reflected the emerging ecological perspective (in its political dimension at least) in American administrative literature. The concept of politics-administration dichotomy was vigorously challenged in these writings.

During and after World War II, challenges to administrative theory came from at least two major directions. First, scholars such as Edwin Stene, Herbert Simon, and Dwight Waldo stressed the need for more "scientific" explanations in the literature,[12] and, second, some writers called for rigorous cross-cultural analysis in public administration. Robert Dahl, for example, asserted that "as long as the study of public administration is not comparative, claims for a 'science' of public administration sound rather hollow."[13]

"Traditionai" Comparative Government and Administration Studies

At this point, a brief reference to pre-World War II studies on "comparative" government and administration is in order, as the reaction against such studies was an important factor in stimulating the later comparative politics and public administration movements.

The traditional literature on "comparative government" focused on foreign relations, political parties, election machinery, pressure groups, constitutions, or institutions in their formal aspects. "Comparative administration," on the other hand, concentrated on central administrative machinery, decentralization patterns, civil service structures, public · finance, financial administration, control over the executive branch of government, and the functions of administrative officers. In the studies on "foreign governments," institutional aspects were covered with reference to major European powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Some of these studies were concerned primarily with the organizational description of "constitutional" governments, meaning essentially, democratic governments. Their emphasis was upon the model of industrialized Western countries, and upon those government institutions and practices which were important in the West. Some reference was also made to colonial administration.

Post-World War II studies abound with criticisms of the traditional comparative government literature. A few of these criticisms are: the traditional literature was culture-bound, limiting itself to the study of Western nations and institutions; it was normative in character because of its commitments to the values of constitutionalism and Western liberal democracy; it was parochial in character since it seemed to believe in a uni-directional development of political and administrative systems on the Western patterns; it was essentially legalistic and formalistic; it was not ecological in perspective; and it overlooked the multifunctional character of governmental institutions.[14] Further, it has also been observed that the traditional comparative government and administration literature was primarily descriptive rather than analytic, explanatory, and problem-oriented. Essentially, it was "non-comparative" in character, for despite the study of governments of several nations within a single volume, cross-cultural and cross-temporal analysis and explanation were rare. It also lacked techniques and concepts to undertake such studies, especially of the non-Western areas. Riggs asks a pertinent question as to why should not this old material be called the study of the "governments of foreign areas," instead of the study of "comparative governments!"[15]

These criticisms do not generally view the traditional comparative studies in an ecological perspective. It must be recognized that any field of knowledge starts on a limited basis. This was true of the early comparative literature as well. Few scholars outside of the United States and Great Britain had really sought to discuss government. Further, the field of political science was dominated for a long time by political philosophy. In addition, there were not many "developing" nations as they are found today, and probably no grants were available to study the administrative systems of countries such as Ceylon and Nigeria. The methodology of social sciences in this period was naturally not as "sophisticated" as it is today. It must also be understood that the early comparative studies were responding to the liberal-democratic environment in which they developed. These studies reflected an interest in viewing the problems of particular societies operating in particular environmental conditions. Thus to criticize such studies for being "normative" is to overlook the ecology of the development of politico-administrative thought. These studies should, instead, be viewed from the perspective of the contribution they made in providing certain important concepts and findings which were later tested, modified, or rejected, and then stir dated further development of the administrative discipline. For example, traditional administrative concepts such as authority, control, communication, planning, organization, coordination, and even efficiency and economy have major relevance to the study of comparative public administration. This emphasis will be clear in the course of further discussion. Likewise, it should be recognized that descriptive materials on governments must precede administrative analysis. The contribution of the traditional comparative government studies to the "new" comparative public administration movement should be judged from this angle—one which stresses various "stages" in the development of government and administration studies.

The Sources of the Comparative Public Administration Movement

The turn of events during and after World War II changed the state of the comparative literature drastically. Today,

comparative public administration has gained a respectable academic and professional status as evidenced by the continually growing number of bibliographies, books, journals, conferences, teaching courses, professional programmes, etc. A pertinent question is: "Why and how did this major transformation take place?" A review of the important factors promoting the academic study of comparative public administration will be appropriate at this stage of our analysis.

The underlying motivating sources for the systematic study of comparative public administration in the United States can be broadly divided into the policy-oriented catalysts and intellectually-oriented catalysts. Both categories are drawn arbitrarily to aid the present analysis, and should not be thought of as absolutely discrete. In fact, they are complementary in character, since the theoretical and the instrumental perspectives are interdependent in the field of comparative public administration.

By "policy-oriented catalysts" is meant those factors, primarily involving policy concerns, which have motivated the development of an interest in the comparative study of public administration. Such factors stimulate the growth of practical knowledge aimed at more effective policy-making and execution in concrete situations. There is demonstrable feedback from such experience gained in practical administration to the realm of academic research. Much of this feedback comes from scholars involved in policy-oriented projects or engaged as practitioners.

During the final phase of World War II, the United States was engaged in military government operations in the two areas of occupation. In these regions, American scholars-turned-practitioners became aware of governmental problems which could not be tackled with the American package of traditional political science and public administration.[16] Scholars working in different cultural contexts became conscious of the multifunctionality of structures, and this awareness led to a greater interest in systematic comparative studies.

The trend toward greater interest in comparative studies con-
after World War II. The Marshall Plan for the economic
, of Europe, and, later, the Point Four Programme for
developing nations, had increased the American political and
economic commitments abroad. Such commitments

the exporting of technical services, a process which was accompanied by large-scale documenting and reporting. The American scholars also joined United Nations technical assistance teams. Soon, a campaign for international administrative reform seemed to be in operation. In this campaign, the United States government received the active assistance of universities and private foundations, as well as the expertise of multilateral organizations. Scores of public administration students were engaged in this giant venture.[17] Since it was quickly recognized that "exogenous" technical change required a complete understanding of the cultural context of the administrative institutions and behaviour in foreign countries, there soon developed a conscious ecological perspective among the students of public administration working in the various developing countries. However, comparative public administration developed somewhat slowly in the initial stage of the technical assistance programme. An important reason for this was that such assistance tended to be on a year-to-year basis, and there was no certainty in the minds of the public administration scholars about its long-term extension. This discouraged particularly those scholars who would have wanted to undertake longer assignments abroad for extensive and more profound studies on socio-administrative change.

Nevertheless, with a growing stress on technical assistance, more and more scholars became interested in the enormous problems of modernization faced by developing nations. It has become fairly well recognized that the emergent nations are caught in the grip of a "revolution of rising expectations" and are facing enormous challenges of institutional change and adaptation. These challenges, in order to be met, need the active assistance of the "modernized" nations which presumably have stakes in the peaceful modernization[18] of emergent nations. From a purely political angle also, developing nations are significant when considered in the context of the prevailing international confusion and the continuing cold war conflict. Therefore, in the United States and other developed nations the recognition of "development" as a universal goal has stimulated greater intellectual and "practical" interests in the problem of developing nations. Understandably enough, the objectives of the

comparative public administration enterprise have been assumed to be related to major issues of the day. The change in academically-perceived "social reality," resulting from the emergence of a large number of new nations on the world scene, has created new motives and opportunities for scientific investigation, and thus has furthered theoretical speculation among the scholars of public administration.

The emergent nations range quite widely in historical background, geographical conditions, population distribution, social stratification, cultural structure, economic growth, ideological orientation, political stability, and governmental institutions. This diversity poses important problems of cross-cultural comparison in social analysis. The students of comparative public administration, therefore, must create conceptual constructs which are highly ecological in character and which are capable of explaining the dynamics of socio-administrative development. Thus, in order to meet the needs of new policy areas of technical assistance administration, important strides have been made in the evolution of the study of comparative public administration. Such an evolution has been particularly stimulated by the intellectual climate of the post-World War II period.

It has already been pointed out that young scholars of public administration, many of whom were academician-turned-practitioners in the post-World War II period, had become dissatisfied with the culture-bound character of the traditional public administration. Dahl's argument that the claims for a science of public administration were hollow, as the study of public administration was not comparative, was an example of such a concern in the late 1940's and the period after that. Consequently, the students of comparative public administration, aware of the intellectual developments in comparative sociology, anthropology, and other areas, became interested in developing theoretical constructs with a cross-cultural, cross-national, and cross-temporal relevance in their field. They recognized that hypotheses developed in the American cultural context, in order to be valid and part of a science of public administration, should be tested in cross-cultural settings.

Another important concern of the students of public administration in the post-World War II period was to move away

from the legal-formal approach to the study of public administration and to concentrate on the actual behaviour of human beings in an administrative organization. This concern was part of the so-called "behavioural movement" in social sciences.

The Behavioural Movement

Since behaviouralism has contributed to the stimulation of comparative public administration, a brief reference to its essential elements in administrative analysis would be in order. Modern behaviouralism, which developed in the late 1930's and 1940's, is concerned essentially with the scientific study of human behaviour in various settings. In political science, behaviouralism started as a protest against older traditional, historical, normative, and largely descriptive kinds of analysis, rather than against their substance. In administrative studies, behaviouralism is considered to have started with the famous Human Relations movement[19] of the 1930's, and later developed, among others, by Chester Barnard[20] and Herbert Simon.[21] Simon has argued that "administrative behaviour" is part of the behavioural science movement, and differs only in subject matter phenomena from other behavioural disciplines including sociology, anthropology, psychology, and political behaviour. The behavioural approach in administrative studies has certain salient features: (1) its literature is descriptive (and analytical) rather than prescriptive, with the studies on motivation being an exception; (2) it emphasizes operational definitions of terms and empirical study based on rigorous methods such as field observation, controlled field experiments, and laboratory studies of organization-like groups; (3) largely, though not exclusively, it is concerned with quantification, mathematization, and formal theory construction. It is interdisciplinary in character and makes considerable use of propositions drawn from other social sciences and of empirical data on administrative behaviour to test such propositions in the organizational context.[22]

The behavioural approach in public administration has motivated greater scientific research and systematic theory construction. Testing of hypotheses in cross-cultural contexts has made the study of comparative public administration a

necessity. In order to study the differing ecologies of a variety of administrative systems, comparative public administration has borrowed concepts, tools, and findings from various social sciences, and thus has developed an interdisciplinary orientation. Behaviouralism itself has acted as an umbrella under which comparative public administration has found several modes of interaction, not only with public administration per se but also with other disciplines.

Recently Herbert Simon classified contemporary research in administrative behaviour as follows:[23]

1. The study of bureaucracy (Robert Merton, Peter Blau and other scholars using and extending upon the Weberian bureaucratic model);

2. Human Relations research pertaining to motivation and increasing job satisfaction (Douglas McGregor, Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert, Warren Bennis, and others);

3. Motivation studies using the Barnard-Simon equilibrium model; and

4. Decision-making studies emphasizing primarily cognitive processes and the rational components of administrative behaviour.

The above kinds of research permeate almost all areas of administrative sciences, and thus are not confined to the study of public administration. In comparative public administration, such scholars as Morroe Berger, Robert Presthus, and Michael Crozier[24] have conducted empirical studies of bureaucratic behaviour in differing cross-cultural settings. However, the number of these studies has been quite small, primarily because of the time and resources they involve. With the development of the discipline, it is expected that empirical studies on organizational behavioural and decision-making in cross-cultural contexts will increase, and that the impact of behaviouralism on comparative administrative studies will become more profound.

The Comparative Politics Movement

The post-World War II period has witnessed the emergence of a major interest in the comparative study of political systems. The comparative politics movement and the comparative public

administration movement share many common stimuli and motivational factors, including the emergence of a host of non-Western nations, America's worldwide involvement in political and economic spheres, and the rise of behaviouralism. In fact, certain scholars, including Harold Lasswell, Robert Michels, and Lawrence Lowell, were showing interest in the comparative studies of political systems even before the World War II, but the movement gained momentum only after the war.

Both the comparative politics and the comparative public administration movements have experienced strong dissatisfaction with the traditional approaches; they share the dominating concern with conceptual frameworks,[25] and both are interdisciplinary in orientation; they have focused predominantly on the developing nations; and they are still faced with the obvious gap between the needed and the actual field research. Developments in comparative politics in the post-World War II period have influenced the emerging developments in comparative public administration.

The first major institutional effort in the emergence of a comparative politics movement was made in 1953 when the Social Science Research Council sponsored a Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics.[26] Since then, the Council has had a Committee on Comparative Politics which has played a significant role in the development of the discipline of comparative politics and other associated areas. Gabriel Almond, Leonard Binder, James Coleman, Joseph La Palombara, Lucian Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner—all members of the Committee on Comparative Politics—have studied public administration as a subordinate aspect of political activity. In 1962, the Committee sponsored a conference on bureaucracy's role in political development at the Centre for Advanced Studies in the Behavioural Sciences. The papers presented at the conference were later edited by Joseph La Palombara, and published in the volume, *Bureaucracy and Political Development*.[27] The conference provided a considerable impetus toward the study of comparative public administration, particularly to its developmental aspects.

The conceptual affinity between the two movements exists primarily because of the integration of the subject matter of their study. Robert Holt has observed that the "boundary between

the political system and the administrative system is the boundary between an analytically defined macrosystem and an analytically defined microsystem".[28] Such an approach has led to the treatment of bureaucracy as an important subsystem of the political system. Students of comparative public administration have shown a dominant interest in interactions between the political system and its bureaucracy in cross-cultural settings, and on this subject have drawn upon hypotheses developed in the literature on comparative politics.[29] This case is only one evidence of the validity of Alfred Diamant's suggestion that the students of comparative public administration can find in comparative politics "a considerable body of substantive materials directly related to their own concerns, as well as an increasingly sophisticated and self-conscious effort at methodological clarification."[30]

In addition to the policy needs and the external intellectual climate, the organization of the comparative public administration movement has also acted as an important part of the environment in which the conceptualization in comparative administrative analysis has taken place.

Certain Organizational Aspects of the Comparative Public Administration Movement

The first concerted attempt to further the study of comparative public administration was made in 1952, when the Public Administration Clearing House sponsored a Conference on Comparative Administration at Princeton. The Conference appointed, under the Committee on Public Administration, a sub-committee on comparative public administration to develop "criteria of relevance" and a design for field studies in foreign countries.[31] The sub-committee in its report included a revised outline on comparative field research prepared by Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman.[32]

The Sayre-Kaufman outline suggested a three-point strategy for comparison, focusing on: the organization of the administratives system, the control of the administrative system, and the securing of consent and compliance by the administrative hierarchy. The strategy was based on two assumptions: (1) the ordering of relationships in hierarchical patterns is assumed to be

common to all societies; and (2) data about those patterns could be obtained through a set of questions. These questions largely reflected Western experience. As Alfred Diamant commented appropriately, they "reflected the innocence of earlier efforts in comparative administration".[33] The Sayre-Kaufman research strategy could not be executed for lack of funds.

In 1953, the year of the publication of the Sayre-Kaufman outline, the American Political Science Association had an *ad hoc* sub-committee on comparative administration. This sub-committee continued in existence until the creation of the Comparative Administration Group under the American Society for Public Administration.

The Comparative Administration Group

The Comparative Administration Group (CAG) was set up in 1963 as a committee of the American Society for Public Administration. It was funded initially for a three-year period by the Ford Foundation, which had been interested in multidimensional problems of emergent nations. The Foundation provided a second grant to the CAG in 1966 for a five-year period. The grant was not renewed in 1971; however, the Group continues to exist with financial support coming from other quarters. Fred Riggs was the chairman of the Group from its inception to the end of 1970. The new chairman is Richard Gable.

The CAG has developed a three-fold programme designed to encourage research, teaching, and more effective public-policy formulation in the area of development administration. The Ford Foundation grant obligated the CAG to focus on the administrative problems of developing countries viewed in the systemic context of their social, cultural, political, and economic environments. The Group supports and sponsors research seminars and conferences and works for the improvement of teaching materials and approaches. It serves as a communication link between the scholars and practitioners concerned with development administration. Its membership includes scholars and government officials who take an active interest in the Group's objectives and programmes.

. The CAG is international in the scope of its activities. It has sponsored and encouraged research in comparative administration in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. Its members regularly lecture and advise on problems of development administration in various emerging countries.

The CAG is organized into 11 committees on Asia, Europe, Latin America, Africa, national planning, comparative urban administration and politics, theories of organization, international administration, comparative legislative studies, comparative educational administration, and systems theory. This organization clearly reflects a well-balanced emphasis on an area approach on theoretical development, and on problem orientation. Most of the committees keep a continuous liaison with official oragnizations such as the Agency for International Development, the United Nations organs, and various national governments.

The Group has organized numerous seminars and research projects held at American universities and in far-flung places such as Korea, Brazil, and Italy. In this process, more than one hundred research papers on various aspects of comparative administration have been prepared and issued in mimeographed form. Most of these papers, after proper revisions, have been published, or are in the process of publication, in edited works.[34] The CAG has brought out a periodical newsletter, which has served as a vehicle of communication among the Group's members. Since 1969, SAGE Publications, in co-operation with the CAG, has published a quarterly *Journal of Comparative Administration*. The Group has also sponsored experimental teaching projects and promoted field research in comparative administration.

Some of the scholars associated with the CAG are Ralph Braibanti, Fredrick Cleveland, Alfred Diamant, Samuel Eisenstadt, Bertram Gross, Ferrel Heady, James Heaphey, Warren Ilchman, Martin Landau, John Montgomery, Fred Riggs, Emil Sady, Wallace Sayre, Frank Sherwood, William Siffin, and Dwight Waldo. This list is sufficient to show how rich the CAG is in its scholarship structure. Waldo has referred to the comparative public administration movement as a "self-conscious movement". The leadership of this movement, as Lynton Caldwell has noted, is provided by the CAG.[35]

The Comparative Administration Group has widened the horizons of public administration; it has opened the doors of the

discipline to all kinds of social scientists (including foreign scholars), has made the scope of the field more systemic by studying different administrative systems in their ecological settings, and has stimulated interest on the part of its members in the problems of development administration. The ultimate purpose of the comparative public administration movement, as Caldwell observed, has been "to hasten the emergence of a universally valid body of knowledge concernmg administrative behaviour—in brief, to contribute to a genuine and generic discipline of public administration."[36]

The Comparative Public Administration Movement Abroad

The greatest impact on the American study of comparative public administration has been that of a European scholar, Max Weber. Ironically, the continental administrative law tradition has inhibited such scientific study of administrative behaviour in Europe. This does not mean, however, that European scholarship has not participated at all in the sprawling comparative public administration movement. In June, 1953, the International Political Science Association sponsored a panel on comparative public administration in Paris. The panel was chaired by Charles S. Ascher. Furthermore, the International Institute of Administrative Sciences has prepared some studies on the administrative experience in different European countries.

Ferrel Heady, in 1962, mentioned the names of Paul Meyer, Fritz Morstein Marx, Brian Chapman, Andre Molitor, and Roman Schnur as among those European scholars who have found congenial intellectual fellowship with members of the American comparative public administration establishment.[37] Many other scholars have also participated in the European sub-committee of the CAG. Yet, the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, of which the American Society for Public Administration is a national unit, does not have close liaison with the CAG.

Besides the European interest, in recent years, several Asian, African, and Latin American countries with the aid of American foundations, or on their own initiative, have established institutes and schools of public administration. Some of these countries

are: India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Iran, Vietnam, Israel, Korea, Turkey, Brazil, and Tanzania. The institutes of public administration are devoted to research and teaching, and also to the improvement of the foundation of public policy in their countries. A few of them publish journals, books, monographs, and newsletters and hold seminars and conferences periodically. Though not directly related to the comparative public administration movement in America, the activities of these institutes do supplement the work of the American scholars.

Teaching of Comparative Public Administration

The teaching of a subject indicates and forms a part of the organizational climate of a discipline. In 1948, Dwight Waldo introduced a course in comparative public administration at the University of California, Berkeley. Since then, comparative public administration has been taught in several universities having public administration programmes. Almost all graduate programmes in public administration have courses in comparative public administration. The emphasis varies from course to course and from school to school. Some of the courses emphasize the study of conceptual frameworks, while others deal with the administrative problems of developing or other nations. Some courses focus on particular geographical areas. In some programmes there is a concentration on the comparative local, particularly urban, government. For example, the Graduate School of Public Administration at New York University offers a course on theoretical constructs and methodology of comparative public administration, one on Western administration, one on comparative non-Western administration (focusing on the Middle East), and another on comparative local government. The school also offers courses in Comparative Metropolitan Finance and in Comparative Metropolitan Government and Administration. Besides, there are several courses on International Administration.[38] Such a differentiation in teaching of comparative public administration is found mostly in the United States, and to a relatively less extent in Great Britain and some continental countries. Many developing nations have introduced

new courses in the field, although the present practice appears to be limited to one course on the administrative practices of major powers, and on comparative administrative theory.

The teaching of comparative public administration, even in the United States, has not been highly integrated with the study of administrative theory. The two areas coexist but with little mutual interaction. Frank Sherwood has argued that separate courses in theory and in comparison lead to duplication. He has asserted that "no good courses in theory can lack a tremendous amount of comparison and no good courses in comparison can exist without a major base in theory."[39] It should be recognized, however, that generally separate courses are developed because of certain limitations, such as those pertaining to time and schedule. For the foreseeable future it can be expected that separate courses in comparative public administration will continue to exist, although the process of their gradual integration with the courses on American administrative theory will be given serious consideration.

Conclusion

In the preceding discussion, it has been stressed that administrative ideas must be seen in the context of the environment in which they develop. Although the early government and administration studies appear to be inadequate for the present purposes of cross-cultural administrative analysis, their contribution in providing a foundation for later disciplinary advancement has been considerable. Most importantly, these studies responded to the environmental challenges of their own period. It can be discerned that an interest in ecological, goal-oriented, developmental, and, to an extent, in comparative (cross-national) aspects of public administration had developed in the pre-World War II period, although it was only later that these themes were provided a central position in the comparative administrative literature.

During and immediately after World War II, an interest in the study of non-Western nations became a common characteristic of almost all social sciences. Students of comparative public administration faced the question of administrative

development to direct socio-economic change in cross-cultural contexts. Thus, they developed a substantial interest in the ecological and developmental aspects of public administration in a comparative context. The American technical assistance programme and the financing of the studies on development administration by the Ford Foundation proved to be major stimulants for the comparative public administration movement. The movement got its intellectual support from the scholars interested in developing the scientific status of the study of public administration and from those engaged in the comparative politics movement. These scholars have stressed the need to study politico-administrative institutions in their social settings, and the study of development has been of a common concern to the students of comparative politics and of comparative public administration.

It is in this environment of policy and intellectual stimulants stressing the efficacy of administrative ecology and development administration that various theoretical approaches to the study of comparative public administration have emerged.

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[16] An academic interest in this context was reflected in several books and articles published during and after World War II. See, for example, A.C. Davidson, "Some Problems of Military Government," _American Political Science Review_, XXXVIII (1944), 460-74; Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Science in the United States in Wartime," _American Political Science Review_, XLI (1947), 978-89.

[17] For example, in 1956, the International Cooperation Administration was sponsoring the work of about 250 public administration specialists in more than 40 countries and seeking an additional 140 to fill existing vacancies. _T.C.A. Newsletter_, International Cooperation Administration, Washington, D.C., No. 8 (January 1956), 1-2 (mimeo), cited in William J. Siffin, "Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration," in Siffin (ed.), _Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration_ (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), pp. 1-2.

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[19] The gist of the Human Relations research is found in F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939).

[20] See, Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938).

[21] See particularly, Simon, *Administrative Behavior*.

[22] Simon, "Administrative Behavior," *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* I, 74.

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[30] Alfred Diamant, "The Relevance of Comparative Politics to the Study of Comparative Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, V (1960), 87.

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Lepawski, University of Alabama; Roscoe Martin, Syracuse University; Arnold Miles, U.S. Bureau of Budget; Robert Presthus, Michigan State College; F.W. Riggs, Public Administration Clearing House; Prof. Herman M. Somers, Haverford College.

[32] Committee on Public Administration, Sub-Committee on Comparative Public Administration, *Final Report* (September, 1953) (mimeo). The Sayre-Kaufman research design was issued later by the CAG. See, *The Sayre-Kaufman Outline: A Research Design for a Pilot Study in Comparative Administration*, CAG Occasional Papers, January, 1966.

[33] "Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regimes," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers of Development Administration*, p. 536.

[34] The volumes published under the CAG's auspices until the end of 1970 were:

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Bertram M. Gross (ed.), *Action Under Planning: The Guidance of Economic Development* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967);

Robert T. Daland (ed.), *Comparative Urban Research; The Administration and Politics of Cities* (Beverly Hills, California: SAGE Publications, 1969);

Ralph Braibanti & Associates (eds.), *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969);

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As of the end of 1971, the following volumes were yet to be published in the Duke University—CAG series:

James Heaphey (ed.), *Spatial Dimensions of Development Administration;*

Martin Landau (ed.), *Organization Theory and Comparative Analysis;*

. Fred W. Riggs (ed.), *Comparative Bureaucracies: A Historical Perspective;* ·
Clarence Thurber (ed.), *Development Administration in Latin America;*
Edwin Bock & Brian Chapman (eds.), *Comparative European Bureaucratic Development.*

[35] Lynton Caldwell, "Conjectures on Comparative Public Administration," in Roscoe Martin (ed.), *Public Administration and Democracy: Essays in Honour of Paul H. Appelby* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), p. 230.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

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[38] Keith M. Henderson (ed.), *Comparative Public Administration: Theory and Relevance* (New York: Graduate School of Public Administration, New York University, 1967), p. 70.

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Conceptual Approaches

A N O V E R V I E W of major conceptual approaches in the field of comparative public administration is the focus of this chapter. The essential elements of the approaches or foci are discussed in the overall context of the theory-building enterprise in comparative administrative analysis.

The natural sciences have contributed significantly to the development of the modern social sciences. Probably their greatest influence can be seen in the commitment of the social sciences to "scientific methods," and their trust that such methods will result eventually in a science (or sciences) of human behaviour. For example, the following statement by James Thompson, et al., may be noted: "We firmly believe that there is in the making a rigorous science of administration, which can account for events in particular times and places and for the ethical and normative content of these events without itself incorporating the particular conditions and values of these events."[1] Likewise, Amitai Etzioni has opined that eventually the comparative study of organization will establish the truly universal propositions of organization theory.[2]

Nevertheless, one might ask whether it is "scientific" indeed to express such certainty as to what these scientific efforts will lead to. In fact, it is difficult to be sure as to what the most appropriate scientific efforts should be in order to achieve the professed goal of a science of administration. It is one thing to have a hope for the achievement of such a goal, and to claim that its achievement is imminent or even possible is another.

With this background, the theoretical assumptions of the study of comparative public administration can be noted. Robert Jackson has outlined four such assumptions:

1. A science of public administration, if not fully achievable, is at least worthy of seeking. Obviously, not all the scholars share this view. However, there seems to be a broad agreement

on the proposition that there are patterns of administrative behaviour which are susceptible to rigorous systematic analysis and thus capable of being drawn together into a body of theory.

2. The scientific study of public administration requires exploration of administrative patterns in the cross-cultural and cross-national contexts.

3. The empirical findings resulting from such cross-cultural studies should be subjected to rigorous systematic comparative analysis.

4. Such a comparative analysis will, hopefully, lead to the derivation of hypotheses about administrative patterns on various levels of generality, having different degrees of applicability and universality. Such propositions could then be integrated into a general theory of public administration.[3]

Whether a "general theory" of public administration will actually emerge cannot be predicted. Thus it is difficult to answer confidently Robert Dahl's question, ". . . Can there be a 'science of public administration' in the sense of a body of generalized principles independent of their peculiar national setting?"[4] There does seem to be, on the other hand, a broad consensus on the goal of comparative public administration. The Comparative Administration Group, in its draft statement on basic research and training the field, defined comparative public administration as "the theory of public administration as applied to diverse cultures and national settings and the body of factual data, by which it can be expanded and tested."[5] The emphasis of the CAG, in its actual working, has been on the first part, rather than the second, of this statement. This has been primarily because of the need to generate substantial numbers of hypotheses before large-scale empirical research could be begun. The factors of time and resources involved in such research have also deterred the process of hypothesis-testing in cross-cultural settings.

The theoretical thrust of the comparative public administration movement is evident in what Fred Riggs has observed as the desirable character of "truly" comparative studies. Riggs has stated that the term "comparative" should be restricted, strictly speaking, to empirical, nomothetic, and ecological studies. By "nomothetic," Riggs meant, "any approach primarily concerned

with the formulation of laws and general propositions."[6] More specifically, through its empirical, nomothetic, and ecological orientation, comparative public administration is considered to have the following purposes:

1. To learn the distinctive features of a particular system or cluster of systems;

2. To explain the factors responsible for cross-national and cross-cultural differences in bureaucratic behaviour;

3. To examine the causes for the success or failures of particular administrative features in particular ecological settings; and,

4. To understand strategies of administrative reform. These purposes have a combination of empirical and normative concerns, which are reflected in the literature of comparative public administrative analysis.

The Pre-Paradigmatic State of Comparative Public Administration

A decade and a half ago William Siffin described comparative public administration as a field abounding in confusion and novelty.[7] The diversity in the literature in comparative public administration could be characteristic of what Thomas Kuhn has called a "pre-paradigmatic stage"[8] in the evolution of a scientific field. Martin Landau, following Kuhn, has observed that the study of formal organizations, as in the case of other "normal sciences," passes through various stages before arriving at that condition which is accepted on a more or less continuing basis as a coherent discipline, by a community of scholars. Before the paradigmatic stage is reached, there exist a number of competing views, languages, and logics, and at this point a common research tradition and consensus regarding a common field of inquiry is lacking. The competing schools of thought question each other, adventurism is rampant, and commonly accepted standards of control do not exist. This state of diversity can also exist as a temporary condition which follows upon the rejection of a common paradigm.[9] Landau's comments on the study of formal organizations apply equally well to the study of comparative public administration. However, a basic question

remains: Is the structure of scientific revolution identical in the natural and the social sciences? Or, should we, in fact, hope for a common paradigm in a social science, such as comparative public administration?

Glenn Paige has warned against equating the natural and social sciences. He has argued that what is "normal" for the natural sciences may be abnormal for the social sciences.[10] In other words, a proliferation of concepts, operations, methods of observation and measurement, assumptions, and explanations might be only natural for the behavioural and social sciences, while for social scientists to agree on a single paradigm, even within a speciality, may be abnormal. A related question may as well be asked: Is it really desirable to have a common paradigm in special areas of the behavioural and social sciences? The answer could lie in Paige's comment that "whereas temporary paradigmatic diversity may be a necessary prelude to sustained natural scientific development, some degree of paradigmatic diversity may be desirable for objective (or inter-subjective) advancement in social science".[11]

The argument does not preclude the predominance of a single paradigm in the future. The only point which needs to be stressed is that a premature expectation of a stage when one single paradigm will be predominant should be avoided. For the present, the scientific study of comparative public administration offers a fertile ground for "poly-paradigmatic" progress. Efforts should be directed to develop a systemic coherence among various "paradigms" which exist or are in the making.

Models in the Study of Comparative Public Administration

The language of social science research is still not clear concerning the usage (and abuse) of its organizing concepts such as model, schemata, schema, map, paradigm, framework, and theory.

Abraham Kaplan has observed that, broadly speaking, "any system A is useful for the understanding of B without regard to any direct or causal connexion between A and B. . . . When one system is model of another, they resemble one another in form

and not in content".[12] This characteristic of "comparability" is evident also in Karl Deutsch's definition that a model is "a structure of symbols and operating rules which is supposed to match a set of relevant points in an existing structure or process".[13] Riggs's viewpoint on models is practically the same.[14] In comparative public administration, the term "model" is used in a "loose" sense. It is generally considered, as viewed by Dwight Waldo, to mean "simply the conscious attempt to develop and define concepts, or clusters of related concepts, useful in classifying data, describing reality and (or) hypothesizing about it".[15]

Sometimes the terms "model" and "theory" are used interchangeably, although some attempts are made to distinguish between the two. Generally speaking, "theory" is a more sophisticated tool than a 'model'. Riggs's distinction between the two is expressed in the following statement: ". . . . Propositions are used to build a "model" which can be evaluated both in terms of its internal logical consistency and its utility for purposes of analysis, but not its truth or falsity. In contrast, a 'theory' is composed of hypotheses, and purports to explain relationships which obtain in the real world. Although we may expect elements of a theory to be logically consistent with each other, the chief test of a theory is its truth or falsity as demonstrated by empirical data".[16] Had Riggs strictly followed his own criteria, his *Administration in Developing Countries* should have been subtitled "A Model of Prismatic Society" and not *The Theory of Prismatic Society*" as it is.[17] Interestingly, however, Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, Waldo, and Nimrod Raphaeli[18] also have used "model" and "theory" interchangeably in practice. Throught the present study, no distinctions are made between these terms.

Models in the social sciences are designed to aid the understanding of human behaviour. They help the process of discovering which questions an empirical inquiry should ask; they aid the researcher in collecting and ordering data and in postulating relationships among variables; they serve a pedagogical purpose by conceptualizing a set of complex interrelationships among the variables under study, and they have indirect, if not direct, policy implications.

Riggs, along with several other scholars, has observed that such models are crucial for the understanding of social reality,

arguing that with each advance in social sciences, more realistic models replace the less realistic ones. He has distinguished between an inductive model or "image" and a deductive model or "ideal" type. Inductive models "tend essentially to be built by impressionistically associating a set of variables derived from experience, by inductive reasoning, however incongruous some elements in the picture may be." On the other hand, in deductive models, "all variables are shown to be logically related to each other, regardless of how far the result may appear to depart from the observed situation".[19] Deductive models do not purport to represent reality. In actual practice, however, there are no purely inductive or purely deductive models; a combination of the features of both types exists in social science models, with an emphasis on one type or the other.

The above discussion would help in a better understanding of the essential features of some specific models in comparative public administration. However, these models should be viewed in the overall context of the state of the literature in comparative public administration to which the present analysis now turns.

The Multi-Perspective Character of Comparative Public Administration

Riggs, in one of his most cited articles, observed that three "trends" could be discerned in the comparative study of public administration. These trends are:

1. From normative to empirical orientation,
2. From "ideographic" to "nomothetic" orientation, and
3. From non-ecological to ecological orientation.[20]

While the terminology of the first and third trends is commonly known, the terms "ideographic" and "nomothetic" are peculiarly Riggsian. "Ideographic" approaches concentrate on the "unique case—the historical episode or 'case study,' the single agency or country, the biography or the 'culture area'." On the other hand, the "nomothetic" approach seeks "generalizations, 'laws,' hypotheses that assert regularities of behavior, correlation with variables".[21] These two concerns are polar types, thus most of the literature in comparative public administration falls between the extremes.

Riggs's categories should not be seen as dichotomous, but only as representing different degrees of emphasis on some elements in various comparative administrative studies. Recent literature on comparative public administration, particularly that sponsored by the CAG, reflects a growing interest in empirical, nomothetic, and ecological approaches. Yet there are found mixes of various characteristics in particular studies, as for example, the literature on development administration represents a synthesis of the normative and the empirical orientations.

Besides Riggs's analysis of trends, other attempts have also been made to classify studies in comparative public administration. In this regard, the classifications suggested by Ferrel Heady and by Keith Henderson may be noted. Heady has distinguished among four important foci of research in comparative public administration. These foci are: (1) modified traditional; (2) development oriented; (3) general system model building; and (4) middle-range theory formulation.[22] Writings in the modified traditional approach show continuity with the earlier literature of somewhat parochial character. It includes basically descriptive comparison of administration in Western countries with particular reference to the administrative organizations and civil service systems. The development orientation is concerned essentially with the problems of public administration in the context of rapid socio-economic and political change. Its emphasis is on the capabilities of administrative systems to direct socio-economic change in a society. The general system model building is concerned with the study of administrative systems in the overall contexts of their social environment. Thus its focus is generally on the whole society. However, the middle-range theory[23] is more specific in its subject of focus, and it concentrates on certain particular components or characteristics of an administrative system.

On the other hand, the classification made by Henderson has divided conceptual approaches in comparative public administration on a threefold basis:

1. The bureaucratic system approach;
2. The input-output system approach; and
3. The component approach.[24]

The bureaucratic system approach is considered to be a middle-range conceptual construct, and thus is almost parallel

to Heady's category of "middle-range theory formulation". Likewise, the input-output approach is based on general systems framework and is parallel to Heady's category of "general systems model building". In the component approach—a residual category—Henderson has included all types of partial approaches dealing with administrative procedures, with control and responsibility and with informal behaviour of administrators. He has not created a separate category for development administration, nor has he classified any studies on the basis of modified traditional character.

The categories of Heady and Henderson are quite broad and overlapping. The focus of development administration can be found in systems models,[25] as also in bureaucratic models.[26] Even the partial or "component" approaches may have a developmental focus.[27] In addition, some studies on bureaucracy adopt a systems framework[23] and broaden their scope to include the whole administrative system. Nevertheless, this is not to deny the utility of the classifications made by Heady and Henderson. In fact, what they appear to emphasize are the most important foci in the field, and in this respect they provide guidance in organizing the literature in the vast field of comparative public administration.

The present study will concentrate upon three of these foci: the bureaucratic approach, the general system approach (as used by Riggs), and the development administration approach. These three foci seem to represent the dominant emphases of the comparative public administration movement in the United States, which, in turn, is of central importance in this study. An extensive analysis of these dominant foci will be undertaken in later chapters. First, a brief presentation of their essential features and those of some other approaches in comparative administrative analysis will be made.

The Bureaucratic System Approach

Max Weber's "ideal type" construct of bureaucracy, depicting the structure of an administrative staff in a "legal-rational" authority system, has been the single most dominant conceptual framework in the study of comparative administration. Weber's

model focuses on the structural characteristics of bureaucracy, such as hierarchy, specialization, rationalized job structure, and the selection of personnel on the basis of merit.[29] Weber's analysis of bureaucracy includes a discussion of the interaction between the bureaucrats and members of other sub-systems of the political system.[30] It also contains reference to the relationships between the economic and the socio-cultural systems and the administrative sub-system.

The Weberian model has been criticized for ignoring the informal, irrational, affective, and dysfunctional aspects of the bureaucratic behaviour. By underemphasizing such variables of the bureaucratic systems, it is claimed, the model becomes less systemic in structure. Further, it is argued that the model applies more to the Western type "legal-rational" public bureaucracies and less to the administrative systems working in the traditional and prismatic environments. It seems to be most efficient in the analysis of uniform events and "settled" bureaucracies and less useful for studying bureaucracies in a changing social order. These and other criticisms will be analysed later in the context of the ecology of the Weberian model.

Although the term "bureaucracy" is no longer restricted to refer to the administrative staff in a "legal-rational" authority system and, instead, is used for almost all types of administrative systems in cross-cultural contexts, the Weberian construct has served a great heuristic purpose in furthering research in the field of comparative public administration. Among scholars who have contributed to the studies of comparative bureaucratic systems are Morroe Berger, Alfred Diamant, Ferrel Heady, Robert Presthus, and Michael Crozier. The emphasis in most of the writings on comparative bureaucracy appears to be on the interaction between the administrative sub-system and the political system in which it (administrative sub-system) exists, although some attention has been given to other dimensions of administrative ecology.

During the present nascent stage of the comparative public administration movement, the study of internal organizational patterns within the bureaucratic systems has not received as much attention as the external environment of bureaucracies. Any ecological approach would be incomplete without an extensive

discussion of the internal organizational patterns which affect the capacity of an administrative system to survive and to direct socio-economic change. Although such studies can be put on the agenda for future research, there is a pressing need to assess the comparative studies of organizational behaviour developing in the disciplines of sociology, social psychology, and business administration. The comparative public administration movement and the comparative organization movement have several common concerns. Both appear to believe that the road to scientific theories is via the route to comparison; they share models and concepts, including general systems, communication, and the Weberian bureaucratic ideal type; and the aim of their "theorizers" is much the same: "descriptive and predictive theory of the greatest validity and comprehensiveness about co-operative human endeavour".[31]

An important concept which is highly developed in comparative organizational analysis, and also in contemporary American public administration, is that of "decision-making". However, this concept has yet to be explored extensively in comparative public administrative analysis.

Decision-making and the Study of Comparative Public Administration

In public administrative studies, several scholars, including Herbert Simon, James March, William Gore, and Charles Lindblom, have been interested in decisional analysis. The decision-making studies by these scholars have focused on the intra-system behaviour of administrative organizations. However, in the comparative study of public administration, the only noticeable effort in this area seems to be that of Martin Landau.[32]

Landau has observed that in developing societies, planning, programming, and other facets of decision-making should be given considerable attention. Closer scrutiny of available alternatives and continual observation of consequences is an important necessity, especially when there is scarcity of time and resources. "Muddling through" should not be the prime philosophy of decision-making in developing countries, though it cannot be avoided totally. Landau has stressed the need to enhance the decision-making capacities of the administrative systems of developing nations.

It may be recalled that Herbert Simon's analytical distinction between "fact" and "value" premises was rejected by most scholars in public administration. Since all decisions have both of these premises, and it is difficult to define "facts" when probably all decisions have a normative *origin* in public administrative agencies, Simon's suggestion was not well received. Landau, however, has picked up the lost thread and used Simon's "fact" and "value" premises as ideal types. Using the social-anthropological concepts of "folk" and "urban" societies,[22] Landau has asserted that at the folk end, decisions are virtually value judgments and at the urban end, the most authoritative decision is a technical judgment.[24] Regarding folk societies, Landau has observed that "we have here a system in which 'facts' tend toward zero and decisions are essentially a matter of values".[25] Since the concepts of "folk" and "urban" societies are ideal-types, Landau has recognized that no real society would probably meet the qualifications of folk societies, though some primitive societies could be plotted very close to the polar point. In an urban society, Landau has suggested programmed decision-making as the optimal mode attainable only in limited institutional behaviour; yet it serves as the ideal form of problem-solving. In his analysis, Landau has implied that in the ongoing process of development, it is essential that decisions should be increasingly based on "technical" or "fact" premises.[26]

Although Landau deserves credit for making a beginning in the area of decisional studies in comparative public administration, it is difficult to see these ideas of his survive the growing influences of a phenomenological approach in public administration, where a "fact" is viewed as a perception and not an objective "reality." Phenomenology makes "values" determine "facts". Hence the folk society may rely on "facts" as they know them, just as fully as the urban society. There may be a need to go beyond the fact-value dichotomy. In any case, there is the need to expand greatly rigorous analyses of decision-making in comparative public administration. Such analysis will aid in looking at the interaction between the external and the internal environments of public organizations, and provide hypotheses on how the nature of decision-making affects, and is affected by, socio-economic and political change taking place in the environment in which

decisions are made and implemented. In other words, decision-making studies can strengthen the ecological and developmental perspectives in comparative public administrative analysis.

An emphasis on the interaction between the internal and the external environments of public organizations, however, appears to have been the dominant concern of general systems theorists.

The General Systems Approach

According to Talcott Parsons, "'System' is the concept that refers both to a complex of interdependencies between parts, components, and processes, that involves discernible regularities of relationship, and to a similar type of interdependency between such a complex and its surrounding environment."[37] Thus the concept of system involves the study of (1) the parts of a system. (2) interactions among such parts, and (3) interactions between the system and its environment. Further, it may be seen that a system evolves in the context of a larger system and, in addition, has its own set of sub-systems. Each system or sub-system is made distinct from its environment by a theoretically defined boundary. The study of system-environment interaction postulates the analytical concepts such as "inputs", which enter from the environment into the system, "throughputs" which "process" the inputs within the system, and "outputs" which go out from the system into the environment. The input-throughput—output process may be complemented by a continuous "feed-back" mechanism operating between the environment and the system. The dynamics of system-functioning are characterized by a sort of "balance" within the system, and between the system and the environment.

In 1957, Riggs—the foremost system theorist in comparative public administration—influenced by Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, F.X. Sutton, and others, introduced an important theoretical construct in comparative public administration in the form of "agraria-transitia-industria" typology.[38] "Agraria" represented a pure traditional society; "industria" represented a pure modern industrial society, and "transitia" symbolized a transitional society moving from the stage of agraria to that of industria. The agraria-industria typology was intended to provide a

"universal framework" for studying the critical range of administrative variables within the whole context of the socio-cultural, economic, and political environment. These ideal-type models postulated an input-conversion-output scheme. Yet the models had only gross categories, thus making it difficult to notice smaller distinctions. Furthermore, the typology was criticized for implicitly assuming a unidirectional movement from the agraria to the industria.

Later, Riggs came out with his well-known model of "prismatic society".[39] This model, based on the structural-functional approach, studies societies on the basis of the differentiation in social structures. The three "ideal typical" categories of "fused", "prismatic", and "diffracted" societies are constructed on the basis of the extent to which roles in various organizations are exclusive or overlapped. The "fused" society has almost no specialization of roles, while the diffracted society is at a high level of structural differentiation. The prismatic society forms the intermediate category. In a prismatic society, a high degree of "formalism"—discrepancy between norms and realities—, "overlapping", and "heterogeneity" exists.[40] Riggs has therefore argued that in a prismatic environment, institutional or formal structural analysis is likely to produce disappointing outcome, since what might normally be expected to result from a particular administrative system or organizational pattern fails to appear because of a big gap between the formally prescribed norms and the effectively practiced action.

Riggs's models are ecologically oriented,[41] i.e., his theoretical constructs are accurately understood as abstract description and analysis of the interactional patterns between public administrative systems and the social environment in which they operate. This approach emphasizes an open system perspective which has been of increasing influence elsewhere in social sciences. However, Riggs's systems models lack the dynamic qualities developed in many open systems models, for he has not analysed in his models the process of diffraction from a developmental perspective.

Another scholar employing system concept in comparative public administration is John T. Dorsey Jr., whose "information energy" model is based on a synthesis of concepts of general system theory, of communication and cybernetics, and of energy

and energy conversion.[12] Dorsey's model conceptualizes individuals, groups, organizations, and societies as complex information energy converters. A system converts inputs, such as demands and intelligence, through various conversion processes of screening, selecting, and channelling into outputs. Generally, high levels of information input, storage, and processing permit high energy output. An administrative system produces outputs in various forms, e.g., regulation of services for other sub-systems and systems forming part of its environment.

Dorsey has presented certain general hypotheses which help explain the administrative problems in "developing" countries in terms of the non-availability of surplus information and energy. His basic hypothesis is that a society's degree of development may be measured in terms of the size of information and energy surplus. Developing nations' administrative systems usually have scarcity of information input and storage and processes of energy. This results in relatively fewer outputs. This, in turn, results in an ineffective administrative process, ritualistic procedures, conservatism, and a lack of rationality.

Dorsey has stressed that research in comparative public administration should focus, if possible, on all of the input, conversion, and output aspects of the administrative system, though, he has added, in particular cases of study, much would depend on the needs and orientation of a scholar. Since Dorsey's approach views administrative systems in the context of their environment, it is essentially ecological. Moreover, as noted above, it has certain elements of a developmental perspective. However, it is probably because of the model's complex variables and the operational problems associated with them that other scholars have not used this approach in their analyses.

The Concept of Development Administration

A set of conceptualizations paralleling the system approach have concerned "development administration". As noted already, the surge of interest in "developing" nations has been the primary stimulant in this respect. Yet the concept of development administration is not inherently confined to the analysis of the administrative problems of "developing" countries. Since

all the countries of the world face the challenge of social change, "development" has universal implications and relevance.

Development administration is related to goal and action-oriented administrative systems. Since most of the definitions of the term "administration" *per se* include the aspect of goal-attainment,[43] the prefix of "development" might at first seem to be redundant. Nevertheless, the term refers to a particular focus on certain key aspects of socio-administrative change. According to Edward Weidner, its foremost proponent, the concept of development administration "refers to the process of guiding an organization toward the achievement of progressive political, economic, and social objectives that are authoritatively determined in one manner or another".[44] Weidner has urged a separate focus on development administration with the end-objective being "to relate different administrative roles, practices, organizational arrangements and procedures to the maximizing of development objectives. . . . In research terms the ultimate dependent variable would be the development goals themselves".[45]

The concept of development administration has two important dimensions. First, it is concerned with the processes through which a public administrative system directs socio-economic and political change in the society, and, second, it studies the dynamics of change within the administrative system, i.e., the way it enhances its capabilities to withstand change coming from the environment, and to direct desired change. The first phase refers to the "administration of development", while the second is related to the process of "administrative development". Both these aspects of development administration will be discussed extensively later.

Since the concept of development administration is primarily concerned with socio-administrative change stressing the inter-actions between an administrative system and its environment, it is fundamentally ecological in perspective. But in treating administrative system as an independent variable and development goals as dependent variables, the reciprocal elements of an ecological approach may be neglected in research. In general, there is the need to move away from less-ecological toward more-ecological studies in development administration. This point will be expanded later.

Conclusion

The three major conceptual approaches in comparative public administration—the bureaucratic system, the general system, and development administration—should be viewed as mutually interdependent and not as discretely categorized orientations.

The bureaucratic approach is increasingly being used to study the developmental role of bureaucracies in cross-cultural settings. Such use of the approach also stimulates the ecological perspective in the comparative study of bureaucracies. It has been noted in the preceding analysis that there is a need to strengthen the ecological perspective by focusing upon internal organizational—and particularly the decisional—behaviour of bureaucracies in relation to their social environment. Such perspective will also aid greater understanding of the process of administrative development which is intimately related to the capacity of an administrative system to make effective decisions.

The general systems approach in comparative public administration primarily focuses upon the functioning of administrative systems in their social environmental contexts. In this approach, researchers may choose to make the study of bureaucracies central. In Riggs's models, however, more extensive-analysis is made of the structure of the social environment of administrative systems than of the administrative systems themselves. Such an imbalance needs correction. Moreover, Riggs has precluded an analysis of the development process in his fused-prismatic-diffracted typology, although he has written extensively on the theme of development administration elsewhere.

It has been noted also in the preceding discussion that the study of development administration focuses on the dynamic interactions between an administrative system and its social environment. Such an interactional orientation makes the concept of development administration essentially ecological in character, although the degree of this emphasis varies from writer to writer.

The next four chapters will explore these approaches more fully, including: the bureaucratic system approach, the general system approach of Riggs stressing administrative ecology, and the development administration approach, emphasizing directed social change.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 *Comparative Studies in Administration* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), p. 4.

2 *A Comparative Analysis of Comparative Organizations: On Power, Involvement and Their Correlates* (New York: Free Press, 1971) subscribes to this thesis.

3 Robert H. Jackson, "An Analysis of the Comparative Administration Movement," *Canadian Public Administration*, IX (1966), pp. 114-15.

4 Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems", *Public Administration Review*, VII (1947), p. 8.

5 Quoted in Ferrel Heady, "Comparative Public Administration: Concerns and Priorities," in Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962), p. 4.

6 Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), hereafter cited as *Administration*, p. 403. Dr. Roman Schnur has stated that ultimately the goal of comparison is building a comprehensive theory, and this goal is recognized in American studies in comparative public administration; cited in Ferrel Heady, "Comparative Public Administration," p. 12.

7 "Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration," in Siffin (ed.) *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1957), p. 17.

8 See, Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), Chap. II.

9 Martin Landau, "Sociology and the Study of Formal Organization," in Dwight Waldo and Landau (eds.), *The Study of Organizational Behaviour: Status, Problems and Trends* (Washington, D.C., Comparative Administration Group, American Society of Public Administration, 1966), pp. 37-50.

10 Glenn Paige, "Comments on 'Sociology and the Study of Formal Organization'," in *Ibid.*, p. 54.

11 *Ibid.*

[12] Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 263.

[13] Karl Deutsch, "On Communication Models in the Social Sciences," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVI (1952), p. 357.

[14] A model, according to Riggs, is "any structure of symbols and operating rules which we think has a counterpart in the real world." *Administration*, p. 5.

[15] Dwight Waldo, "Comparative Public Administration: Prologue, Performance, and Problems," in Preston P. Le Breton (ed.), *Comparative Administrative Theory* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), p. 114.

[16] *Administration*, pp. 106-07.

[17] This interesting observation has been made by Robert Jackson in "Analysis of Comparative Administration Movement," p. 117.

[18] Herbert A. Simon and Allen Newell, "Models: Their Uses and Limitations," in Leonard D. White (ed.), *The State of Social Sciences* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956), p. 66; Waldo has used "model," "schema," and "theory" interchangeably—all in the sense of a conceptual framework to organize and manipulate data. See, e.g., his "Comparative Public Administration," 126 n.; Nimrod Raphaeli, "Comparative Public Administration: An Overview," in Raphaeli (ed.), *Readings in Comparative Public Administration* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1967), p. 4.

[19] "Models in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," in Riggs and Edward W. Weidner, *Models and Priorities in the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Chicago: Comparative Administration Group, American Society for Public Administration, 1963), p. 16.

[20] "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration, *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, XXVIII (1962), pp. 9-15.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[22] *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 9-13.

[23] "Middle-range theory attempts to explain a restricted set of relationships, as opposed to theory . . . which attempts to comprehend and to explain an entire social system." Robert Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," *Public Administration Review*, XIX (1959), p. 26.

24 *Emerging Synthesis in American Public Administration* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), pp. 52-8.

25 For example, Samuel Katz, "Exploring a Systems Approach to Development Administration," in Fred W. Riggs (ed.), *The Frontiers of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 109-38.

26 See, for example, several articles in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

27 For example, Frank P. Sherwood, "The Problem of Public Enterprise," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers of Development Administration*, pp. 348-72.

28 For example, Michael Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964).

29 For an analysis of the structural characteristics of bureaucracy in the Weberian ideal-type, see, Chapter III.

30 On this aspect of bureaucratic analysis, see Chapter IV.

31 Dwight Waldo, "Foreword" in Heady and Stokes, *Papers*, p. vi.

32 "Decision Theory and Comparative Public Administration," *Comparative Political Studies* I (1968), pp. 175-95; "Development Administration and Decision Theory," in Edward Weidner (ed.), *Development Administration in Asia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 73-103.

33 Landau has used these concepts as outlined in the following sources: Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," *American Journal of Sociology* LII (1947), pp. 293-308; Horace Miner, "The Folk Urban Continuum," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (eds.), *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955).

34 "Development Administration and Decision Theory," pp. 96-102.   35 *Ibid.*, p. 99.

36 Landau has observed that the requirement for development is a change in the epistemological basis of "cognitive maps" —i.e., the construction of "cultural modes" which permit empirical variables to play a major role in the trusted procedures of decision-making, for development itself, in the modernizing context, is the process of legitimating technical decisions. Until this occurs in some impressive measures,

there can be no administration as we understand it and no concept of administration as an independent variable. *Ibid.*

[37] "Systems Analysis: Social Systems," *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, XV, p. 458.

[38] "Agraria and Industria: Toward a Typology of Comparative Public Administration," in William J. Siffin (ed.), *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*, pp. 23-116.

[39] For an introduction to the "sala" model, see, Riggs, "The 'Sala' Model: An Ecological Approach to the Study of Comparative Public Administration," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, VI (1962), pp. 3-16; also, Riggs, *Administration*, pp. 3-49.

[40] For an analysis of these features, see, *Ibid.*

[41] On the concept of administrative ecology, see among others, Riggs, *The Ecology of Public Administration* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House; 1961).

[42] John T. Dorsey, Jr., "An Information-Energy Model," in Heady and Stokes (ed.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*, pp. 37-57.

[43] Note, for example: Administration is "determined action taken in *pursuit of a conscious purpose*," Fritz Morstein Marx (ed.), *Elements of Public Administration* (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 4. Emphasis added.

[44] "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research," in Heady and Stokes, *Papers*, p. 98.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 107.

The Bureaucratic System Approach:
Its Salient Characteristics

I N T H I S chapter, the bureaucratic approach will be analysed in regard to its early development by Max Weber and to later modifications added primarily by American scholars.

The justification for taking Weber's bureaucratic model as the point of departure for the present analysis seems obvious. Weber (1860-1920), the well-known German sociologist, is considered to be "the foremost mentor" for the study of comparative public administration in the United States.[1] Roman Schnur has observed that the emergence of an emphasis on comparative public administration in America can be attributed to three factors. They are:

1. the influence of German immigration since about 1933;
2. the translation of the writings of Max Weber; and
3. final entrance of the USA into world politics after 1945.[2]

In the first chapter, an indirect reference was made to the third point contained in Schnur's analysis. For the present purpose, however, the first two points—which are interrelated—appear to be quite significant. As is well known, German sociologists, such as Hans Gerth and Reinhard Bendix, have made notable contributions to the study of comparative bureaucracies. Primarily, such sociologists have been influenced by the writings of Max Weber, to which they were introduced in Germany some time during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Beyond this, however, Weber's impact on the comparative study of administrative systems has been considered so substantial that Nimrod Raphaeli, a leading synthesizer in the area of comparative public administration, has observed that Weber's "ideal" model of bureaucracy has been the single most influential item in the literature of public administration and subsequently of comparative public administration.[3]

The conceptual framework of bureaucracy propounded by Weber should be studied in the light of his methodology of constructing "ideal-type" models which he consistently used, and in relation to his typology of authority systems.[4] Sociological studies are full of debate on Weber's methodology of constructing "ideal-types" and its application to authority patterns. Thus it is necessary to examine first how Weber conceived his methodology of "ideal-type" construction.

The Nature of Ideal-Type Constructs

Weber defined ideal-type constructs as follows: "This [ideal-typical] conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system. Substantially, this construct in itself is like a *utopia* which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality. . . . An ideal type is formed by one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a *utopia*. Historical research faces the task of determining, in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality".[5] This relatively long citation indicates that Weber seemed to be clear in his mind that the ideal-type does not represent "reality" *per se*, but is only an abstraction weaving an exaggeration of certain elements of reality into a logically precise conception.[6] He felt that the first task in the study of society and culture should be to clarify the elements united in a particular structure and to integrate them in an ideal-type, which in turn would serve a heuristic purpose of furthering social analysis.[7]

Weber's methodology of constructing ideal-types is closely connected with the comparative analysis of social phenomena. Such constructs imply that two constellations are comparable in regard to some common features. Statements about the common features would, in turn, imply and necessitate the use of general

concepts. Weber also recognized that to understand the causal elements of the lawful regularities in the social order, the examination of comparable conditions is essential. This led him to the study of historical cases. Such cases became "crucial instances" and thus controlled the level of abstraction that he used in explaining any particular problem. The real historical experience would usually fall in between the extremes of his types; hence Weber approximated the complexity of specific historical situations by bringing various ideal-type concepts to bear upon the specific case under his focus.[8] Thus, ideal-types helped Weber in constructing "ideographic" as well as "nomothetic" analyses. With the help of a battery of such constructs (on capitalism, religion, authority, etc.), he was able to discuss particular historical cases, while in his comparative studies he illustrated his analysis with rich insights from historical cases. At the world historical level, through this method, he was able to make useful major distinctions, such as between patrimonialism and feudalism, between occidental and oriental cities, and other similar dichotomies.

Sociological and administrative literature of the past two decades or so is full of critical appreciation of this methodology of the ideal-type. It is not necessary to investigate broadly the criticisms usually levelled against such constructs; yet an example will be useful. Notably one major criticism has concerned the lack of empirical base for ideal-type constructs. For instance, Carl Friedrich has observed: " . . . Weber . . . sets forth his ideal-types as mental constructs which are neither derived by a process of deductive ratiocination from higher concepts, nor built up from empirical data by relevant inference, nor demonstrably developed as working hypotheses from such data."[9] Obviously, Friedrich, in this statement, has called for clearly inductive or deductive analysis while Weber, on the other hand, took a particular kind of middle-range approach which is neither, but includes elements of both. However, there seems to be little or no disagreement among social scientists that the methodological peculiarity of ideal-types does not reduce the immense heuristic value of such constructs. As Abraham Kaplan has observed, "An ideal-type does not function as an observational term or even an indirect observable; the fact, therefore,

that there is nothing in the world corresponding to it does not rob such a concept of scientific usefulness."[10]

The foregoing brief introduction to ·Weber's methodology will, hopefully, aid a better understanding of his typology of authority systems, which is an important part of his constellation of ideal-types and central to the· understanding of his approach to bureaucracy.

Types of Authority Systems

Weber defined power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance."[11] "Imperative control," or authority, on the other hand, "is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons."[12] Thus, power is the more inclusive term, and extends to all combinations of circumstances in which a person might impose his will in a given social situation. On the other hand, exercise of authority would require that a person successfully issue orders to a group of subordinates who respond because of their belief in the legitimacy of the order. Thus the *felt obligation* of the subordinates is central in authority relationship. Where authority has become institutionalized, it is often associated with corporate groups, that is, with groups which use their administrative staff to enforce orders.[13] In fact, the character of a corporate group is held to be determined, to a great degree, by the way in which the authority is legitimized. On the other hand, the relationship between a staff and its corporate superiors might be based on custom, on affectuality, on purely material interest, or on ideal motives. Thus authoritative relationships would combine with those based on other motives as well. In actual superior-subordinate relationships, a combination of all the four bases would prevail. However, Weber argued that a secure foundation of authority would be required for the emergence of a very stable order of relationships.

Weber classified authority on the basis of its claim to legitimacy, since on this would depend largely the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff suitable to it, and the ways of

exercising authority. His three pure types of legitimate authority are based respectively on his three bases of legitimacy. They are:

"1. Rational grounds—resting on a belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue command [legal authority].

2. Traditional grounds—resting on an established belief in the sanctity of memorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them [traditional authority], or, finally,

3. Charismatic grounds—resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him [charismatic authority]".[14]

In fact, the above authority types do not apply just to the superior-subordinate relations in a corporate organization; they have a wider scope, since they denote the relationship between a supreme ruler (e.g., a prophet, a king, or a parliamentary leadership), an administrative body (e.g., disciples, royal servants, or officials), and the masses of the ruled (e.g., followers, subjects, or citizens). The features of traditional, charismatic, and legal-national authority are discussed in detail in the literature. For purposes of the present analysis, however, only an overview of these features is provided.

Traditional Authority

As indicated in Chart I, the traditional authority system claims and accepts legitimacy on the basis of "sanctity" of order. The ruler is obeyed because the traditions demand so. Rules and spheres of competence are not fully defined, and while precedents have an important role in the exercise of authority, the ruler may exercise essentially arbitrary authority in various ill-defined realms of action. The administrative staff in such an authority system is either patrimonial or non-patrimonial. If the former, its members owe traditional loyalty to the supreme head, while, if the latter, they are tied to the chief by purely personal loyalty (of favourites, vassals, etc.), or simply through free contract. Despite the supreme position of the chief, the staff may have large *de facto* powers resulting from the decentralization of administration.

Chart I
Traditional Auhority

Nature of Legitimate Authority	*Nature of Administrative Staff*

Nature of Legitimate Authority

1. Legitimacy claimed and accepted on basis of "sanctity of order".
2. Obedience not to. enacted rules but to persons whose orders legitimized by:
   a. tradition which governs certain areas
   b. chief's free personal decision (prerogative)
3. No rules are enacted; new situations are covered by "precedent," i.e., the wisdom of the promulgator.

Nature of Administrative Staff

1. Staff recruited from 2 sources:
   a. patrimonial—persons tied to chief by traditional loyalties
   b. non-patrimonial—purely personal loyalties (favourites), vassals (relations of fealty), or those who freely contract for such a relationship.
2. Many posts filled on basis of kinship, but slaves can also rise to top posts.
3. Staff develops from corps of non-patrimonial origin, but often these were originally personal followers of chief.
4. Traditional administrative staff lacks:
   a. clearly defined spheres of competence
   b. rational ordering of offices in a hierarchy
   c. regular appointments or promotions
   d. technical training as a regular requirement.
5. Types of staff under traditional authority:
   a. "gerontocracy" or "patriarchalism": there is no personal administrative staff at all
   b. patrimonialism: a personal staff develops which is under the purely personal control of the chief
   c. decentralized patrimonialism: groups or individuals in administrative staff have appropriated certain advantages, offices, etc., and thus limit control, power of chief (leasing, tax farming, sales of offices).

Source: Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Administration* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962), p. 89.[15]

In dealing with the administrative system under traditional authority, Weber developed linkages between the socio-cultural system and the administrative system. He hypothesized that under such a system, personal contacts, loyalties, kinship, and even age determine to a large extent the recruitment and "promotion" of the administrative officials. Such appointments usually preclude considerations of technical qualifications. In suggesting such hypotheses, Weber intended to show the correlation between the socio-cultural and administrative variables rather than claiming a causal relationship between them. It should also be clear that he used such scheme as an ideal-type model and not as a description of any empirical situation. Thus one can find elements of "traditional" administrative system even in the "modern" bureaucracy. Where one analyzes such mixes, Weber's study of the administrative patterns in the traditional authority can serve a heuristic purpose. The study of "tradition," then, is an important aspect of the analysis of cultural systems in general. Further, Weber's hypotheses can aid in the analysis of administrative systems which operate in the setting of "primitive" or tribal societies having a dominant place for tradition in the functioning of the social system. In all of these cases, one is concerned with the manner in which socio-cultural traditions interact with, or rather determine limits for, the political system of which administrative sub-system is a part. This emphasis upon the close interdependence of societal structures suggests Weber's recognition of the need to look at politico-administrative system from an ecological perspective.

Charismatic Authority

In the charismatic authority system, legitimacy is claimed and accepted on the basis of the "charisma" or the superhuman and supernatural qualities of the ruler, and not on any set of legal rational rules or traditions (see Chart II). In Weber's analysis, charisma of the ruler lies in the eyes of the beholder, but includes also an institutionalized aspect.[16] The ideal-type charismatic authority has no separate administrative staff but only a set of disciples attached to a master. The disciples are chosen on the basis of their charismatic qualities. There are no formal proce-

Chart II

Charismatic Authority and Its Routinization

Nature of Legitimate Authority

1. Individual in power considered superhuman and supernatural; he is treated as leader.
2. Those who consider leader's claim valid are followers; they do not elect him but recognize the charisma—this is their duty.
3. Consistent failure of charisma may lead to deposition of leader.
4. To be more than transitory, charisma must be routinized by finding successor:
   a. find person with specific characteristics (Dalai Lama)
   b. oracles, lots, etc.
   c. designation by original charisma holder
   d. designation by charismatically qualified staff
   e. charisma transmitted hereditarily
   f. charisma transmitted by ritual means (laying on of hands)
5. Most powerful motive for routinization is search for security, (authority, social prestige, economic security).
6. Authority structure of routinized charisma is affected by manner in which administrative staff secures economic position: special case—"feudalism".
7. Charisma can also be routinized in anti-authoritarian direction:
   a. use of plebiscite to legitimize leadership is most important way for democracy to be combined with leadership
   b. it is a form of charismatic authority in which authoritarian elements are concealed by plebiscite
   c. anti-authoritarian routinized charisma may lead to emphasis on economic rationality, but at the same time may do away with all rational procedures if this prevents obtaining benefits for followers

Nature of Administrative Staff

1. In pure form there is no administrative staff, only followers and disciples; there are no legal rules ("It is written . . . but I say unto you. . . .")
   a. disciples chosen on basis of charismatic qualities
   b. no appointments, promotions, etc.
   c. no hierarchy, no specified spheres
   d. no salaries, benefices, etc.
   e. unlike traditional authority, not bound by precedent
2. Routinization also affects character of administrative staff:
   a. norms for recruitment will be created
   b. method for selecting charismatic successor will also affect method for selecting administrative staff
   c. routinized staff may secure its economic position through benefices, fiefs, offices
3. Routinization of charisma in anti-authoritarian direction also will affect nature of administrative staff:
   a. principle of election may be applied to staff
   b. election of staff will tend to curtail power of leader
   c. but as long as election limited to plebiscitary leader, then staff will usually be chosen on basis of personal loyalty (no rational selection criteria, no specific task spheres, no technical competence)

dures for appointment, promotions, remuneration, and other areas of personnel administration. Likewise, disciples obey the orders of their leader primarily because they perceive super-human and supernatural qualities in him. No legal rules exist to direct administrative procedures, nor are precedents of administrative action paid any regard. If the disciples perceive a notable decline or failure of the charismatic qualities of their master, they might abandon him, thus causing the breakdown of the charismatic authority system.

Weber has suggested that charismatic authority can be "routinized," i.e., institutionalized so that it continues to exist even after the departure of the charismatic leader from the scene. Charisma may be routinized in an authoritarian or an anti-authoritarian direction. The authoritarian devices could range from the use of oracles to designation by the charismatic staff. On the other hand, the institutionalization of plebiscite could routinize charisma on a democratic basis. Various forms of routinized charisma need different kinds of administrative staffs. Often the chief proponent for routinizing purely charismatic authority are the members of the staff who normalize recruitment and set up ordered methods of pay, etc. Thus, with its routinization, charismatic authority loses its ideal-typical character and assimilates, to an extent, some characteristics of other forms of authority.

It is clear that Weber, in his analysis of the administrative staff under a charismatic authority system, stressed the impact of socio-cultural beliefs and values on such system. The charismatic character of the political system (i.e., top leadership) determines, to a great extent, the nature of the administrative staff (disciples). In turn, the disciples' support is extremely crucial to the survival of the charismatic leadership. Beyond this, however, routinization of charisma influences the modification of procedures for the selection of administrative staff. The routinization also affects the way the administrative staff secures its economic position through benefices, fiefs, and offices.

It appears that Weber's conception of charismatic authority can aid the study of the administrative systems of many emerging nations where routinization of what has been called charismatic leadership is taking place. In fact, it is not hard to find charis-

matic elements in almost any political system. Such personal loyalty is an important factor in diverse administrative situations even among "modernized" nations, although the legal rational authority is said to generally characterize authority structures in such nations

Legal Rational Authority

In a legal rational authority system, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal rules, which in turn are justified on the basis of their rational character. The legal rational authority system appears to be rational in two ways: (1) in the adjustment of rules as means toward achieving the dominant goals in the political system; and (2) in the universal criteria of achievement which apply to individuals in the system, i.e., these individuals are required to act rationally in achieving personal success in the system, thus supporting its more general aims.

The essential characteristics of the legal rational authority and its administrative staff (termed by Weber as "bureaucracy") are summarized in Chart III.

"Functional" Analysis in the Weberian Ideal-Type Bureaucracy

Peter Blau, a keen student of bureaucracy, has discerned an implicit "functional" interdependence among the characteristics of Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy with rational, efficient administration being the dominant end of the system and, hence, the criterion of "functionality".[18] Blau has observed that in large scale complex organizations an effective operation requires the sub-division of tasks into specialized responsibilities. The discharge of such specialized tasks likewise requires professionally qualified personnel. Further, division of labour on large scale necessitates proper coordination among jobs and such coordination among various channels requires a special administrative staff, which also regulates the process of organizational communication. In addition, a strict hierarchy of authority, by enabling superiors on successive levels to guide, indirectly or directly, the performance of a large number of subordinates,

Chart III

Legal Rational Authority

Nature of Legitimate Authority	*Nature of Administrative Staff*

1. Obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order.
2. Legal norms may be established on any of a variety of bases (expediency, values, etc.)
3. Abstract rules which are intentionally established are applied to specific cases.
4. Person in authority occupies an "office".
5. Person who obeys command obeys "only the law", not an individual.
6. Offices arranged in hierarchical manner with appeal and grievance machinery.
7. Because application of norms is a rational process individuals in authority need specialized training.
8. Officials separated from ownership of means of production; their private property strictly separated from public property.
9. Office separated from living quarters.
10. Official does not appropriate his "office".
11. Written documents are heart of process; all decisions in writing.
12. Ultimate source of authority in a legal-rational system may well be in another order (charisma).

1. Legal authority in purest form utilizes bureaucratic administrative staff.
2. Characteristics of bureaucrats are:
   a. subject to authority only in official capacities
   b. organized in hierarchy of offices
   c. each office has defined competence
   d. office filled by free selection
   e. officials appointed on basis of technical competence
   f. paid in money; fixed, graded salary scale; pensions (responsibility as well as social status taken into account).
   g. office is primary occupation
   h. there is a career; advancement by seniority and/or achievement
   i. official is separated from means of administration
   j. official subject to discipline in conduct of office.
3. Appointment is crucial feature because election impedes hierarchical discipline.
4. Specialized knowledge is indispensable, even though at top of bureaucracy there is a non-bureaucrat.
5. Administrative bureaucratic staff in purest form: "monocratic" type
   a. "the most rational means of carrying out imperative control over human beings
   b. primary source of superiority is technical knowledge
   c. can escape existing bureaucratic authority only by creating another bureaucratic authority
   d. capitalism has been major spur toward bureaucratization
   e. development of bureaucracy leads to social levelling, and social levelling favours bureaucracy (appointment by merit)

Source: Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model," p. 88.[19]

assists in the process of coordination among different tasks required for the achievement of organizational objectives. Since *the close supervision of all the subordinates may be impossible* (in tune with the concept of "span of control"), official rules are needed to guide administrative procedures, thus restricting direct supervisory intervention to extraordinary cases. However, despite professional training and a set of official rules, rational decision-making could be obstructed by personal bias and emotions. To preclude such interference by irrational factors, emphasis is placed on impersonal detachment in administration. Nevertheless, impersonal discipline in the hierarchical bureaucracy might alienate its members, and therefore the provision of a secure career is expected to lessen the effect of such alienation, and to promote organizational loyalty.

Briefly, the problems relating to one characteristic of the bureaucratic organization model are countered by the existence of other conceptualized conditions which meet them. These various conditions, in totality, generate a constellation of features which represent the ideal-typical bureaucracy. Thus it may be recognized that there is a functional interrelationship among the parts of this analytical scheme. From this perspective, it *may be argued that Weber's bureaucratic model is systemic to* a degree, as a systemic perspective, among other things, accords importance to the interrelationships among structural variables within a social system or sub-system. But such a perspective should also take into account the dynamic interaction among these variables, and the resulting changes this interaction produces in the system. In this regard, Weber's ideal-type of bureaucracy seems to have limitations. For example, his model does not account for potential conflict between the requirement that officials be appointed on the basis of technical competence, and the rule that superiors be obeyed on the basis of their incumbency of an office. In fact, it is difficult for a single ideal-type to resolve the problem of tension between the need for loyalty and a claim for expertise.[20] Similarly, conflicts between hierarchy and specialization, and between meticulous compliance with rules and the exercise of specialized knowledge might arise. The literature is full of such criticisms of Weber's ideal-type of bureaucracy.[21] These criticisms, however, generally

overlook the state of specialized operations at the time Weber developed his ideas on bureaucracy. At the end of the nineteenth century, large scale technology was not highly developed in Germany, and, therefore, the then existing level of specialization did not pose a serious threat to the hierarchical arrangements within administrative organizations. Conversely, in 1970's, specialization in government operations is much more developed (at least in the industrialized nations), and consequently its reconciliation with organizational hierarchy poses a serious problem which is difficult to be tackled strictly within the Weberian framework.

Furthermore, it is crucial to view dichotomies such as "hierarchy vs. specialization" in the broader context of Weber's methodology of constructing ideal-types which purposefully exaggerates certain features that may or may not be present in actual situations. Obviously, total hierarchy and total specialization are not expected to coexist in a single situation. Weber recognized this point when he implied that the ideal-type of bureaucracy is designed to help further research, and is not to be mistaken for a description of something existing in empirical reality.

Critics generally overlook the fact that Weber did show, at some points of his analysis, an awareness of the conflicts which occur as a result of the interactions among different structural parts of bureaucracy. Note, for example, Weber's remark: "A very strong development of the 'right to office' naturally makes it more difficult to staff them with regard to technical efficiency, for such a development decreases the career-opportunities of ambitious candidates for office".[22]

Nevertheless, in spite of some indication of Weber's awareness of possible destabilizing interactions among various structural components of bureaucracy, his analysis lacks analytical categories which account for such interactions.

In Weber's discussion of the bureaucratic model, there appears an implicit recognition of social environmental influences on bureaucracy. For example, structural features, like career system, recruitment by merit, security of tenure, and separation of ownership from management appear to represent a recognition of the external socio-political influences that corrupt or obstruct effective operation of the administrative system, and

of the means to eliminate or limit such influences. Thus, the impact of the interaction between bureaucracies and their social environment appears to have been taken note of, and the emergence of the structural characteristics of bureaucracy appear to have been partly explained (even though only implicitly) in terms of the need to insulate public officials from certain environmental influences that impede their adherence to the norms of a legal-rational authority system.

Efficiency and Rationality

Weber's ideas on efficiency and rationality are closely related to his ideal-type bureaucracy. Weber observed that bureaucracy is capable of attaining the highest level of efficiency possible, and is thus the most rational known formal means of carrying out imperative control over human beings.[23] It is of central importance, therefore, to examine how he related the "goal" of efficiency and the "value" of rationality to his ideal-type construct of bureaucracy.

Although Weber did not provide any rigorous definition of "efficiency," his analysis appears to suggest that by the term he meant the realization of organizational goals at a minimum cost in terms of the consumption of resources such as money, labour, time. According to him, bureaucracy surpasses honorific and advocational forms of administration in precision, lack of equivocation, knowledge of the documentary record, continuity, sense of discretion, uniformity of operation, system of subordination, and reduction of conflict and duplication.[24] It may be stressed that such advantages of bureaucracy should be seen in relation to the efficiency of other types of administrative systems which Weber had studied. In other words, bureaucratic organizations are more likely to be efficient than the administrative sub-systems of the traditional and charismatic authority systems. Sometimes critics overlook this comparative context in which Weber remarked that the monocratic (hierarchical) form of bureaucracy is capable of achieving the highest form of efficiency. Friedrich, for example, has criticized Weber for giving "value judgment", and has commented that Weber's discussions on bureaucracy "vibrate with something of the

Prussian enthusiasm for the military organization".[25] Friedrich probably would not have made such comment had he recognized Weber's stress upon the efficiency of bureaucracy (i.e., the administrative staff of the legal-rational authority system) involving its comparison with the administrative staffs of the traditional and the charismatic authority systems. Thus, Weber's analysis did not preclude the *possibility* of other, more efficient forms of administration.

Although Weber attempted to associate bureaucracy closely with the achievement of efficiency, it has been argued above that his ideal-type analysis lacks a set of analytic categories which could account for the interactional patterns among structural parts of bureaucracy. Thus it is not possible *within his scheme* to hypothesize about the conditions which could aid or impede the achievement of efficiency. There are substantial references in sociological literature to the point that several of the characteristics of Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy may impede, rather than aid, the achievement of efficiency. Excessive hierarchy, overdeveloped specialization, promotion by seniority, and rigid adherence to rules could cause bureaupathological behaviour. Thus, there are some gaps in Weber's construction of bureaucracy which suggest the need to complement such ideal-type models with dynamic analyses of systemic administrative change, such as those generally associated with the concept of administrative development. These gaps impose limitations on Weber's model for socio-administrative analysis in the *present* time, but these limitations should be seen as associated with the early stages of organizational and analytical development.

Recognizing that Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy might not be capable of achieving the "highest" level of efficiency, Peter Blau has given an interesting twist to bureaucratic analysis. He has suggested that we should look at the "purpose" of an ideal-type bureaucracy, i.e., the achievement of efficiency, and then see what structural characteristics suggested by Weber (and in what combination) help achieve the desired level of efficiency. Thus, Blau has defined bureaucracy as "organization that maximizes efficiency in administration or an institutionalized method of organized social conduct in the interest of administrative

efficiency."[26] The main problem of concern becomes the ex-
peditious removal of obstacles to efficient operations which arise
recurrently. This can be accomplished only by creating favourable
conditions for continuous adjustive development in organization,
including those conditions which encourage employees to ex-
ercise initiative in meeting the emergent problems.[27] Analysis of
such conditions should be of considerable importance for studies
of internal organizational analysis, but for the present purpose
it may be sufficient to note that Blau's concept of bureaucracy
assumes variability among the structural and "behavioural"
characteristics of a bureaucratic organization.[28] It also emphas-
izes that there are no rigidly prescribed interactional patterns
of organizational sub-systems, since such patterns may change
from place to place, and from time to time. It further assumes
that structural parts within a bureaucratic organization are
constantly interacting with each other, and that different sets
of interactions may produce different results. Thus in Blau's
approach, dynamic system change is related to the achievement
of dominant system goals. This feature makes it extremely
relevant to the study of goal-oriented administrative change
which is the focus of the concept of development administration.

In Weberian analysis, bureaucracy is seen as the most
rational instrument for achieving efficiency in administrative
operations.[29] Therefore, implicitly the level of efficiency is
tied to the level of rationality. In his historical analysis,
Weber associated the concept of rationality with specific
means-ends schemes, but his ideal-type construct of bureaucracy,
primarily because of its static nature, does not incorporate any
references to the varying manifestations and consequences of
rationality under different ecological situations. This limitation
in Weberian analysis, therefore, should be viewed in the
context of ideal-type methodology which is not intended to
explain specific empirical situations. If one is to move beyond
the point where Weber left off in this realm, it might be
appropriate to develop diverse analytic categories of efficient
rational administrative behaviour, keeping in view different
intra-organizational structures, and the variety of environment
in which bureaucracy works. Such categories should have a
dynamic perspective in order to be of more relevance to the

study of comparative public administrative systems operating in rapidly changing environments.

Mixed Types of Authority and Administrative Systems

Perhaps Weber was more aware of social interactional patterns in bureaucracy than his ideal-type constructs suggest. Such a consciousness is certainly reflected in his views on the working of "mixed" authority systems.

Although Weber reserved the term "bureaucracy" for the administrative staff in a legal-rational authority system, he discerned bureaucracy, or something resembling it, in ancient Egypt, China, and the Roman Empire, as well as in the modern European States.[30] *Prima facie*, as Riggs has noted, one gets two contradictory impressions from Weber's analysis of bureaucracy. On the one hand, Weber saw that a wide range of societies, from traditional to modern, have produced bureaucracies, all sharing certain key characteristics. On the other, he saw bureaucracy as an ideal-type, only loosely approximated in historical examples, while the trend toward full bureaucratization is forecast in modern developments.[31] However, it can be seen that these two aspects of Weber's work are not mutually inconsistent. In an ideal-type framework, the structural characteristics of bureaucracy are exaggerated, while in empirical historical systems they are found generally in "impure" form. Hence, bureaucracy might be highly associated with certain characteristics of the modern world, while also approximated to a degree in particular kinds of non-modern settings.

Weber himself implied that in the real world, *"pure"* legal-rational authority systems, like the other two ideal-types, had never existed. He showed awareness of the fact that in the empirical world, elements of various authority patterns are mixed with each other. Thus, although he had seen the genesis of bureaucracy primarily in the trend toward greater rationalization of social systems and in the development of legal rational authority, he had noticed that some bureaucracies emerge even from charismatic movements. Weber also observed that the supreme head of a bureaucratic group may

have claim to authority on a basis other, than the legal rational, e.g., a hereditary charismatic ruler (a hereditary monarch), or a pure charismatic ruler' (a plebiscitary president) may head a bureaucratic staff. He never implied that the traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational authority systems were incompatible historically. He had also noted that with the routinization of charisma in a democratic direction, charismatic authority comes to possess an administrative staff having several legal-rational characteristics. Further, he held that a legal-rational order will generally ,retain traditional and charismatic qualities. Thus, Weber suggested, though perhaps not with much clarity and forcefulness, the need for working with "mixed" types or with clusters of interrelated characteristics from several of the ideal-types.[32] He also spoke of mixed types such as "patrimonial bureaucracy" when referring to specific cases of historical administrative systems. The foregoing analysis has stressed the point that it is only when the ideal-type construct of bureaucracy is studied in conjunction with Weber's analysis of different types of historical authority systems that it provides "the most illuminating framework for analysing administrative systems".[33]

Weber's conceptualization of "mixed" types of authority and administrative systems can thus serve an important heuristic purpose in the study of contemporary administrative systems, which are likewise mixtures of apparently contrary tendencies. Some scholars have suggested new "mixed" types in this context. Helen Constas has proposed the conceptualization of a charismatic bureaucracy as found in Incan Peru, in Pharaonic Egypt, and in many totalitarian States. She has observed that such a bureaucracy may not ultimately transfer itself to a legal-rational system, and that it could even be highly irresponsible and irrational,[34] if viewed in strictly Weberian terms. On the other hand, Amitai Etzioni has remarked that an organization "might shift from a more bureaucratic to a more charismatic structure, and then back to a more bureaucratic one".[35] Peace-time armies are generally bureaucratic; when they engage in war, bureaucratic rules are likely to be set aside; and, again, with the end of war and return to normalization, their bureaucratic character generally returns. David Willer

has suggested a new ideal-type of authority system which is based on "ideology." as its basis of legitimacy.[36] Willer's conceptualization can be helpful in studying the administrative staff in a system such as that of the Soviet Union, where ideology is assumed to exert a dominant influence on the politico-administrative system. It is clear that there is need for further conceptualization of authority systems, and particularly of mixed types.

The preceding analysis of mixed types of authority shows cognizance on the part of Max Weber and some other scholars that socio-cultural systems in various settings are likely to include a mixture of different types of authority systems. The recognition of such mixes illuminates the complexity of the environment in which an administrative system works, and thus contributes to the ecological perspective in comparative administrative studies. In spite of certain obvious needs for expansion and modification, it may be argued that: "Probably Weber's analysis of authority *even as it stands*-constitutes the most highly developed and broadly applicable conceptual scheme in any comparable field which is available, not only in the specifically sociological literature but in that of social science as a whole."[37]

The Influence of Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy in Comparative Public Administration

In the second chapter, it was pointed out that among the prominent approaches to the study of comparative public administration, the most influential has been that of "bureaucratic" systems. It must be stressed that this approach is dominated by the "ideal-type" model of bureaucracy propounded by Weber. As shall be seen, a substantial amount of work on comparative bureaucracies has been influenced by this model.

It has been claimed that no other model in the study of public administration comes even near to matching Weber's "ideal-type" in detail, clarity, and rigour of analysis. The model possesses the attractiveness of "broadness" and advantage of relative simplicity. Further, it points toward the tentative formulation of hypotheses concerning the content of public administration as defined for comparative purposes.[38] Thus the impact

of Weber's model has been felt in the form of unexpressed or expressed premises and hypotheses in the teaching of public administration, particularly the comparative public administration.[39] Specifically, as Fred Riggs has noted, Weber's analysis of bureaucracy has stimulated two types of studies: (1) those which accept the Weberian image and seek to discover the existence of bureaucratic features in several empirical administrative systems in different times and places; and (2) those which focus on constructing new typologies intended to modify the Weberian system.[40]

In constructing typologies and conducting empirical research, students of comparative "bureaucracies" have stretched the use of the term "bureaucracy". No more is its usage restricted to the depiction of an administrative staff under a legal rational authority system.[41] In fact, now it is used while referring to any contemporary administrative system, regardless of the nature of the "authority" in which such a system works. However, to avoid confusion, scholars should specify the manner—Weberian or non-Weberian—in which they use the term "bureaucracy" in particular studies.

Various Meanings of "Bureaucracy"

Two broad types of emphases in the use of the term "bureaucracy" in comparative public administrative studies may be noted: "structural" and "functional".

The structural definitions identify "bureaucracy" as generally an administrative system possessing features such as hierarchy, specialization, and competent incumbents.[42] Ferrel Heady has observed that the most useful way to view bureaucracy is in terms of certain structural characteristics. He has argued that bureaucracies can be rated on a continuum for each of a number of dimensions of organizational structure, and that this structural profile can be used for the purposes of comparing bureaucracies.[43] Heady has assumed that "a viable polity in the world of today must have a public service that meets the criteria of a bureaucracy". The government operations in any country require a definite internal hierarchical arrangement, well-developed functional specialization, and specific qualification standards

for membership in the bureaucracy.[44] Heady's approach fairly well represents the view of several students of comparative public administration. They generally assume that despite some variations, practically all nations seem to be attempting an increase in the components of specialization and "competence" in their administrative structures. Besides, they argue that hierarchy, in its manifold variations, seems to exist in almost all administrative systems of contemporary States. Because of the almost universal presence of the characteristics of hierarchy, specialization, and competence, it has been argued that Weber's bureaucratic model is of immense heuristic value.

In this expanded usage of the term "bureaucracy", some scholars have attempted to define the particular types of public officials who should be considered as composing a "bureaucracy". In comparative public administration, major interest has been in those public officials "who occupy managerial roles, who are in some directive capacity either in central agencies or in the field, who are generally described in the language of public administration as 'middle' or 'top' management".[45] Such a focus on "higher civil service" is understandable, since generally administrative officials belonging to this category are in a crucial position to influence public policy formulation and implementation. With the penetration of military personnel in politico-administrative systems in countries such as Pakistan, Thailand, South Vietnam, and in several Latin American nations, students of comparative public administration are studying the roles of the military officials as well. Further, the field of inquiry is no more restricted to "career" civil servants, but has extended to non-career public officials in administrative positions. For example, to Riggs, bureaucracy includes *"public executive bureaucracy including career and non-career civil and military bureaucracy"*.[46] These differences in the structural interests of those studying "bureaucracy" create the necessity for a student of comparative bureaucracies to specify the precise scope he has in mind when referring to bureaucracy in a particular setting.

From a "functional" perspective, the study of bureaucracy[47] involves the study of the consequences of "bureaucratic behaviour" on other sub-systems of the general social system of which the bureaucracy is a part. Two broad types of behavioural

characteristics can be noted in the comparative administrative literature. The first category includes derivatives of Weber's concept which views bureaucracy in the context of the rationalization of collective activities. Carl Friedrich has specified four behavioural features of bureaucracy in this sense: "objectivity," "discretion", "precision", and "consistency". They are "clearly and closely related to the measure-taking functions of administrative officials",[48] and thus contribute positively to the bureaucracy's capacity to achieve its objectives in a rational manner. Such characteristics of, what Riggs has called, "bureau-rationality",[49] are also assumed to aid the achievement of the goals of the broader social system in which bureaucracy operates.

Bureaucracy has also been viewed from the perspective of the "pathological" or "dysfunctional" aspects of its behaviour including slowness, ponderousness, routine, and complications of procedures, causing frustrations to the members, clients, or subjects of an administrative organization.[50] Victor Thompson has considered such characteristics to represent "bureau-pathology".[51] It may be noted that Michael Crozier's main concern in *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* has been with the dysfunctional aspects of the French bureaucratic behaviour.

These two implications of bureaucratic behaviour suggest that terms like "bureaucratization" and "de-bureaucratization", as used by Samuel Eisenstadt,[52] are more likely to be misleading than to provide help in comparative bureaucratic analysis,[53] unless the effects of these processes are clearly spelled out. Further, it may be stressed that the "dysfunctionality" of bureaucratic action should be judged in regard to its broadly social consequences and not with reference to any preconceived set of "behavioural traits". Such an orientation would assume that "functionality" of bureaucratic action is "situational", and has to be considered from an environmental perspective. A pattern of behaviour may be pathological in one organizational setting, but "rational" or "functional" in another. The same pathological behaviour in bureaucracies may have different origins in different political systems. It might result from an overcommitment to rationality in a Western bureaucracy and an undercommitment to it in a non-Western country. Thus, research on bureaucracy in a comparative perspective should

view "bureau-rationalistic" and "bureau-pathological" as elements of bureaucratic behaviour in the particular administrative ecological settings. Such an approach would also help in viewing the "functionality", of particular bureaucratic characteristics in terms of their contribution to the achievement of developmental goals which a particular society is pursuing.

Conclusion

Max Weber's bureaucratic model should be studied in the context of his analysis of authority systems, which in turn should be viewed in the perspective of his ideal-type methodology. Weber's analysis is ecological to the extent that it considers the nature of different types of administrative systems in reference to the social environment in which these systems work. This ecological perspective has enhanced the usefulness of Weberian analysis in cross-cultural administrative studies.

In his historical studies Weber also showed that the interactions among various elements of the social system may cause "mixes" in the authority systems and in their administrative staffs. Several later scholars have suggested further combinations of authority-administrative relationships, thus extending upon the work done by Weber. These later constructs, by taking into account additional environmental influences which affect the administrative system, have added to the ecological elements in comparative administrative models. However, most of the analysis including Weber's has focused on the impact of the social environment on the administrative systems, rather than on the converse. It is expected that more attention will be paid to the reciprocal relationship between the two elements in future studies employing a bureaucratic system approach.

Weber saw public bureaucracy as a servant of the State, and thus considered that the goal of bureaucracy was to fulfil efficiently objectives determined by the State. Therefore, "efficiency" in the ideal-typical model of bureaucracy emerges as almost pre-defined, and lacking a dynamic character. To make the concept of efficiency more ecological, it is essential to view it from the perspective of the interaction between the organizational goals on the one hand and the internal and the external

environments of the organization on the other. A similar need is to treat the concept of rationality in a more ecological and dynamic manner. The need stands, therefore, to construct diverse analytic categories of efficient and rational administrative behaviour, keeping in view the dynamics of socio-administrative change.

In comparative public administrative studies, the term "bureaucracy" is used to depict administrative systems of all contemporary nations, regardless of the particular social environments in which such systems operate. Essentially, the term is used either in "structural" or in "functional" contexts. The structural approach has drawn heavily on the Weberian ideal-type, while the functional approach focuses on the consequences of the administrative action for the goals of the administrative sub-system, and for the social system as a whole. Thus the functional approach is more ecological than the structural, although they are complementary to each other, for the former studies how the behavioural features or structural characteristics of bureaucracy are related "functionally" to the general social system.

In later chapters, the ecological and the developmental perspectives in the comparative study of bureaucracy will be explored more extensively.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Keith Henderson, "Comparative Public Administration: The Identity Crisis," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, I (1969), p. 68.

2 Cited in Ferrel Heady, "Comparative Public Administration: Concerns and Priorities," in Heady and Sybil Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Public Administration, 1962), p. 12.

3 "Comparative Public Administration: An Overview," in Raphaeli (ed.), *Readings in Comparative Public Administration* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), pp. 7-8. Martin Landau has observed that Weber provided the "paradigm" for the study of bureaucratic (or Formal) organization. "Sociology and the Study of Formal Organizations," in Dwight Waldo and Martin Landau (eds.), *The Study of Organizational Behavior: Status, Problems, and Trends* (Washington, D.C.: Comparative Administration Group, American Society of Public Administration), pp. 37-50.

4 Some major sources which the present analysis draws upon are: Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947), hereafter cited as *Theory*; *from Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated, edited and with an introduction by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), hereafter cited as *Essays*; Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), hereafter referred to as *Portrait*; and Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in Heady and Stokes, *Papers*, pp. 59-60.

5 Max Weber, *The Methodology of Social Sciences*, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), p. 90. Emphasis original.

6 H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, "Introduction," in *Essays*, p. 59; Reinhard Bendix, "Max Weber," *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, XVI, p. 499.

7 It should be stressed that the ideal-types have basically a heuristic purpose, and are not to be treated as labels to be applied to social phenomena. They are concepts upon which research programmes can be based. For a discussion of the functions of ideal-types in social analysis, see, among others, *Essays*; *Theory*; Bendix, *Portrait*, *passim*. For brief reviews, see, Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 82-3; Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), 601 ff.

8 Gerth and Mills, "Introduction," in *Essays*, pp. 59-61.

9 "Some Observations on Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy," in Robert K. Merton, *et. al.* (eds.), *Reader in Bureaucracy* (New York: Free Press, 1952), p. 28.

10 Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 82.   11 *Theory*, p. 152.

12 *Ibid.*   13 *Ibid.*, p. 153.   14 *Ibid.*, p. 328.

15 Based on *Ibid.*, pp. 341-58.

16 Weber, in his writings on methods of social sciences, rejected the assumption of any "objective meaning" of human action. He preferred to restrict the understanding and interpretation of meaning to the subjective intentions of the actor. Gerth and Mills, in *Essays*, p. 58. Weber noted that ". . . in 'action' is included all human behavior when and in so far as, . . . by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals); it takes into account the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course." Parsons, in *Theory*, p. 88. However, in his actual work, Weber showed awareness of the paradoxical fact that the results of interaction are by no means always in conformity with the intentions of the actor. Gerth and Mills in *Essays*, p. 58. Such insights from Weber's writings can aid analysis in the "New" public administration, which is interested in phenomenological aspects of administrative analysis.

17 Based on *Ibid.*, pp. 358-81; 386-96, and *Essays*, pp. 245-52.

18 Blau, "Weber's Theory of Bureaucracy," in Dennis Wrong (ed.), *Max Weber* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 142-43; "Organization: Theories," *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, II, 299.

19 Based on *Theory*, pp. 329-41, and on *Essays*, pp. 196-244. Although Weber used the term "bureaucracy" in a broader

sense including public, private, and religious bureaucracies, the present analysis is concerned only with public bureaucracy.

20 Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model", p. 65.

21 See, among others, Friedrich, *op. cit.*; Alvin Gouldner, "On Weber's Analysis of Bureaucratic Rules," in Merton, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-51.

22 *Essays*, p. 203.   23 *Theory*, p. 337.

24 Bendix, *Portrait*, p. 426.

25 Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

26 *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 60.

27 Blau has suggested the following conditions of adjustive development: employment security; internalized standards of workmanship; cohesive work groups; split in management authority; and evaluation on the basis of clearly specified results, *Ibid.*, pp. 61-66.

28 Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 18.

29 Alvin Gouldner has suggested that Weber's analysis of authority and organization can be traced to Saint-Simon's belief that modern government would rely, for its functioning, on administrators with specific skills and "positive knowledge," in other words, on rationality. "Organizational Analysis," in Robert Merton, *et. al.* (eds.), *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 401.

30 *Essays*, p. 204.

31 Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 72.

32 *Theory*, pp. 329; 382-86.

33 John Rex, "Max Weber," in Timothy Raison (ed.), *The Founding Fathers of Social Science* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 177.

34 "Max Weber's Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (1958), pp. 400-09; also, "The U.S.S.R. from Charismatic Sect to Bureaucratic Authority," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VI (1961), pp. 282-98.

35 *Modern Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 57.

36 "Weber's Missing Authority Type," *Sociological Inquiry*, XXXVII (1967), pp. 231-40. On the other hand, Roy Laird observed that Weber's bureaucracy has been "completely carried through" in the U.S.S.R. See, *The Soviet Paradigm* (N.Y.: Free Press, 1970),Chapter VIII, pp. 116-32. Reinhard Bendix has opined that the continuous requirements of political clearance by the Communist Party in all important decisions, in addition to its appropriate administrative surveillance, makes the Soviet society a "post-bureaucratic" or "superbureaucratic society". "Bureaucracy," *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, II, p. 212. For an interesting interpretation of how Weber's analysis of bureaucracy can assist in the study of totalitarianism, see Bendix, *Portrait*, pp. 465-67.

37 Talcott Parsons, "Introduction," in *Theory*, p. 77.

38 William J. Siffin, "Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration," in Siffin (ed.), *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 11.

39 Waldo has noted that on bureaucracy, little empirical research has been done by the students of public administration as against sociologists. "Comparative Public Administration: Prologue, Performance, and Problems," in Preston P. Le Breton (ed.), *Comparative Administrative Theory* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), p. 115.

40 Riggs, *Administration*, p. 72.

41 Note, for example, the following titles: Lloyd A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy: Century of Political Evolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy in Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Martin Harry Greenberg, *Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Brooks, 1970).

42 For example, Carl Friedrich has defined bureaucracy as a form of organization marked by hierarchy, specialization of roles, and a high level of competence displayed by incumbents trained to fill these roles. *Man and His Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 468-70.

Victor Thompson has considered bureaucratic organization to be characterized by a highly elaborated hierarchy of

sense including public, private, and religious bureaucracies, the present analysis is concerned only with public bureaucracy.

20 Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model", p. 65.

21 See, among others, Friedrich, *op. cit.*; Alvin Gouldner, "On Weber's Analysis of Bureaucratic Rules," in Merton, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-51.

22 *Essays*, p. 203.   23 *Theory*, p. 337.

24 Bendix, *Portrait*, p. 426.

25 Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

26 *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 60.

27 Blau has suggested the following conditions of adjustive development: employment security; internalized standards of workmanship; cohesive work groups; split in management authority; and evaluation on the basis of clearly specified results, *Ibid.*, pp. 61-66.

28 Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 18.

29 Alvin Gouldner has suggested that Weber's analysis of authority and organization can be traced to Saint-Simon's belief that modern government would rely, for its functioning, on administrators with specific skills and "positive knowledge," in other words, on rationality. "Organizational Analysis," in Robert Merton, *et. al.* (eds.), *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 401.

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31 Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 72.

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34 "Max Weber's Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (1958), pp. 400-09; also, "The U.S.S.R. from Charismatic Sect to Bureaucratic Authority," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VI (1961), pp. 282-98.

35 *Modern Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 57.

50 Crozier, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Harold Laski has defined bureaucracy as an administrative system having a passion for routine, the sacrifice of flexibility to rule, delay in decision-making, and conservative outlook inhibiting experimentation. "Bureaucracy," *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, III, p. 70.

51 Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-77.

52 "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization and Debureaucratization," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IV (1959), pp. 302-20.

53 Ferrel Heady has also subscribed to the view that associating particular traits with "bureaucracy" is not helpful in research on bureaucracy. "Research Literature on Comparative Public Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly* V (1960), p. 144.

authority superimposed upon a highly elaborate division of labour. *Modern Organizations* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961), pp. 3-4.

Fred Riggs has defined bureaucracy as a "hierarchy of offices under the authority of a [political] head." "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective", *Journal of Comparative Administration*, I (1969), p. 10.

Michael Crozier has noted that the traditional meaning of bureaucracy has involved "government by bureaus", or "government by departments of the State staffed by appointed and not elected functionaries, organized hierarchically, and dependent on sovereign authority". He has observed that "bureaucratic power" in this perspective implies reign of law and order, but at the same time government without the participation of the governed. *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 3.

See also, J. Slesinger, *A Model for the Comparative Study of Bureaucracy* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1957).

43 *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, pp. 18-9.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 21. Heady has also observed that "bureaucracy as a specialized structure is common to all modern States." *Ibid.*, p. 15. Apparently, by the term "modern," Heady has implied "contemporary", and not "developed". Thus, it should be clear that although "bureaucracies" as structures in a strict Weberian sense are not found in all societies, in a "functional" sense they are found in almost all political systems. In this sense, organizations, performing primarily administrative functions are, identified as bureaucracies.

45 Joseph La Palombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," in La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 7.

46 Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics," p. 11. Emphasis original.

47 It may be stressed again that in the discussion of this section, the term "bureaucracy" is being used in the sense of an administrative system of any contemporary State.

48 Friedrich, *Man and His Government*, p. 471.

49 Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics," p. 12.

50 Crozier, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Harold Laski has defined bureaucracy as an administrative system having a passion for routine, the sacrifice of flexibility to rule, delay in decision-making, and conservative outlook inhibiting experimentation. "Bureaucracy," *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, III, p. 70.

51 Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-77.

52 "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization and Debureaucratization," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IV (1959), pp. 302-20.

53 Ferrel Heady has also subscribed to the view that associating particular traits with "bureaucracy" is not helpful in research on bureaucracy. "Research Literature on Comparative Public Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly* V (1960), p. 144.

Bureaucracy and the Political System

I N S Y S T E M I C terms, public bureaucracy is generally considered to be a sub-system of the political system. The nature of the relationship between bureaucracy and other structures of the political system has been widely discussed by Max Weber and by more recent students of comparative public administration. This chapter will examine some of the basic propositions developed on the interactional patterns between the political system and its bureaucracy. During the course of the discussion, the term "bureaucracy" will be used in two ways. When used in the context of Weberian analysis, it will mean the administrative staff of a legal-rational authority system. When used in reference to the writings in comparative public administration, it will refer to the administrative system of any contemporary State. This divergence in usage will reflect that to be found in the writings discussed. A degree of inexactness will be caused by this dualism of meaning; yet, it will not be serious so long as the different contexts are kept in mind.

With Weber, the analysis will focus primarily upon his legal-rational authority system in which bureaucracy formed the administrative sub-system. With more contemporary writers the focus will be expanded to include the administrative sub-systems of any political system. The great influence of Weber's "bureaucratic model" upon these later writings provides the rationale for considering them in conjunction with each other.

It may also be stressed that the analytical distinction made in the comparative administrative studies between the bureaucracy and the political system should not imply that bureaucracy is being considered in this analysis as "outside" the political system. Thus, in general, the relationship discussed will be that between the administrative system and *other* components of the political system.

Weber observed that while politicians were expected to concentrate on electoral and legislative functions, bureaucrats should devote themselves to administrative tasks, i.e., to the implementation of public policy determined by the political leadership. Thus Weber, like Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow, appeared to subscribe to a politics-administration dichotomy. He observed that bureaucrats ought to remain "neutral" and impartial in the conduct of administrative affairs. An administrator was expected by him to execute the orders received from his political superior, even though he had some disagreement with the political leadership over the issues involved. Therefore, the public responsibility for the goals of administrative action fell on the politician and not on the administrator.

Weber also held that to make the decision-making process in government predictable, the administrative hierarchy should be solely staffed by professionals; for the administrative process could be subverted by non-professionals. He was sceptical of the ability of the elected officials to attain the high standards of technical and administrative competence expected of a bureaucracy.[1] Thus, the stress in Weber's analysis on the role of an administrator seems to be based on a strong interest in what might be called "neutral competence". In practice, neutral competence involves the ability to do work of government expertly, and do it according to explicit, objective standards without regard to personal partisanship or other obligations and loyalties.[2] Such an emphasis by Weber has led some scholars to suggest that "Weber's theory must be modified when applied to the American scene where bureaucracy is not passive and neutral".[3] However, such interpretations may have some validity only when we think of the "ought" in Weber's analysis rather than the "is". Aware of dysfunctions caused by the possible excesses of both bureaucrats and political leaders, Weber favoured a balance between the power of the politicians and of the bureaucrats. However, he was a keen student of bureaucracy's functioning and recognized that such a balance was difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the characteristic of neutral competence in Weber's analysis should be seen in the context of his ideal-type construct of bureaucracy, whose features lead logically to a concept of neutral competence. Nevertheless, this peculiar

conjunction of the ideal-type's characteristics and Weber's "preference" for a "balanced polity" should not, in any way, lead to the view that for Weber, some ideal-type characteristics had normative implications.

Although Weber made an analytical distinction between the role of the politicians and that of the public officials, he recognized that every problem, despite its seemingly technical nature, can assume political significance, and its solutions are influenced by political considerations. From this perspective, which suggests an ongoing interaction between politics and administration, Weber could visualize a continuing competition for power. He described bureaucracy as a "power instrument of the first order for one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus".[4] He discerned that under "normal" conditions, the power position of a "fully developed" bureaucracy is always "overtowering".[5] The primary factor leading to such a situation is the technical superiority and expertise of administrators as against the "dilettante" politicians. Moreover, "Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of 'secret sessions': in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism."[6] If bureaucrats are successful in concealing important premises of decisions and in avoiding inspection of and control over their functioning, bureaucratic absolutism might result, as it did in imperial Germany under Bismarck.[7] Weber recognized that such an absolutism, perpetuated behind closed doors and without any possibility of effective control, promoted the evils of personal influence and personal struggle. And in this context, he comprehended how difficult it was to control bureaucracy effectively. He observed that in a modern State, day-to-day administration was in the hands of the bureaucracy, and this enhanced specialized knowledge, which, coupled with the secretive character of administrative functioning, made the accountability of bureaucrats extremely difficult.

This recognition of the power potential of bureaucracy led Weber to advise politicians to resist bureaucratic efforts to gain control over the administrative machinery. He even warned that a nation "which believes that the conduct of State affairs is a matter of 'administration' and that 'politics' is nothing but the part-time occupation of amateurs or a secondary task of

bureaucrats might as well forget about playing a role in world affairs. . . ."[8] This statement clearly reflects the great importance Weber attached to control of the bureaucracy by the politicians.

One of the important methods of political control over bureaucracy, according to Weber, was parliamentary control over the administrative activities of government. He contended that such parliamentary control over bureaucracy can be effective only when parliament may conduct inquiries and cross-examine administration before commissions of inquiry. In this connection, he commended the British practice of holding parliamentary inquiries. He also recognized that parliamentary committees provide an opportunity for politicians to become more educated about administration. In addition, these committees increase parliamentary control over administration through public disclosures.[9] Inherent in this analysis is Weber's interest in the problem of limiting bureaucracy's role in a democracy.

Weber's Ideas on Bureaucracy's Role in a Democracy

Weber's analysis of democracy is subsumed under his discussion of legal order, although, of course, a legal order is not necessarily democratic.[10]

Weber noted that democratic movements demanding equality before law and protection against arbitrary excess of legal and administrative authority have helped the development of bureaucracy. Such movements have demanded recruitment to and progress in public posts on the basis of technical qualifications rather than personal or political considerations. These demands upon bureaucracy have had a levelling effect. This process has involved the recognition of a formal equality between the officials and the people over whom they exercise authority under the law. Similarly, the emphasis on technical qualifications rather than inherited status in recruitment and advancement in bureaucracy was considered by Weber to be another stimulus for this levelling of status differences.[11] However, such an equality is "formal" because bureaucrats, by virtue of their educational qualifications and diplomas, can become a privileged class.[12] Likewise, officials appointed for life-time careers are in a position to misuse their office and expand their authority. Thus,

the measures designed to protect a bureaucracy against the abuse of authority and encroachment of privileges—appointments on qualifications, promotion on merit or seniority, pension provisions, and formal supervision and appeals procedures—may also promote bureaucratic power. Weber noted that " 'democracy' as such is opposed to the 'rule' of bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization".[13] Thus Weber recognized that bureaucracy concentrates power in the hands of those who are in charge of bureaucratic machinery and that such a concentration of power is against the basic premises of democracy,[14] particularly so when experts or technocrats are removed from the influence of popular public sentiments. But he also recognized that without a civil service class, democracy could be plagued by a spoils-system, public waste, irregularities and lack of technical efficiency. "Thus," he concluded, "democracy has to promote what reason demands and democratic sentiments hate".[15]

The preceding discussion indicates Weber's deep insights into the problem of interaction between democracy and the bureaucratic system. However, Peter Blau has opined that Weber could have made a more systematic analytical distinction between "democracy" and "bureaucracy". Blau himself has attempted such a distinction on the basis of the two basic purposes for which men organize themselves.[16] One of these purposes is "to settle on common courses of actions, on objectcives to be collectively pursued". Another purpose may be "to implement decisions already agreed upon or accepted, to work together on attaining given objectives". A democratic organization is the one created for the achievement of the first purpose and the one which reaches common agreements by some form of majority rule. Such an organization is characterized by "freedom of dissent". On the other hand, an organization created for the purpose of "realizing specific objectives," already determined or specified, such as winning a war or collecting taxes, is a bureaucratic organization. This type of organization is an efficiency-oriented organization. In sum, Blau's differentiating criteria between democracy and bureaucracy hinges upon ". . . whether the organization's purpose is to settle on common objectives or to accomplish given objectives, and whether the government

principle of organizing social action is majority rule rooted in freedom of dissent or administrative efficiency".[17]

It is apparent that Blau's distinction between democracy and bureaucracy is purely analytical, for most, if not all, organizations in the empirical world are engaged in both types of purposes noted by Blau, i.e., deciding on collective goals and then implementing them. In his distinction, Blau appears to be supporting Weber's ideal-type dichotomization between the roles of the politicians and of the administrators. It has been noted, however, that Weber himself recognized that to separate administrative questions from political ones in practice is extremely difficult. Likewise, it would be problematic to separate the process of detemining goals from that of implementing them.

It appears, therefore, that in his bureaucratic model, Weber was primarily concerned with the "rule application" function of bureaucracy, although in discussing the power-role of bureaucracy, he seemed to recognize that bureaucracy may also operate as an important "interest group" in a polity, even without formal channels of interest-articulation. However, Weber's analysis of the political role of bureaucracy seems to be less detailed in his treatment than some of his other subjects such as economy and religion. For this seeming underemphasis, two reasons may be hypothesized. First, Weber did not complete his analysis of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political system before his death, and, secondly, as Bendix has noted, many of his writings on the subject are not available in English.[18] In spite of these limitations, Weber's ideas on the relationship between the political system and its bureaucracy have served an important heuristic purpose in comparative public administration.

There appears to be an underlying assumption in comparative public administrative literature that a public bureaucracy, for analytical purposes, is a sub-system of the political system in which it operates. Such an assumption might imply that bureaucracy has greater interaction with the political system than with the economic or socio-cultural systems. This implication is clear in the following statement by Ferrel Heady: "The environment of bureaucracy may be visualized as a series of concentric circles, with bureaucracy at the centre. The smallest

circle generally has the most decisive influence, and the larger circles represent a descending order of importance as far as bureaucracy is concerned. We may visualize the largest circle as representing all of society or the general social system. The next circle represents the economic system or the economic aspects of the social system. *The inner circle is the political system; it encloses the administrative sub-system and bureaucracy as one of its elements*".[19]

In the above statement, Heady is looking only at the influences of social, economic, and political systems upon the bureaucracy, without an interactional perspective in mind. This approach is less ecological than an interactional approach to the study of the bureaucracy and the general social system. Secondly, Heady's proposition about environmental influences upon bureaucracy may not hold true in all cases, as there may be societies where social or economic systems have greater influence on bureaucracy than the political system. Nevertheless, the purpose in citing the above statement by Heady was only to indicate an important trend in thinking which suggests the predominance of political elements in the ecology of public bureaucracies seen from a comparative perspective. Conversely, it has been argued that the study of comparative politics is incomplete unless it includes in its scope the role played by public bureaucracies in the political process.[20] In the writings of "American" public administration, interest in the interaction between the political system and bureaucracy has been long-standing. From Woodrow Wilson through Francis Rourke,[21] such a concern has been evident in the literature. However, in comparative public administration, greater concern with this issue may be attributed to the development of interest in the politico-administrative systems of the "new" or "emerging" nations.

It has been recognized that in "modernizing" nations, the close association of bureaucracy with the processes of goal-setting and goal-attainment brings it in close relationship with other components of the political system. Ferrel Heady has noted that public bureaucracies in "developing" countries are more likely to be multifunctional than in "developed" nations. Their role in policy or rule-making and even in interest articulation

and aggregation thus becomes important.[22] Bureaucracy's role in "political development," then, has become an important focus for the students of comparative public administration.[23] However, such an interest is not restricted to the study of "developing nations"

Bureaucracies seen in the cross-national context have been studied by some scholars in relation to the surrounding political structures with which they interact. Certain typologies of bureaucratic systems have been developed which are based on the relationship between the bureaucracies and the political system. For example, Merle Fainsod has sketched five patterns of bureaucracies: (1) representative bureaucracies; (2) party-State bureaucracies; (3) military-dominated bureaucracies; (4) ruler-dominated bureaucracies; and (5) ruling bureaucracies.[24]

The first type, representative bureaucracy, is to be found in a competitive political process. "The initiative which representative bureaucracies exercise must be adjusted to an underlying political consensus; the dynamics of change are regulated by the competitive political process".[25] Comprising the second type, party-State bureaucracies, are "the by-products of totalitarian regimes and other one-party dominated political systems".[26] The bureaucratic leadership is guided basically by the party, and more particularly the party leadership. Party-State bureaucracies may also be associated with strong charismatic leadership, as is the case in quite a few African States. The third type, the military dominated bureaucracy, generally develops in societies where the armed forces occupy a strategic position. "The tendency of military-dominated regimes is to stress the military virtues of hierarchy and discipline, and to give short shrift to processes of explanation, persuasion, and discussion".[27] However, a military-dominated political system might even experience, though paradoxically, a phenomenal rise in the power of its civilian bureaucracy, as happened in Pakistan. This could happen because of the military's dependence on the civilian bureaucracy for expert advice on administrative matters. The fourth type, ruler-dominated bureaucracy, is the personal instrument of an autocratic ruler used to strengthen his control over his people. Bureaucracy, in such a situation, is most likely to have a subservient role, though some individual bureaucrats, because of

their personal qualities and the confidence which the ruler places in them, may be influential in the politico-administrative system. The final category, the ruling bureaucracies, Fainsod has identified with the political systems where the bureaucracy is the *de facto* ruling element. An example of such a bureaucratic system may be the case of colonial rule where the administrators in the field function with "minimum direction from a metropolitan centre with more or less absolute authority over the local inhabitants".[28] In political systems dominated by bureaucracies, there may be a tendency among bureaucrats to accumulate the powers of decision-making in both political and administrative matters. However, they require legitimization from some other source such as a figurehead monarchy or a colonial power.

It is clear that Fainsod's categories emphasize the character of the political role of bureaucracy. Similar criteria have been employed by Heady in constructing his typology of bureaucratic systems.[29] Their interests reflect one major thrust of the writings on bureaucracy's interaction with the political systems, *i.e.*, a concern with "the growing acquisition of unregulated power by these (bureaucratic) organizations, their increasing regimentation and domination of vast areas of social life and their use of such power for their own benefits".[30]

"Balanced" and "Unbalanced" Polities

An important subject of interest to these tsudents of comparative public administration has been the question of "balance" between external political leadership and the bureaucracy in regard to their respective ability to control the functioning of the polity. On this subject, the most appropriate point of departure appears to be Fred Riggs's recent essay, "Bureaucratic Politics in a Comparative Perspective".[31] The following analysis will draw heavily upon this particular analysis by Riggs, although references to other scholars' views will be made at appropriate points.

According to Riggs, a political system is composed of its "constitutive system", its "bureaucracy" and its "head of State". "Constitutive system" refers to a "primary component of government which includes as sub-components an elected assem-

bly, an electoral system, and a party system".[32] "Bureaucracy", for him, means "public executive bureaucracy including career and non-career, civil and military positions".[33] Thus, in Riggs's analysis, "constitutive system" and "head of State" collectively imply what other scholars often identify as "political system". Bureaucracy is a sub-system of the political system. Still, in order to study the relationship between the two, they are treated as distinct for *analytical* purposes. As far as a separate category for "head of State" is concerned, it may be useful in the study of the politico-bureaucratic systems in countries having a single strong leader at the top of the political hierarchy. However, only Riggs appears to have used such a category in his analysis. Other scholars have generally included the head of State in their depiction of the political system in general.

Balanced Polity

Riggs has observed that "when a reasonably stable balance of power exists between a bureaucracy and a constitutive system, we may refer to the resultant form of government as a 'balanced polity'."[31] He has specified that "reasonable balance", for want of exactness, could be understood as "approximate equality". He has also argued that the lack of measurability does not render the concept of "reasonable balance" meaningless, as there exist many concepts in social sciences which are useful, although their boundaries are not defined exactly. However, he has suggested that the concept of the balance of power between the constitutive system and the bureaucracy could be operationalized if we think about some probable consequences of "balance". For example, if Cabinet-level positions are recruited through the constitutive system, it probably implies that relatively more power is being exercised by the constitutive system. Further, if middle-level positions in the bureaucracy, such as those of bureau and division chiefs, are predominantly occupied by career officials, it may be considered to represent substantial power being enjoyed by the bureaucracy. A polity having the coexistence of both these structural conditions may be said to have a balance of power between the constitutive system and the bureaucracy. Riggs has also observed that although both the

constitutive system and the bureaucracy perform political as well as administrative functions, it is generally felt that the former is more adept at political functions, and the latter in administrative ones. Such a view has close resemblance to Weber's suggestion that bureaucracy should, by virtue of its neutral competence, concentrate on administrative functions, while the politicians, devoting themselves to electoral functions, should desist from dabbling in administrative matters.

Riggs has hypothesized that most polities with constitutive systems can be classified as balanced or unbalanced, leaving some marginal cases which cannot be definitely classified. He has suggested that in all or virtually all "modern" States, government is balanced.[35] However, he has also argued that the governments of the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Jamaica, Lebanon, and some Latin American states may also be called "balanced", since they are characterized by an effective sharing of power between the constitutive system and the bureaucracy.[36] The reason for the existence of balanced polities in these countries may be traced to the fact that their constitutive system emerged prior to their independence, and their political leaders learned to exercise power even without appointing their proteges in all key positions in bureaucracy. Riggs has stressed that "modernization" and democratic pluralism may not have a high positive correlation with "balance". For example, Kuwait, despite being a "very rich" country, does not have a balanced polity, while India and the Philippines, in spite of their low economic development, seem to have balanced polities.[37] Likewise, there is no reason to assert *a priori* that the governments of North Korea and North Vietnam should not be characterized as balanced.[38] Nevertheless, Riggs's analysis gives the impression that the more "modernized" and/or pluralistic a government is, the greater chances it has of being a balanced polity.

Riggs has also hypothesized that balanced governments, as against the unbalanced ones, are likely to be more effective in policy formulation and implementation.[39] But he has not ruled out the possibility of effective unbalanced polities and ineffective balanced polities. Thus he has not related performance and "balance" in a polity in terms of a causal relationship.

Unbalanced Polity

An unbalanced polity may be a "party-run polity" dominated by its constitutive system with the power position of the bureau-cracy reduced substantially,[40] or it may be a "bureaucratic polity" dominated by its bureaucracy.[41]

Party-run polities are characterized by the prevalence of polit-ical spoils, with party workers and favourites holding the key positions in the bureaucracy, particularly in its broad middle spectrum. Such positions include the heads of the bureaus, departments, and agencies carrying on almost all of the special-ized work of bureaucracy. Riggs has observed that although such an arrangement may strengthen the political organization, it might lead to a decline in administrative performance of the government. Further, an unchecked spoils could reduce the "legitimacy" and creditability of the political system, assuming that continued governmental ineffectiveness would lead to mass cynicism and alienation.

Riggs seems to have overlooked the possibility that loyal party officials could be quite responsive to the demands of the client-ele, and, if this should be the case, spoils might not cause a reduction of the "legitimacy" of the political system. Rather, the spoilsmen might help enhance the legitimacy of the polity, as they could make bureauracy a less impersonal and more intelligible agent of the State; possibly they could be more motivated to implement new policies than more officious bureau-crats.[42] Moreover, Riggs's analysis does not deal with the possibility that in subordinate and unskilled positions, politically appointed workers might not cause a decline in administrative efficiency;[43] rather, they might well be more responsive to the public, bending rules to enhance their responsiveness. Such changes might have a positive impact on efficiency.

In a "bureaucratic polity", according to Riggs, the bureau-cratic ruling group endeavours to control the powers of the head of state and of the constitutive system. Thus, bureaucracy dominates the policy-making as well as the policy-implementation process. Riggs has observed that "new" or "non-Western" States often, if not always, have unbalanced polities, but these may not necessarily be bureaucratic polities. However, in his earlier

writings, Riggs held that in "transitional" societies bureaucracies generally usurp, in the name of titulage, or popular "guidance", the roles which, in modern society, are played by legislatures, elected executives, and party leaders.[41]

In his discussion of the bureaucratic polity, Riggs has found military regimes supported by civil servants to be the dominant empirical examples. Ferrel Heady has also hypothesized that political control over the bureaucracy is weakest in civil and military elite systems such as South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan. Riggs himself has explored in detail the case of Thailand.[45] Likewise, Henry Goodnow has noted that in Pakistan, members of the higher civil service exert predominant influence on the polity.[46]

Pakistan's case also shows how the "remnants" of a colonial bureaucracy can hold and enhance their influence even after independence. On the other hand, Riggs has claimed that a balanced polity operates in post-colonial India. These two almost diametrically opposed cases underscore the difficulty in generalizing about the political status of a post-colonial bureaucracy.

In regard to the question of imbalance in polities, two other problems are discussed in the literature. These are: the preservation and growth of pluralistic, if not democratic, structures in the political system, and the improvement of bureaucratic performance. For example, Joseph La Palombara has observed that with the process of national development in emerging countries, bureaucracy, with its specialized knowledge, has been able to concentrate considerable power because of the opportunity to make major politico-administrative decisions. This, he has argued, has resulted in the emergence, in several countries, of "overpowering" bureaucracies inhibiting or sometimes precluding the development of democratic polities. He has hypothesized that the situation may be further aggravated if there is a dominant military rather than civil bureaucracy. He has gone so far as to suggest a de-emphasis of the goals of economic development and other developmental measures in order to limit the responsibility of bureaucracy in the process of goal setting and implementation.[47] Goodnow has also observed that the bureaucratic polity makes the development of democratic institutions more difficult.[48]

In this regard, it has been suggested that the dangers of an uncontrolled bureaucracy should be reduced by attempting to make the bureaucracy more representative of the society and to provide built-in checks and balances in the polity.[49] Riggs has argued that to achieve the goals of development, political systems in modernizing societies need greater political responsiveness and increased administrative capacity, and that both these features increase the balance of a system.[50] Thus, a party-run polity may be less capable administratively, while a bureaucratic polity may be less responsive politically. He has suggested, therefore, that one of the important strategies for achieving development goals involving economic growth is to *"adopt policies likely to transform polities which are not balanced into balanced polities."*[51] Riggs has also commented that the Western technical assistance, by strengthening bureaucracy in many modernizing nations, has been responsible for creating unbalanced polities, although this process might have helped in creating a balance in those societies where bureaucracy had been weaker in relation to the constitutive system.[52]

It would appear from the preceding analysis that Riggs has taken a rather limiting view of responsiveness and of administrative capability. The meaning and nature of "responsiveness" may, in fact, vary from one polity to another, and it seems inappropriate to associate it generally with a specific structural characteristic, without looking at the consequences of such a characteristic in particular ecological situations. Furthermore, administrative capability does not necessarily increase if the intermediate level positions in a bureaucracy are filled by career bureaucrats. Much could depend on the calibre of the career civil servants, and the nature of their interaction with the top as well as lower level public officials, and, of course, with the public. Riggs's argument that to accelerate economic growth it may be desirable to transform unbalanced polities into balanced ones appears to ignore the possibility that development programmes in different societies might require varying combinations of structural elements within the polity. It may be desirable, for example, to provide substantial discretionary powers to the manager of a public enterprise competing in the open market, or even to appoint an experienced civil servant as

a Cabinet Minister for the sake of increasing the administrative capability of government. Such an "imbalance" in the political system might increase its performance capability. There is no empirical evidence to suggest a causal relationship between a balanced polity and "superior" administrative performance.[53]

It is clear, however, that Riggs's views are more "balanced" than those of most other scholars.[54] Nevertheless, even in Riggs's writings, one can find a preference for stressing the primacy of the political, and the need to keep bureaucracies "controlled". Most scholars in comparative public administration, influenced by the Western traditions of "neutral" civil servants, appear to find it difficult to accept the idea of politically influential bureaucrats. However, the difficulty of distinguishing between policy-making and its implementation—especially when the political leadership has to rely on professionals—should be recognized.[55] Reinhard Bendix has emphasized that the use of discretion is *not* synonymous with the abuse of authority. And considering the "quality" of several political structures in "new" nations, it is conceivable that bureaucracies, with their expertise and "modernizing" outlook, are likely to gain a prominent place in the political system, even when they are not "power-hungry."[56] They control many of the most valuable action resources. But they are subject to several positing domestic and international influences including professional performance values, which increase the responsibility of their developmental preference. Moreover, as Ralph Braibanti has suggested, bureaucracies, like other institutions, can become representative, and also responsible to the public.

It needs to be stressed that too much emphasis on the development of balanced polities may be detrimental in the context of "developing" nations. Ferrel Heady has warned that "It would be political suicide for a struggling nation with inchoate non-bureaucratic political institutions to insist for the sake of balance that the bureaucracy deliberately be brought down to the same level of inadequacy."[57] Milton Esman has charged some "academic analysts" in comparative public administration with an unreasonable suspicion of bureaucracy as an institution. He has rejected the "academic analyst's" extended search for political and social disorders which might result from improve-

ment of the bureaucratic system, and instead has proposed that we "focus more directly on the substantive programmatic or institutional objectives of public administration."[53] The "proper balance" in the polity may depend, among other factors, on the stage of political development of a nation State and on the nature of the programme goals it has chosen for accomplishment through administrative instrumentalities, as well as on the distribution of technical competence and political activism within its society.

Conclusion

Weber's analysis of the interactional patterns between the political system and its bureaucracy should be viewed in the context of the time when Weber wrote his ideas. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Prussian bureaucracy had a dominating influence on the politico-administrative system. Weber always appeared to prefer a political system which would not be monopolized by any one particular group, but instead would be regulated by some patterns of checks and balances among various components of the system. It is in this perspective that his analysis of an apparent dichotomy between the role of the politicians and of the bureaucrats should be studied. Nevertheless, Weber showed great awareness of the difficulty of dichotomizing politics and administration in empirical situations, and recognized that constant competition among the politicians and the bureaucrats was a common feature of a polity with a legal-rational character.

Further, Weber recognized that while a democracy needed an efficient bureaucracy, it could still be threatened by this bureaucracy. However, he also saw that bureaucracy had a levelling effect on the socio-political system by broadening the base of peoples' participation in government.

Today, much of this Weberian thinking appears to have been incorporated by Fred Riggs in his writings. Riggs's ideas on the relationship between the political system and its bureaucracy should be seen in the context of the following three goals that he has implicitly considered as essential for a contemporary polity:

1. Legitimacy: For a government to operate effectively, it must be accepted and recognized by people to constitute their legitimate State.

2. Stability or balance: Government, in order to have self-restraint and integrity, should be subjected to the discipline of countervailing powers.

3. Capacity: Government should have capacity to make and implement political decisions—decisions that bring about changes of a desired (intended) type.

Fred Riggs, in his analysis, appears to have considered efficiency and representativeness (or pluralism) as means to achieve the above goals. However, his major emphasis in his study has been on the problem of balancing the polity, rather than on its performance in policy-making and policy-implementation.

Other scholars in comparative public administration have also studied extensively the issues concerning political control over bureaucracy and those pertaining to the balance or imbalance in the political system. Most scholars have shown their preference for the primacy of the political over the administrative. This viewpoint appears to be a direct outcome of the Western values and experience. In fact, this concern with a general formula for "balance" for the polity, which ignores the specific goals and resources of a particular political system at a particular time, involves too sweeping a focus. It is possible that at a particular stage of national development, a "bureaucratic polity" may prove to be more helpful in maintaining political stability than would a "party-run" polity. Likewise, it may be necessary, sometimes, to strengthen the political system to allow bureaucracy to function effectively. Scholars such as Ralph Braibanti and Milton Esman have moved away from the singular stress upon balance, and by associating the issue of balance with particular ecological conditions of a country, have made their studies more ecological.

The ecological perspective, however, is still underdeveloped in the study of the interaction of the bureaucracy with other components of the political system. A stress on the study of "balance" in polities has led to an analysis of the political system as a whole, and with the "constitutive system" in particular. With the expansion of interest in this area, it may be expected that the bureaucracy's relations with certain particular structures, such as legislatures, parties, interest groups, political communication systems, and electoral systems will gain greater interest in comparative study of public administration.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethics and the Rise of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribners Sons, 1958), pp. 389-90.

2 Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrine of Public Administration," *American Political Science Review*, L (1956), p. 1060.

3 John M. Pfiffner and Robert Presthus, *Public Administration* (5th ed., New York: The Ronald Press Co.. 1967), p. 42.

4 *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated, edited and with an introduction by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), hereafter cited as *Essays*, p. 228

5 *Ibid.*, p. 232. Here Weber was probably talking of the empirical reality in the modern State, and not of "fully developed" in an ideal-type sense.   6 *Ibid.*, p. 233.

7 Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), hereafter cited as *Portrait*, p. 452.

8 Quoted in Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Administration* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962), pp. 80-81.

9 Bendix, *Portrait*, pp. 456-57.

10 "This legality . . . may derive from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties on the relevant terms. On the other hand, it may be imposed on the basis of what is held to be a legitimate authority." Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), hereafter cited as *Theory*, p. 130.   11 *Essays*, pp. 224-28.

12 Cf. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1957).

13 *Essays*, p. 231.   14 See, *Ibid.*, pp. 232-35.

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¹⁵ H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, "Introduction," in *Ibid.*, p. 18. It may be interesting to note that Weber, during his visit to the United States in 1904, recognized the "function" of "machine politics". As Gerth and Mills have noted, Weber appreciated the indispensability of machine politics in a modern "mass democracy"; otherwise a "leaderless democracy" and a confusion of tongues could prevail. Machine politics, in this context, denotes the management of politics by professionals, the disciplined party organization and its organized propaganda. Such a process could facilitate the emergence of a strong leader, whether in the role of a strong president or the city manager [sic]. This centralization process, according to Weber, stimulated greater rationality and efficiency in the bureaucratic machine, *Ibid.*, p. 17. Thus Weber recognized that a kind of spoils system could promote "political development" which in turn could stimulate "administrative development". For a similar view of the role of spoils in political development, see, Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 120-67.

¹⁶ The following discussion is based on Peter Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (1963), pp. 315-16.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 315.   ¹⁸ Bendix, *Portrait*, p. 423.

¹⁹ *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 24: Emphasis.

²⁰ See, Riggs, Comparative Bureaucracy: A Focus for the Study of Comparative Politics, paper prepared for the Sub-committee on Comparative Bureaucracy of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (1958). In this paper Riggs's main focus was on the power role of bureaucracy in its political setting. He proposed a typology of bureaucracy, based on such a role. It included five types of bureaucracies: guardian, caste, tutelage, spoils, and merit, with tutelage type represented by the transitional societies. Riggs's typology was a modification of Fritz Morstein Marx's distinctions among guardian, caste, patronage, and merit bureaucracies. See, Morstein Marx, *The*

Administrative State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 54-72.

21 Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, II (1887), pp. 197-222; Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1969).

22 *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, p. 106.

23 See various essays in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*. From a historical-sociological perspective, Samuel Eisenstadt has analysed the structures and functions of bureaucratic machine in relation to the evolution of political systems in a cross-cultural context. See his, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: Free Press, 1963).

24 "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in La Palombara (ed.), *op. cit.*, 233 ff.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 235.   26 *Ibid.*   27 *Ibid.*, p. 236

28 *Ibid.*, pp. 236-37.

29 Heady, while typifying bureaucratic systems, has also distinguished between the "developed" and the "developing" nations. In his framework, France and Germany have "classic" administrative systems; British and American administration is influenced by the "civic culture" of the polity; Japan has a "modernizing administration," and the U.S.S.R. presents a case of "administration under Communism". In the "developing" nations also, bureaucracies are affected by the nature of the political systems in which they work. Such, systems may be classified as "traditional-autocratic" (examples: Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan); "bureaucratic elite systems—civil and military" (examples: Burma, Pakistan, Thailand); "polyarchal competitive systems" (examples: the Philippines, Malaya, Ceylon); "dominant-party mobilization systems" (examples: the U.A.R., Tunisia); "Communist totalitarian systems" (examples: North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba). Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, pp. 41-57; 73-97.

30 S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization," *Current Sociology*, VII (1958), p. 103. On the power role of bureaucracy, see also, Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucrat-

ization and Debureaucratization," *Administrative Science Qtrly.*, IV (1959), pp. 302-20; and Arnold Brecht, "How Bureaucracies Develop and Function," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 292 (March 1954), pp. 1-10.

[31] *Journal of Comparative Administration,* I (1969), pp. 5-38.

[32] *Ibid.,* p. 17.   [33] *Ibid.,* p. 11.   [34] *Ibid.,* p. 18.

[35] *Ibid.* Likewise, Ferrel Heady has suggested that in the "developed" nations, whether democratic or totalitarian, there exists sufficient political control over bureaucracy, while still allowing the bureaucrats substantial participation in the policy-making process. *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective,* p. 108.

[36] While referring to the "polyarchal competitive systems" among the "developing" societies (examples: the Philippines, Malaysia, Jamaica, Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, Lebanon, Ceylon, Turkey, etc.), Heady has argued that the trend is toward a "better balance between the bureaucracy and other political institutions in regimes that resemble those of developed democratic polities," *Ibid.,* p. 109.

[37] Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics," pp. 34-35.

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 28.   [39] *Ibid.,* p. 19.   [40] *Ibid.,* p. 26.

[41] *Ibid.,* p. 23.

[42] Richard Sisson, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective: A Commentary and Critique," *Journal of Comparative Administration,* I (1969), p. 41.

[43] Though Riggs does not appear to be quite clear as to whether the lower administrative positions would also fit in his definition of "bureaucracy," it can be assumed that they would.

[44] See, Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 74. Riggs has shown great interest, at least until recently, essentially in "bureaucratic polities". See his, *Thailand: Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966).

[45] *Thailand: Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity.*

[46] "Bureaucracy and Political Power in the New States," in *The Civil Service of Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 3-22.

[47] "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," pp. 3-33; also "Bureaucracy and Political Development: Notes, Queries, and Dilemmas," pp. 34-61, in La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*.

[48] Henry Goodnow, *op. cit.*

[49] Bernard M. Brown, *New Directions in Comparative Politics* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), pp. 49-51.

[50] Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics," p. 34.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 34. Emphasis original.

[52] In fact, the predominant theme in the whole of La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, is that the polity must be upgraded first and foremost whereas improvement of the administrative apparatus without "proper" political control could cause "undue" increase in the bureaucratic power and the dangers which have been associated with it.

[53] "Bureaucracy," *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, II, p. 24.

[54] However, Riggs, like La Palombara, had earlier suggested that deliberate measures should be taken to limit the bureaucratic expansion and strengthen political institutions which could control bureaucracy. For elaboration, see "Relearning an Old Lesson: The Political Context of Development Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XXV (1965), pp. 70-79.

[55] Richard Sisson, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[56] Sisson has noted that several historical, unbalanced polities stimulated more effective performance, e.g., Ataturk's Turkey, Tudor England, Bismarckian Germany, Meiji Japan, etc., *Ibid.*, p. 44. Likewise, studies of France under the Fourth Republic and of Mao's China after the Cultural Revolution may also reveal interesting findings in this context.

[57] *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, p. 106.

[58] "The Ecological Style in Comparative Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XXVII (1967), p. 278.

Riggs's "Administrative Ecology"

FRED W. RIGGS, who is perhaps the most innovative contemporary theorist in comparative public administration, has been concerned primarily with conceptualizing on the interactions between administrative systems and their environment. The main locus of his interest has involved "developing"[1] or transitional societies. It is to explain the "administrative ecology" of such societies that he has constructed "prismatic-sala" models. In order to provide a background for these models, certain key elements of the ecological and the structural-functional modes of analyses will be discussed briefly in this chapter. This analysis will be followed by an introduction to certain basic components of early Riggs's typology of "Agraria" and "Industria"; then the essential characteristics of his "fused-prismatic-diffracted" typology will be given. Some critical comments will also be offered on these models. It may be stressed that Riggs is an example of those comparative public administration writers who are seriously interested in the ecological perspective. An analysis of his work will allow a fuller examination of the emerging emphasis upon ecology.

Riggs has concluded that Weber's ideal-type construct of bureaucracy, because of its assumptions of a relatively autonomous administrative system, is not particularly relevant to the study of developing societies, where the administrative structures do not have the same degree of autonomy from other social structures as do their counterparts in many of the developed societies. Administrative structures which are in close and continuous interaction with many portions of the general social system adopt a highly multifunctional character in the developing countries. It is even likely that these structures perform less of the strictly "administrative" and more of a variety of "extra-administrative" functions. There may even be cases when the "manifest" administrative function is entirely lost sight of in

practice. In such situations, it would be most difficult to evaluate an administrative sub-system on the basis of its departures from the strict norms of the ideal-type bureaucracy. The "real" bureaucratic systems in the developing States are so removed from either the legal-rational model or the purely traditional type that to study them with the aid of such "pure" dichotomous constructs will provide misleading results.[2] Therefore, Riggs has argued, there is need to develop new conceptual constructs to study societies which have a *mixture* of "primitive" and "modern" structural characteristics.[3]

The "overlapping" and "heterogeneous" structures in the developing societies, Riggs has further observed, are difficult to encompass within the conceptual framework of Weber's bureaucratic model which appears to be based on the assumption of a continuous trend of certain broad social structures (especially the administrative ones) toward universal "bureaucratization".[4] Eugene Litwak has claimed that Weber's bureaucratic model "is most efficient when the organization deals primarily with uniform events and with occupations stressing traditional areas of knowledge rather than social skill."[5] In this context, Karl Deutsch has commented that Weber did not provide any "dynamic" ideal-types, although in Weberian analysis "change" is dealt with in discussions of historical systems.[6]

It has also been pointed out that a widely underemphasized aspect of Weber's bureaucratic analysis is the linkage between the "macroscopic" and the "microscopic" via middle-range levels of analysis. Except for studying in some detail the interaction between the political system and its administrative sub-systems, Weber did not analyse extensively the linkages of the economic and socio-cultural systems with the bureaucracy. Although he related "bureaucratization" with the emergence of a money economy and with the nature of capitalism,[7] and also referred to the effect of bureaucracy in levelling socio-economic differences in a society,[8] Weber's analytical treatment of the interaction among the phenomena is found to be "less developed".

Further, Talcott Parsons has noted that even though "all of the most important technical elements of Weber's analysis of authority are of generalized significance for the whole field of social relationships", Weber tends to "treat the sphere of the

organization of authority as *analytically* autonomous in a way which obscures this continuity of patterns throughout the social system as a whole."[9] Parsons has also criticized Weber for not employing systematically the concept of generalized social system at all main levels.

In addition, it has been argued that interactional patterns between authority systems and other social structures are understressed in Weberian analysis. Thus, Alvin Gouldner has pointed out that the ideal-type model is "theory relatively innocent of spatio-temporal cautions," and that it gives the impression that bureaucracy "has existed in an essentially similar form, regardless of great differences in the social structures in which it was enmeshed". Weber's bureaucratic model, Gouldner has observed, has been created only out of elements "which may be constant, regardless of varying social structures".[10]

While considering the above criticism of Weberian analysis, it appears that several scholars who profess to believe in the "idea of ecology" overlook the efficacy of the "ecology of ideas". There seems to be a tendency among some writers to pay only lip-service to Weber's contribution to the socio-administrative analysis, and then to criticize him for what he did not do. Long check-lists are often prepared to point out what is missing in Weberian analysis. This way, not only is Weber's real contribution disparaged, but injustice is also done to scholarly analysis by evaluating a writer outside a "proper" perspective. In fact, however, Weber must be studied in the context of the time he was writing his ideas, of his methodology of ideal-types, of the heuristic character of his analysis, of his discussion of historical systems, and, most importantly, of his place in the evolution of social thought.

Discovery of "limitations" of Newton's law of gravity was not possible until the major development of his ideas had led to the discovery of new unexplainable anomalies. To criticize him now for not taking into account the theory of relativity would reflect no more than an extremely anti-ecological bias. Paradoxically, however, Weber's bureaucratic analysis is often evaluated from the standpoint of all the advances which organization theory, systemic analysis, and developmental theory have made in the last thirty years or so. Thus, it should be stressed that Weber

for example, has observed that only those studies are "truly" comparative which are empirical, nomothetic, and ecological.[16] From this perspective, administrative process may be viewed as a system having an environment with which it interacts, and in which it operates.[17] This proposition is a corollary of the view that the "larger society" is a "system containing administrative institutions as a sub-system."[18] Riggs has been primarily interested in analysing the interaction between the administrative sub-system on the one hand and the political, social, cultural and economic sub-systems of the society on the other. This speaks of his basic orientation, which is termed as *ecological*.[19] Behind such a perspective lies Riggs's belief that the nature of public administration in any country cannot be understood without grasping the social setting in which it operates.

A useful approach in the ecological analysis of different social systems is "structural-functionalism". Riggs has considered this framework of analysis appropriate to his ecological orientation in the study of administrative systems, for, in many ways, structural-functionalism involves a delineation of the *general* social context within which administration operates. Therefore, an overview of the structural-functional approach is pertinent at this point.

The Structural-Functional Approach

Various scholars, such as Talcott Parsons,[20] Robert Merton,[21] Marion Levy, Jr.,[22] Gabriel Almond,[23] and David Apter,[24] have used the structural-functional approach in social analysis. In structural functionalism, social structure is considered as "any pattern of behavior which has become a standard feature of a social system".[25] Structures may be "concrete," such as government departments and bureaus, or they may be "analytic," i.e., constructs abstracted from concrete reality, such as "structure of authority."[26] Generally, analytic structures include some concrete referents.

All social structures perform some "functions". In structural-functional terms, a "function" involves "a pattern of interdependence between two or more structures, a relationship between variables". It refers to "any consequences of a structure in so far as they affect other structures or the total system of which they are a part".[27]

In social systems research, a one-to-one relationship between structures and functions should not be assumed; the functional effects of particular structures are a matter of empirical research.[28] A social structure may perform more than one function, and, likewise, a function may be performed by more than one structure. These premises allow the structural-functional analysis to obviate the misconceptions that (a) structures having resemblance to each other in different environmental settings perform similar functions; (b) the non-appearance of any particular structure implies the absence of some function(s); or (c) structures may be only unifunctional in character.[29] Even though not all kinds of functions are performed in *all* societies, the structural-functional approach assumes that there are some structures and functions which are "requisite" or "prerequisite" for the survival or health of a society.[30] Although various scholars have produced different sets of requisite functions of social systems, this does not lessen the utility of these concepts which provide "categories to identify structures, which, though different, are analytically comparable".[31] Thus, in comparative analysis, functional requisites provide a basis for comparative research involving different environmental settings.

Riggs has identified five functional requisites for any society—economic, social, communicational, symbolic, and political.[32] The same set of functional requisities applies to an administrative sub-system. Riggsian analysis does not argue as to why only these functional requisites are chosen, nor does his analysis provide such categories a central place.

The present summary is an incomplete overview of the structural-functional approach. But even this overview makes it relatively clear that this particular mode of analysis:

1. focuses on the *interactions* among various components within a social system, and

2. analyses the interaction between the system and its environment.

These characteristics are indicative of the "systemic-ecological" character of the structural-functional approach.[33]

In the field of public administration, it was first suggested in 1955 by Dwight Waldo that structural-functional analysis might provide some guidance in the construction of "a model of what

an administrative system is like as a general type".[34] Waldo's suggestion was first followed by Fred W. Riggs when he came out with his "agraria-industria" typology two years later.[35] Since then, Riggs has been the prime "user" of the approach in comparative public administration, although other scholars have also been influenced by the comparative features and the "value-neutral" premises of structural-functionalism. Basically, the approach has brought a consciousness that the institutions and practices of the administrative systems of the Western nations are not necessarily the best in all cases. These various indigenous structures in non-Western nations, though seemingly dysfunctional from Western views, may prove "functional" for their own particular social settings.[36]

The Agraria and the Industria

In his agraria-industria models, Riggs distinguished between societies that are "predominantly or characteristically industrial" and those in which the "agrarian institutions predominate".[37] The models were designed to provide "a system of hypothetical categories for the classification and analysis of realities, including patterns of political and administrative transition".[38] The polar types were abstracted from observed realities, with Imperial China and contemporary America providing the bases for conceptualizing the agraria and the industria respectively. Essentially, these ideal-types resemble the Weberian constructs of the traditional and the legal-rational authority systems, although unlike Weber, Riggs used an inductive approach in conceptualizing these models. The main structural features of the agraria were presented as follows:[39]

1. Predominance of ascriptive, particularistic, and diffuse patterns.[40]

2. Stable local groups and limited spatial mobility.

3. Relatively simple and stable "occupational" differentiation.

4. A deferential stratification system of diffuse impact.

Conversely, a "modern industrial society" was characterized as having the following structural features:[41]

1. Predominance of universalistic, specific, and achievement norms.

2. High degree of social mobility (in a general—not necessarily vertical/sense).

3. Well-developed occupational system, insulated from other social structures.

4. "Egalitarian" class system based on generalized patterns of occupational achievement.

5. Prevalence of "associations," i.e., functionally specific, non-ascriptive structure.

Several scholars, including Riggs, found that the polar types of agraria and industria were not especially helpful in studying transitional societies. Although Riggs did construct a middle category of "transitia," this category was less developed than the polar types of the agraria and the industria. The ideal-types lacked sufficient mechanism to analyse "mixed-type" societies. Critics argued that the modern "industrian" system never exists by itself, but always has an "agrarian" system inside it.[42] These models also implied a unidirectional movement of a society—moving from an agrarian stage to an industrian stage. More-over, from a researcher's viewpoint, the categories of the models were found to be too abstract and general, and most strikingly, the analysis of administrative systems was provided only a peripheral place in the whole scheme.[43] Riggs himself soon abandoned the agraria-industria typology in favour of a new scheme of constructs dealing with "fused-prismatic-diffracted" societies. In spite of some of its limitations, the agraria-industria typology contributed significantly in the field of comparative public administration by paving the way for further ecological studies, to which Riggs's contribution is still predominant.

The Models of Fused-Prismatic-Diffracted Societies

In conformity with the concept of multifunctionality, social structures may be "functionally diffuse" (if they perform a large number of functions), or "functionally specific" (if they carry out certain prescribed limited functions).[44] Riggs has termed the functionally diffuse societies as "fused" and the functionally specific ones as "diffracted". The modal society intermediate between these two polar types is "prismatic".[45] The fused-prismatic-diffracted models are designed then to be

"ideal types not to be found in any actual society, but perhaps approximated in some, and useful for heuristic purposes and as an aid in the organization of data".[46]

Using Parsonian pattern variables, Riggs has hypothesized that "a diffracted system would rank high in terms of universalism and achievement orientation, a fused model high in particularism and ascription, with the prismatic model intermediate in these scales".[47] Riggs has also developed intermediate categories of pattern variables. Thus, a prismatic society is characterized by "selectivism" (intermediate category between universalism and particularism), "attainment" (intermediate category between achievement and ascription), and "polyfunctionalism" (intermediate category between functional specificity and functional diffuseness). Riggs has cautioned that correlations among these variables will be a matter of hypothesis alone and not of definition, i.e., only by empirical observations can the existence and degree of such correlations be identified.

The focus of Riggs's analysis is the study of certain key elements of the social structures in a prismatic society and their interaction with the "sala," i.e., the administrative sub-system in such a society.[48] His treatment of the fused and diffracted societies is sketchy, and has relevance only to the extent that it aids the analysis of prismatic societies. Riggs's primary interest has been to illuminate administrative problems in transitional or developing societies.[49]

A summary of the basic characteristics of the prismatic-sala model of Riggs is in order.[50] Three such features have been identified by Riggs—"heterogeneity," "formalism," and "overlapping".

Heterogeneity

A prismatic society is characterized by a high degree of "heterogeneity," which refers to the "simultaneous presence, side by side, of quite different kinds of systems, practices, and viewpoints".[51] The coexistence of fused and the diffracted traits is an indication and consequence of incomplete and uneven social change. There are, in a prismatic society, urban areas with a "sophisticated" intellectual class, Western style offices,

and the modern gadgets of administration. On the other hand, there exist rural areas possessing traditional looks and outlooks, with village heads or "elders" combining various political, administrative, religious, and social roles. This heterogeneity is a characteristic of the administrative structures as well. In a prismatic society, the *sala* exists along with modern "bureau" and traditional "courts" or chambers.

Formalism

"Formalism" refers to ."the degree of discrepancy or congruence between the formally prescribed and the effectively practiced, between norms and realities".[52] The level of congruence between these elements speaks of the degree of "realism"; conversely, the discrepancy between them represents formalism. "The greater the discrepancy between the formal and effective, the more formalistic a system."[53] The fused and the diffracted societies have relatively high degree of realism,[54] while a prismatic society is characterized by a high degree of formalism. Actual official behaviour in prismatic societies does not correspond to legal statutes, even though the public officials may insist on following some of the laws literally. Often they insist on meticulously following some technical provision of laws and rules, while at the same time overlooking others—usually those that relate to general terms and objectives. Formalistic behaviour is caused by "the lack of pressure toward program objectives, the weaknesses of social power as a guide to bureaucratic performance, and a great permissiveness for arbitrary administration".[55] The motivation for formalistic behaviour may come from an official's natural "inclinations" or from the pay-off he gets in a particular situation. Thus formalism, generally, joins with the process of official corruption.

The policy implication of the realism-formalism dichotomy, according to Riggs, is that formal reforms in administrative institutions in a diffracted society are likely to introduce changes in the administrative behaviour, while in a prismatic society, such reforms are likely to have only a superficial impact. Therefore, an attitude fostering realism should be nurtured among the public officials prior to bringing about any institutional changes in the administration of prismatic societies.

Overlapping

Related to heterogeneity and formalism is the characteristic of "overlapping", which refers to "the extent to which formally differentiated structures of a diffracted society coexist with undifferentiated structures of a fused type".[56] To the extent that structures perform their manifest functions in a diffracted society, substantial overlapping does not occur. Likewise, in a fused society, which has only one set of structures for almost all kinds of functions, the problem of overlapping does not arise, because in such a society, whatever is formal is also effective. In a prismatic society, on the other hand, although new or "modern" social structures are created, in essence the older or undifferentiated structures continue to dominate the social system. New norms or values generally associated with the diffracted structures are paid lip-service only and thus are overlooked in favour of older values more appropriate to an undifferentiated society.[57] In the sala, overlapping may be judged by the "extent to which what is described as 'administrative' behaviour is actually determined by non-administrative criteria, i.e., by political, economic, social, religious, or other factors".[58]

Overlapping in a prismatic society has several noticeable dimensions. These are conceptualized as nepotism, "poly-communalism," the existence of "clects," "poly-normativism," lack of consensus, and the separation of "authority" from "control".

Nepotism

In a diffracted society, the considerations of family loyalty are divorced from official behaviour. While in a fused society, the politico-administrative system has a patrimonial character and, therefore, provides dominant importance to kinship or family. On the other hand, in a prismatic society, the new formal structures are superimposed on the family and kinship. In addition, universalistic norms in administering the laws are often disregarded, while the official recruitment is determined by nepotism. Thus, patrimonialism is officially proscribed, but in fact practised.

"Poly-Communalism" or "Clects"

In a diffracted society, almost everyone is "mobilized" for "mass communication". Such a society has a "national community" which exists with its own set of elites ("minority communities"). In a diffused society, on the other hand, mass media are absent, and hence there is a lack of mass mobilization. Each village or tribe exists as a relatively closed system. Between these two polar types falls the prismatic society where the rate of mass assimilation to the elite's symbol system is likely to be slower than the rate of mobilization.[59] This situation produces a state of "poly-communalism," or the simultaneous existence in a society of various ethnic, religious, and racial groups which live in a "relatively hostile interaction" with each other. In such a poly-communal society, membership in various "interest groups" is largely community based. Riggs has called these groups "clects," which have characteristics of attainment orientation, selectivism, and poly-functionalism. Clects carry out relatively diffuse functions of a semi-traditional type, although they are organized in a "modern" associational way.

Poly-communalism and clects influence the character of the sala. A public official in a prismatic society is likely to develop a greater sense of loyalty toward the members of his own community than toward the government. In matters of recruitment to the official positions and of the administration of rules and regulations, the dominant minority community gains disproportionate representation.[60] However, to protect the interests of other minorities a "quota system" may provide a sort of proportional representation in the recruitment to official positions. But such an arrangement may lead to a mutual hostility among various communities, which in turn tends to generate non-cooperation among the several government agencies staffed by members of the rival communities.

Sometimes the sala, or one of its agencies, develops close relations with particular clects, or starts functioning like a clect itself. In these circumstances, the sala functions primarily in the interest of some particular groups, but it continues to pay lip-service to achievement and universalistic norms. As a consequence of this alliance between sala and clects, sala officials profit

through kickbacks or rebates. This aspect of prismatic behaviour is closely related to the economic sub-system of a prismatic society.

Prismatic Economy—the "Bazaar-Canteen" Model

In a diffracted society, prices are determined essentially by the market factors of supply and demand. Conversely, "arena factors" (considerations which determine balance of power, prestige, and solidarity) in the society dominate the economic system of a fused society, and the question of price scarcely arises. In a prismatic society "market" and "arena" factors interact with each other and produce a state of "price indeterminacy", where it is generally impossible to determine a common price for a commodity or service.

Riggs has studied the exchange relationship between public officials and their clients in terms of buyer-seller relationship. Thus, prices charged for public services in a prismatic society vary according to the nature of the relationship between a public servant and his clientele. Services are sold to the members of the "inside" clects and of the dominant community at preferential (reduced) rates, and, conversely, at higher charges to members of the "deviant" or minority community and of the "outside" clects. In other words, the economic organizations in a prismatic society generally act like a "subsidized" canteen, providing goods and services at lower rates to the members of privileged groups and to the politically "influential" persons having access to the canteen. In addition, these economic organizations have characteristics of a "tributary canteen"; they charge higher prices to members of the "outside" groups.

Price-indeterminacy promotes a bazaar-like atmosphere in a prismatic society, involving considerable bargaining on the amounts of financial dealings with regard to such areas as taxes, fees, rebates, and bribes. Such practices influence considerably the whole set-up of the financial administration and, most particularly, that of budgeting, accounting, and auditing. Price indeterminacy also impairs the collection of government revenues, causing, among other things, low salaries for public officials. As a corollary to low emoluments through regular channels

public officials feel more inclined and motivated to increase their income through illegitimate means. Thus, the norms of official conduct are affected by, and, in turn, affect, the economic sub-system of a prismatic society.

"Poly-Normativism" and Lack of Consensus

In a prismatic society, "new" sets of norms and rules coexist with the traditional ways of behaviour. As a result of an over-lapping of the formal and the "effective" standards of conduct, prismatic society's social interactions are characterized by a lack of consensus on norms of behaviour. Such a situation of "poly-normativism" or "normlessness" affects the sala, where officials, although publicly claiming to follow objective, univers-alistic, and achievement-oriented practices, actually follow more subjective, ascription-oriented, and particularistic modes of conduct. They also respect the traditional rigid hierarchy of status. These officials claim to apply Western rationalistic norms in their conduct, but still continue to cling to the traditional practices. In their desire to imitate the West and their own past simultaneously, the officials develop a "mimetic" behaviour, which involves borrowing or appropriating what others have done.

A prismatic society's source of potential public officials is generally restricted to certain particular groups. Even when the officials acquire rank through achievement (via education or through a competitive examination), the opportunities for careers development and fringe-benefits depend largely on ascribed means, particularly support of one's superiors and seniority in service. Even the citizen, in his relationship with the sala, is poly-normative—ready to disregard official rules for his own benefits, and yet stressing the idea that governmental conduct should be of a strict legal-rational character.

Power Distribution: Authority Vs. Control

The power structure of a prismatic society consists of a "highly centralized and concentrated authority structure overlapping a control system that is highly localized and dispersed".[41] There

exists a separation of "authority" ("officially sanctioned or legitimate power") and "control" ("real" but "unofficially permitted or illegitimate power").

The authority of the sala overlaps with the society's control structures which are based in poly-communalism, clects, and poly-normativism. Thus, the administrative function "may be performed by concrete structures oriented primarily toward this function and also by other structures lacking this primary orientation".[62] Such an overlapping influences the relationship between politicians and administrators. Generally, a prismatic society has what Riggs has called "unbalanced polity" with bureaucrats dominating the politics-administrative system.[63] This is so, despite the politicians' possessing formal policy-making authority. Thus, the sala officials have more extensive participation in decision-making processes than do their counterparts in a diffracted society. Such concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucrats tends to result in a lack of official responsiveness to public needs and wishes. Riggs has held that the strengthening of public administration in transitional societies is likely to block political development.[64]

To an important degree, the influence of political leaders (or those having "authority") varies with their ability to reward or punish the administrators. A weak "formal leadership" may not be able to reward bureaucrats adequately for the achievement of organizational goals and, therefore, might unintentionally motivate the sala administrator to devote most of his attentions to safeguarding and promoting his own material interests. Thus, the behaviour of the sala official ranges from an effectively dominant control over decision-making to the role of a sinecurist.

Whatever role a bureaucrat might play in a prismatic society, he influences considerably the level of output in the sala. Riggs has suggested that "there is an inverse ratio between administrative output and bureaucratic power: the more powerful officials become, the less effective they are as administrators".[65] The sala is characterized by nepotism in recruitment, institutionalized corruption, inefficiency in the administration of laws, and by the motives of gaining power and of protecting its own interests. The sala behaviour is "basically wasteful and prodigal".[66]

Much of the overlapping and formalism has to do with the character of development in a particular society. It would be pertinent to see how different sources of social change in a prismatic society induce some of its characteristics.

The Dilemma of Change in a Prismatic Society

Riggs has observed that because of the relatively long time-span of their development, the Western nations were able to adjust gradually their effective behaviour to the evolving prescribed behaviour. Consequently, these nations experienced less formalism, heterogeneity, and overlapping than is faced by the contemporary transitional societies. This difference in the pace of development is related basically to the sources of change in a particular society.

A prismatic society faces pressure for change from external sources as well as from internal ones. If change is caused primarily by external pressures (as under technical assistance programmes), it may be called "exo-genous" change. Conversely, change that is stimulated predominantly through internal processes is "endo-genous". When both types of pressures for change are relatively equal in strength, the change they produce is "equi-genetic".

Riggs has hypothesized that the more exo-genetic the process of diffraction, the more formalistic and heterogeneous its prismatic phase; the more endo-genetic, the less formalistic and heterogeous.[67] Thus, greater formalism, heterogeneity, and overlapping are likely to exist in an "exo-prismatic" society than in an "endo-prismatic" one. This difference results because, with endo-genetic change, "effective" behaviour precedes the creation of new formal institutions, but in an exo-genetic transformation the sequence is reversed. Paradoxically, in their bid to absorb the externally induced change in the shortest possible time, prismatic societies face the possibilities of higher formalism, heterogeneity, and "the severity of revolutionary tensions".[68]

Appraisal

A critical appraisal of certain salient characteristics of the prismatic-sala model in the overall context of the Riggsian typology of social and administrative systems is now possible.

Ecological models, such as those of Riggs, provide conceptual tools "for identifying and analysing the contextual values that motivate administrative behaviour" in the developing countries.[69] A "truly" ecological approach in public administration, however, would study the *interactions* between the administrative system and its environment and thus would analyse the way each of them affects the other's behaviour. In Riggs's analysis of the prismatic society, the major focus is upon the impact of the environment on the administrative structures. In his analysis, public administration appears to be a dependent variable, with little autonomy or independent capacity to control or modify its environment except as a result of external forces. This feature of Riggsian models becomes quite manifest in the analysis of the interaction between the sala and various socio-cultural and economic environmental structures. It is less manifest in Riggs's hypotheses on the relationship between the political system and its bureaucracy, for he makes much of the relative dominance of bureaucracy over the political system. In fact, however, the independent variables in his analysis lie *outside* bureaucracy in the social system. Since many prismatic societies in the real world have relatively autonomous administrative sub-systems capable of directing socio-economic change, an analysis of prismatic societies should take into account the variation in the capabilities of administrative systems in different settings.

The major thrust of Riggs's models involves the structure of the environment of administrative systems and not the administrative systems themselves. His primary concern appears to be the input side of the administrative system, rather than throughput or output. The prismatic model is "relatively more successful as a conceptualization of developing social systems than as an analysis of the place of administration in such systems".[70] This is so mainly because Riggs has "not fully worked out the implications of his theory for public administration".[71]

As regards the structure of the environment of administrative systems, Riggs's models understate the possibility that various social structures may vary independently of each other. There are several cases, however, in the empirical universe where a "developing" prismatic society has "prismatic" socio-cultural sub-systems, but a relatively diffracted bureaucratic sub-system.

For example, in India and Malaysia, largely as a result of their colonial experience, there is a considerable role-differentiation between the politicians and the bureaucrats, with the politicians generally being supreme. Although Riggs pays lip-service to the possibility of a variety of mixes, the major thrust of the prismatic model appears to be based on the assumption that there is a high degree of co-variation of certain structures, thus producing a limited set structural combination. There exists, therefore, a clear need to construct more "mixed" type categories for the analysis of transitional societies, which would also take into account the degree of autonomy of each sub-system in a society.

The absence of such variously mixed analytical categories in Riggsian analysis has led to certain unfortunate causal implications. It is not necessarily true, for example, that formalism enhances the power of bureaucrats, or that increased power of administrators leads to administrative ineffectiveness. Nor can it be claimed that the subordination of bureaucrats necessarily makes the functioning of power centres more effective.[72] In fact, much would depend on the way a term such as "power" is defined for various social environments. Likewise, Riggs's analysis conveys an impression of causality in his correlation of social and administrative structures.[73] One might argue that such impressions of causality are ingredients of the logical structure of Riggs's ideal-type constructs. Nonetheless, at various points of his analysis Riggs has discussed prismatic patterns and their inter-relationships in a manner that suggests that these are accurate descriptions of patterns existing in the empirical universe.[74]

Riggs could have made his analysis more useful by hypothesizing more extensively on the interrelationships among certain structural conditions within a prismatic society. R.S. Milne has provided an example by specifying certain structural conditions which might cause or promote the emergence or existence of other structural characteristics. He has hypothesized that under two conditions bureaucrats may not be powerful in a prismatic model. First, if there is a tradition of civil service neutrality, and, second, if the politicians are powerful enough to be able to control the bureaucrats.[75] In Pakistan, the first condition obtains, but not the second; in India both prevail to a degree, while in the Philippines the second exists, but not

the first. Thus, Riggs's analysis needs more analytical categories incorporating structural variation among different prismatic societies.

Overlapping—A Restricted Concept

Another area requiring further examination is the concept of "overlapping". In Riggsian analysis "overlapping" appears to be limited in its scope, as it is designed only to indicate the simultaneous existence of traditional institutions and those patterned after Western practices. It does not include certain other sources of overlapping found in transitional societies. John Montgomery has observed that one method of instituting administrative reforms in developing countries without a wholesale replacement of qualified personnel is "to duplicate functions, placing the old bureaucracy in a competitive position or bypassing it altogether". For example, "semi-public corporations and similar devices can serve both to stimulate the bureaucracy and to develop controlled non-governmental capabilities for serving national purposes".[76]

What is true of a developing or prismatic society may also be true of a "relatively diffracted society" like the United States. Michael Crozier has observed that American administrators "do not mind setting up two or three competitive agencies whose conflicts will certainly entail waste, but which also brings new ideas and interesting change".[77] Thus the developed societies, despite having less multifunctionality of structures, are not different from the developing societies in regard to the phenomenon of overlapping considered broadly. Moreover, it should be noted carefully that overlapping *per se* is not dysfunctional to the process of administrative development. In some cases, as Crozier remarked, it might bring "new ideas and interesting change".

Thus, Riggs's ecological models should give greater recognition to the existence of overlapping in other contexts. An analysis of the sources of overlapping in relatively diffracted societies could add to the heuristic utility of Riggs's models. Otherwise, the practice of associating the feature of overlapping largely with prismatic society, and at the same time enumerating the

evils of overlapping, only reinforces the "negative" image of prismatic societies (which, in essence, applies to all the developing societies of today).

The Negative Character of the Prismatic Model

In general, the prismatic model appears to have a Western bias. The prismatic traits seem "deviant" when viewed from the vantage point of a diffracted society. The negative character of the model is reflected, first of all, in the terminology used by Riggs to depict social behaviour in a prismatic society. Riggs uses terms like "normlessness," "ritualism", "mimetic", "donative expenditure", "bazaar-canteen", "subsidized canteen", "myths", "double talk", "interference complex", and "dependency syndrome" to characterize the functioning of a prismatic society. Unquestionably, such terms are value-laden. They emphasize only the negative aspects of the prismatic behaviour. The model implies that the "negative" and "negative alone" is the "real" in a prismatic society. This prismatic terminology may be contrasted with terms like "market imperfections" and "frictions" used to understand deviant behaviour in a relatively diffracted society.

Terminology, however, is only one reflection of the apparent philosophy behind the prismatic model. As Michael Monroe observed recently: "Riggs's theory appears to use developed nations, like the United States, as the standard for evaluating activities in the prismatic nations. In this way, development setbacks in the prismatic countries are explained as dysfunctional applications of diffracted norms to bewildered and unstable societies".[78]

Riggs apparently has chosen to study only those actions of a prismatic society which appear to violate ideal standards of economy, efficiency, and morality of the West. He has not made complementary efforts to compare standards of morality, economy, and efficiency of the transitional societies with immorality, bad economics, and inefficiency in the developed nations.[79] Moreover, his model analyses essentially the negative aspects of the political, social, economic, and administrative sub-systems in developing countries. Logically, with an implicit idealized

American comparative reference, the prismatic model emerges with largely a negative character.

Riggs has held that the United States comes very close to the diffracted model, although it has certain´ prismatic traits as found in the American local government. But such references to prismatic behaviour in the United States or in other relatively diffracted societies appear to be wholly peripheral in his scheme of analysis. Monroe, on the other hand, has provided convincing arguments that American social structures have a large number of prismatic characteristics. A few cases: violation of the letter and the spirit of the American Constitution in civil rights matters; indifference of public employees toward strike laws; corruption in high governmental circles; labour union activities which violate prescribed legislation; the discriminatory behaviour of the regulatory agencies; tax loopholes; weaknesses of the insurance system; the "Mafia"; politically backed private monopolies; bureaucratic overstaffing; phenomenal military budgets; and anomaly of J. Edgar Hoover—the most "powerful" bureaucrat.[80] In citing these instances, it is not intended to argue that American society is relatively prismatic. The purpose here is to indicate that Riggs has clearly understated the nature and the extent of prismatic traits in relatively diffracted societies. He has, in fact, assumed a close relation between the diffraction of social structures and legal-rationality in the behaviour of their participants. Thus, in Riggs's ecological models, with insignificant exceptions, prismatic behaviour consistently accompanies a medium level of differentiation, while diffracted behaviour is concomitant with a high level of differentiation. Riggs has presented several examples to support the first of three assumptions but has not carefully analysed the implications of the second assumption; thus the reasons for prismatic behaviour in a diffracted society are left undiscussed. As a consequence, Riggs appears to have evaluated the actual behaviour of prismatic societies in relation to the formally prescribed behaviour of diffracted societies. Analytically, this imbalance of emphasis overburdens the prismatic model with largely negative elements, implications, and inferences. If analytical categories of "effective" social and administrative behaviour in a relatively diffracted society are created and

then utilized to evaluate the functioning of the prismatic-sala system, then the image of social and administrative structures in the developing societies would not be as negative as Riggs's prismatic model would suggest.[81]

Further, Riggs has looked at both the formal and the actual norms and practices within a prismatic society. However, he appears to have considered the "stated" goals and objectives as identical to the "real" goals and objectives. Organizational analysis has demonstrated that formally "given" objectives are often not the "real" objectives. If the "real" objectives of a social or administrative organization are not considered, findings will necessarily reflect a huge gap between assumed purposes and actual performance. Although it is difficult to study the "real" goals of a social organization,[82] the alternative of considering the "formal" goals for the "real" ones is also risky. This dilemma is inherent in most cases of goal-analysis. Nonetheless, the image of prismatic society emerges as highly negative because of the identification of its "real" goals with "formal" ones.

The problem of negativism is increased in Riggs's model by the almost total neglect of the existence of diffracted behaviour in a prismatic society. Riggs has not considered "adequately" significant variations in the effectiveness of different structures in a prismatic society. Jose Abueva has pointed out that in the Filippino bureaucracy, at one extreme are "decisional areas of known unmitigated cathexis and individual bargaining, such as patronage in semi-skilled and unskilled labor in public work projects"; while on the other end there are decisional areas where rules are applied and services rendered objectively and "where official duties and obligations clearly transcend cathexis and bargaining as the form of exchange among . . . those involved in official transaction."[83] This is an example of the rather common occurrence of diffracted traits in a society which Riggs has considered as prismatic.[84] Riggs appears to have merely touched on this aspect of social behaviour in his ecological models. However, still another major limitation of these models is a relative neglect of the potentially positive consequences of a supposedly prismatic characteristic—"formalism".

Formalism—Positive and Negative

In Riggsian terms, "formalism" refers to "the degree of discrepancy or incongruence between the formally prescribed and the effectively practiced, between norms and realities". Riggs has stated that this ·"distinguishing characteristics" of a prismatic system leads to official corruption, to arbitrary administration, and to obstacles in the achievement of programmed objectives. Thus, in Riggsian terms, formalism is dysfunctional for developing countries.[85]

Both structural-functional analysis and the ecological perspective suggest that a particular structure may be eufunctional or dysfunctional depending, among other things, on its environment. Riggs has not looked at this aspect of ecology when analysing "formalism". In a sense, Riggs's implication that formalism is dysfunctional in most or all circumstances represents a "non-ecological" viewpoint. To counterbalance the Riggsian concept of "negative" formalism, Valsan has recently presented a new concept of "positive formalism".[86]

Considering some empirical examples of public administration in India, the Philippines, and Stalinist Russia, Valsan found that formalism seemed to bring forth "a positive and creative effect useful for development," by skipping several slow-moving routines of government. Such "functional" formalism has been aptly termed by Valsan as "positive formalism". While the negative formalism leads to, what Riggs has called, "negative development,"[87] "positive formalism helps positive development."[88] Valsan has suggested that even in an "atmosphere of negative formalism, where what is legal is given little respect, good leadership may 'exploit' it for the sake of development through positive formalism".[89] Interestingly, Milne has recommended that the training institutions in developing countries should *"teach and promote the virtue of practising positive formalism as much as practicable"*.[90] Although it may be difficult to develop "formal" training in formalism, Milne's point emphasizes the value of positive formalism as a new dimension in comparative public administration. Thus, this concept creates an awareness that high administrative output is not always a function of "realism" in bureaucratic behaviour. ·

Diffraction, Coordination, and Performance

Riggs, in his search for a common variable in economic, political, socio-cultural, and administrative development, has found the degree of diffraction (or structural differentiation) a useful heuristic measure.[91] In his analysis, the central variable is "increasing differentiation of structures rather than any consequences of that diffraction, whether it be productivity, capital formation, income distribution, personal security, or some associated political, social, or administrative variable".[92] Thus, Riggs has not hypothesized or provided analytical categories concerning the relationship between the degree of diffraction and the level of development in a society, although he has stated that it might serve a heuristic purpose to identify these processes (of diffraction and development) with each other.[93]

·Another area needing greater representation in Riggs's models is administrative coordination. Although Riggs has referred to the problems of "poor coordination" in the context of developing countries in general,[94] in his diffraction-oriented ecological models, he has not related such problems to the internal organizational patterns in bureaucratic structures. Recently he has boserved, however, that "the more differentiated a system becomes, the more difficult and delicate becomes the task of coordinating highly specialized roles".[95] But he has not developed this theme extensively. Paradoxically, most problems in prismatic societies can be seen from the perspective of lack of coordination—between the politicians and the administrators, between the generalists and the specialists, between planning agencies and the administrative organs, and between the central authorities and the decentralized administrative organs. Thus, a clear need exists to include an analysis of the problems of politico-administrative coordination within the structure of prismatic model.

Furthermore, Riggs's ecological models do not contain specific hypotheses on the relationship between differentiation and administrative performance. But outside the framework of these models, he has reflected on this subject. While dealing with the concept of "administrative development",[96] he recognized that variations in performance level become increasingly significant as the degree of structural differentiation of a system increases.[97] The heuristic utility of Riggs's ecological models will certainly

increase if they include some analytical categories hypothesizing interrelationships among ᵫe degree of diffraction, administrative coordination, and organizational performance. Adding more variables could make the task of a researcher more difficult, but the elements of coordination and performance are of crucial pertinence if Riggsian models are to become more *administration-oriented* than they are now.[98] A focus on administrative outputs will also help these models to become more developmental in perspective.

Some Aspects of "Heuristicism" in Riggsian Models

The ideal-type models of Riggs, by underscoring the significance of "administrative ecology," have influenced much research in comparative public administration.[99] "Systemic" models which follow a macrosociological approach, as Riggsian constructs do, are essentially logical frameworks of analysis, designed to suggest certain relationships among the different variables they incorporate. The rigors of a "scientific theory" should not be expected in these frameworks. It can be argued, nevertheless, that for aiding researchers, the concepts outlined in such models should be "manageable" for research, and therefore they should be operationalized or made potentially operationable to the degree possible. This point becomes pertinent in Riggs's case because he has held that degrees of differentiation are potentially quantifiable. He observed: "As the techniques become refined, it may be possible to locate individual countries—Thailand, Egypt, the Philippines, Mexico, Japan, Spain, Brazil, New Zealand, Ethiopia, the United States, China, Italy—on such a [diffraction] scale. We could imagine a central tendency for each country which could be located at a unique point in the scale of diffraction."[100]

In their present form, the ecological models enable only qualitative and functional comparisons among various societies. But even such comparisons become less useful with reliance on impressionistic categories like "more or less prismatic," "highly prismatic," and "typically prismatic".[101] When efforts are made to measure diffraction, certain problems peculiar to public administration are bound to crop up. It is difficult to define,

for example, the boundaries between "policy-making" and "policy-execution," and between "discretion" and adherence to rules. In spite of these and other operational problems, the ecological models have brought new awareness of certain crucial kinds of interactions between the administrative system and its social environment.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis appears to have demonstrated that Weberian and Riggsian analyses somewhat complement each other in the study of cross-cultural administrative patterns. Weber described essentially the characteristics of bureaucracy which evolved as a result of certain kinds of socio-economic development (and which also contributed to that development). Riggs, on the other hand, seems to be seeking explanation of why similar bureaucratic development does not emerge rapidly in present-day developing countries. .

It is easy to discern Weber's influence on Riggs in the construction of ecological models. Like Weber, Riggs has provided three ideal-type constructs, which are essentially deductive in character. While the basis of Weberian categories is the type of legitimacy associated with an authority system, Riggsian typology is based on the criterion of structural differentiation, which differs from Weber's qualitatively distinct ideal-types. However, it appears that elements of Weber's legal-rational authority dominate in Riggs's diffracted society. More particularly, legal-rational authority system is characterized by a relative autonomy of structures, which is also a feature of a diffracted society. Likewise, it can be seen that a fused society (of Riggs) has several characteristics of Weber's traditional authority system. Both these systems have a role-differentiation of a simple sort.

· Although no exact parallel of Weber's charismatic authority system is found in Riggs's typology, some characteristics of routinized charisma can be found in empirical "prismatic" societies, such as India, Nepal, Ethiopia, and Iran. Nevertheless, empirical examples of charismatic authority are somewhat different today, in that most charismatic figures are obviously involved

in modernizing programmes. Since Riggs has been interested primarily in contemporary administrative systems, he has not come out with a category of ideal-type charismatic leadership. Perhaps he has assumed that the fragmented administrative system in an emergent nation is not typically dominated by politicians even when there is a charismatic leader.

Weberian and Riggsian typologies differ in regard to the number of ecological elements incorporated in them. In Weberian analysis, the nature of the administrative staff is understood by reference to the character of the authority system. Weber linked several socio-cultural norms of the authority system with the character of the administrative staff. But his analysis of the impact of economic environment upon an administrative system is sketchy. Riggs's discussion of the socio-cultural and economic aspects of administrative ecology is much more extensive than Weber's. He has drawn upon contemporary structural-functionalism, and hence his analysis includes a more systemic approach on societal level. Both scholars, however, have paid considerable attention to interaction between the political system and its administrative sub-system.

Weber's analysis of the administrative staff within a legal-rational authority is extensive when compared to his treatment of administrative staff in a traditional and a charismatic authority system. Riggs, on the other hand, has been more interested in the working of the "sala" in a prismatic society, and a discussion of the administrative patterns in the diffracted and the fused societies is only peripheral to his central concern of understanding the administrative problems of prismatic societies. In other words, Riggs, like Weber, has focused attention on nations at a certain stage of socio-cultural development—although he has chosen a different set of nations—and, therefore, has treated other nations only incidentally for purposes of comparison. Thus, the crux of Weberian analysis is legal-rational authority system and its bureaucracy, while that of Riggsian discussion is prismatic society and its "sala". Some of the major differences between Weberian "bureaucracy" and Riggsian "sala" can be seen as the next page:

Bureaucracy	*Sala*
1. Organized in hierarchy of offices.	1. "Heterogeneity".
2. Defined competence of each office.	2. "Overlapping".
3. Selection of officials by achievement.	3. Attainment as the basis of recruitment; nepotism.
4. Administration by rule.	4. Formalism.
5. "Universalism" and impersonal operations; officials are subject to authority only in official capacity.	5. Personalized norms in official behaviour.
6. Separation ·of public funds from private.	6. Widespread official corruption.

The problem in making such a distinction is that Riggs's ideal-type of sala system is by nature a composite one, and it is difficult to clearly specify in it all the counterparts of the characteristics of "bureaucracy".

Nonetheless, both typologies lack analytical categories to explain "development" in social and particularly administrative systems. Weber's assumption of the unilinear development of bureaucratization is not very helpful for studying the crises of modernization. Riggs, likewise, chose not to analyse the impact of increasing diffraction upon development in his ecological models. Lack of developmental orientation in Weber's models can be explained by the fact that he was not looking at societies where the rate of modernization was pronounced. The "third world" had not emerged before him, and, for that matter, the "second world" had just begun to emerge before his death. On the other hand, Riggs's writings have been influenced by the emergence of numerous "new" States. Outside of his ecological models, he has made substantial contributions to the nascent field of development administration. However, it is important that both the ecological and developmental perspectives should be included in comparative administrative models. The rationale behind this suggestion will be made clear in the next chapter.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 The terms "developing" and "developed" are being used in the general sense of "modernizing" and "modernized", respectively, unless specified otherwise. The fundamental emphasis in the terms is on the socio-economic change, though sometimes, "political development" is also implied by them. The concept of development will be considered more fully in the next chapter.

2 See, for example, Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Because it did not account for the environment in which an administrative system works, Berger concluded, Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy does not fit the Egyptian case.

3 Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), hereafter referred to as *Administration*, p. 73.

4 See; Reinhard Bendix, *Max ·Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City; New York: Doubleday, 1962), hereafter cited ·as *Portrait*, p. 459; H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills have observed: "We nevertheless feel justified in holding that a unilinear construction is clearly implied in Weber's idea of the bureaucratic trend." *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited with an introduction by Gerth and Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), hereafter cited as *Essays*, p. 51.

5 Eugene Litwak, "Models of Bureaucracy which Permit Conflict," *The American Journal of ·Sociology*, LXVII (1961), p. 177.

6 Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press. 1966), p. 46.

7 Bendix, *Portrait*, p. ·383.   8 *Essays*, pp. 224-28; 230-32.

9 "Introduction," in *Theory*, p. 76. Emphasis original.

10 Alvin W. Gouldner, "On Weber's Analysis of Bureaucratic Rules," in Robert Merton, *et al.* (eds.), *Reader in Bureaucracy* (New York: Free Press, 1952), p. 48.

11 The present chapter is devoted to the analysis of ecological models of Riggs, while the sixth chapter treats the subject

of development administration. However, some comments on developmental aspects of Riggs's models will be made in this chapter.

[12] "The Ecology of Government," in *Reflections in Public Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1947), pp. 1-19.

[13] "The Science of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, VII (1947), pp. 1-11.

[14] "Technical Assistance: The Problem of Implementation," *Public Administration Review*, XII (1952), p. 266.

[15] Among others, see *Administration*, and *The Ecology of Public Administration* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), hereafter referred to as *Ecology*.

[16] Riggs, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, XXVIII (1962), p. 15.

[17] *Administration*, p. 19.   [18] *Ibid.*

[19] Keith Henderson has opined that Riggs's prime perspective could best be characterized as "ecological". *Emerging Synthesis in American Public Administration* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), pp. 51-52. Ferrel Heady has labelled Riggs's theory-building as "ecological oriented". "Comparative Public Administration: Concerns and Priorities," in Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962), p. 4.

[20] See, among others, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957).

[21] *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951).

[22] *The Structure of Society* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1952); "Structural-Functional Analysis," *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, VI, 21-29; *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[23] Almond and James Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966).

[24] See, among others, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[25] Riggs, *Administration*, p. 20. Riggs, in introducing the structur·al-functional approach in comparative public administration, has drawn largely on Levy, *The Structure of Society*.

[25] Alex Inkeles, *What. is Sociology* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 35. Riggs, while giving an example of a "bureau" as a structure, has observed that a "structure is not composed of people and things themselves, but of their actions." However, "it (structure)'does not include all their actions, but only those actions which relate to the goals and work of the bureau. The bureau also includes the relevant actions of 'outsiders' with whom it interacts in the normal course of business, its *clientele* or 'audience'. They may be served or regulated by it; they may be the subject as well as the object of its activity." *Administration*, p. 20. Emphasis original.

[27] For an analysis of the various meanings of functions, see, Robert Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," in N. J. Demerath III and Richard A. Peterson (eds.), *System, Change and Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 10-75.

[28] Riggs, *Administration*, p. 20.

[29] Robert H. Jackson, "An Analysis of the Comparative Public Administration Movement," *Canadian Public Administration*, IX (1966), p. 120.

[30] Recently, Levy has distinguished between structural and functional "requisites" and "prerequisites". "Requisites" are essential for the continued existence or maintenance of a particular social unit, "prerequisites" are the necessary conditions before a particular social unit comes into being. "Structural-Functional Analysis," pp. 23-4. Talcott Parsons has not distinguished between the functional requisites and prerequisites. He has postulated four functional requisites of social structures: goal-gratification, adaptation, integration, pattern maintenance and tension management. See, among others, Parsons, Robert F. Bales and Edward· Shils, *Working Papers on the Theory of Action* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1953).

[31] Riggs, *Administration*, p. 22.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 99. Also, see note 30, above. ·

[33] Oran Young also has considered the structural-functional analysis as a "systemic" approach. See, *Systems of Political*

Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 27-37.

[34] *The Study of Public Administration* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 9.

[35] "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in William J. Siffin (ed.), *Toward a Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1957), pp. 23-110.

[36] Lynton Caldwell, "Conjectures on Comparative Public Administration," in Roscoe Martin (ed.), *Public Administration and Democracy* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), p. 232.

[37] The basis of this conceptualization is found in F. X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," paper prepared for the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics, Princeton, 1955 (mimeo).

[33] Siffin, "Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration," p. 9.

[39] Riggs, "Agraria and Industria," p. 29.

[40] For an introduction to these Parsonian pattern-variables, see note 44, below.

[41] Riggs, "Agraria and Industria," p. 29.

[42] Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and James Coleman (ed), *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, p. 23.

[43] For a critical appraisal of the agraria-industria typology, see, among others, F. J. Tickner, "Comparing Administrative Systems," *Public Administration Review*, IX (1959), pp. 19-25; R.S. Milne, "Comparisons and Models in Public Administration," *Political Studies*, X (1962), pp. 1-14; Robert Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," *Public Administration Review*, XIX (1959), pp. 27-31.

[44] The distinction made between functional diffuseness and functional specificity is one of the five pattern-variables initially propounded by Talcott Parsons. A pattern-variable "is a dichotomy, one side of which must be chosen by an actor before the meaning of the situation is determinate for him, and thus before he can act with respect to that situation." Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of*

Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 77. Parsons has suggested that there are five, and only five basic pattern-variables, and they comprise:

1. The dilemma of gratification of impulse versus discipline: affectivity-affective neutrality;
2. The dilemma of private versus collective interests: self-orientation-collectivity orientation;
3. The dilemma of transcendence versus immanence: universalism-particularism;
4. The dilemma of object modalities: ascription-achievement;
5. The dilemma of the scope of significance of the object: diffuseness-specificity. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-4.

Riggs, in his analysis, has made use of only the last three of these pattern variables.

[45] *Administration*, p. 24. The terminology is drawn by analogy from optics—the prism causes the diffraction of undifferentiated fused white light into a rainbow spectrum of distinct colours.

[46] Riggs, *Models in the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Comparative Administration Group, American Society for Public Administration, 1959), p. 22.

[47] Riggs, *Administration*, p. 31.

[48] In Riggsian terminology, "bureau" is the general term to denote the locus of administrative action in a society. A diffracted society has a diffracted bureau or office, having the characteristics of efficiency and rationality. A fused society has a fused bureau or a "chamber". The Spanish term "sala" has a variety of meanings, such as a room, a pavilion, a government office, or a religious meeting; it represents an "interlocking mixture of elements from the diffracted office and the fused chamber." *Administration*, p. 268.

[49] In Riggsian analysis, a prismatic society may be "transitional" if it is "dynamic" in character. Likewise, transitional or "underdeveloped" countries may possess strong prismatic characteristics. *Ibid.*, p. 34. In spite of making an analytical distinction between these terms, Riggs, in providing concrete examples, has identified those societies as prismatic which are generally known as "developing" or "transitional".

⁵⁰ The analysis is based on *Administration; Ecology;* "The 'Sala' Model: An Ecological Approach to the Study of Comparative Administration," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration,* VI (1962), pp. 3-16. This article is reprinted in Nimrod Raphaeli (ed.), *Readings in Comparative Public Administration* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 412-32, and has also appeared under the title, "The Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model," in Heady and Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration,* pp. 19-36.

⁵¹ *Ecology,* p. 91.

⁵² Riggs, "The 'Sala' Model," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration,* p. 5. Also see, *Ecology,* pp. 91-2. By "effective" behaviour, Riggs has referred to what *actually* happens, the unofficial conduct, the practice, the informal, the *real* behaviour of people, politicians, administrators, pressure groups, etc.

⁵³ *Ecology,* p. 92.

⁵⁴ Riggs has recognized that prismatic characteristics may be found in the diffracted societies, for example, in the United States local government. "The 'Sala' Model," p. 5.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.,* p. 5.   ⁵⁶ *Ibid.,* p. 6.

⁵⁷ Thus, "overlapping implies a social schizophrenia of contradictory formal (conscious) and informal (unconscious) behavior patterns." *Ibid.,* p. 6.

⁵⁸ *Ecology,* p. 92.

⁵⁹ The concepts of "mobilization" and "assimilation" have been borrowed by Riggs from Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York: Wiley, 1953).

⁶⁰ Riggs has noted that in the Southern region of the United States, the black community is disadvantaged in public employment. "The 'Sala' Model," pp. 7-8. This is an example of the prismatic characteristics existing in a relatively diffracted system.

⁶¹ "The 'Sala' Model," p. 14.

⁶² *Administration,* p. 33.

⁶³ For a discussion on unbalanced polities, see Chapter IV. In his theory of prismatic society, Riggs first conceptualized "bureaucratic polities" alone; it was only later that he advanced the notion of "party-run" polities.

⁶⁴ *Administration,* pp. 226-27. In this context, by political deve-

lopment, Riggs has generally implied a "balance" of power between the politicians and the bureaucrats; one gets a clear impression from his analysis that he favours effective political control over the bureaucrats. For a general discussion on this subject, see Chapter IV.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 285. This hypothesis has been appraised in Chapter IV.

[64] See, *Ibid.*, pp. 260-85.

[65] *Ecology*, p. 143.   [68] *Ibid.*

[69] Milton J. Esman, "The Ecological Style in Comparative Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XXVII (1967), p. 278.

[70] Jackson, "An Analysis of the Comparative Public Administration Movement," p. 124.

[71] Richard A. Chapman, "Prismatic Theory in Public Administration: A Review of the Theories of Fred W. Riggs," *Public Administration* (London), XLIV (1966), p. 423.

[72] Edgar L. Shor, "Comparative Administration: Static Study versus Dynamic Reform," *Public Administration Review*, XXII (1962), p. 160.

[73] *Ibid.* In the summary of Riggs's basic ideas in this chapter, terms such as "likely" and "generally" minimize much of the deterministic impression which the original works provide at several places. However, Riggs has argued that his model is an "ideal-type", and does not represent "reality".

[74] Joseph La Palombara has observed that Riggsian analysis stresses that the diffracted and the fused societies are only ideal-types and thus appears to imply that all empirical systems are necessarily prismatic. "Public Administration and Political Change: A Theoretical Overview," in Charles Press and Alan Arian (eds.), *Empathy and Ideology: Aspects of Administrative Innovation* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966), p. 93.

[75] *Concepts and Models in Public Administration* (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1966), p. 18.

[76] John D. Montgomery, "Sources of Administrative Reform: Problems of Power, Purpose, and Politics" (Bloomington, Ill.: CAG, 1967), mimeo, p. 63, quoted in Milne, "Differentiation and Administrative Development" *Journal of Comparative Administration*, I (1969), p. 222.

77 *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 253.

78 "Prismatic Behavior in the United States?," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, II (1970), p. 230. A part of the following discussion is based on this source.

79 "To a certain extent the analysts of comparative government lack the courage to compare unpleasant aspects of developed societies with similar as well as dissimilar observations abroad." *Ibid.*, p. 241.

80 Note another of Monroe's comments: "Bureaucratic power may prove to be most socially maligned in a developed society where technology has given bureaucrats the communication and control capabilities to impose their will upon nearly all citizens." *Ibid.*, p. 238.

81 Monroe has commented, "A comparative analysis of formalistic or hypocritical behaviour patterns in prismatic and diffracted contexts may demonstrate similar causes and perhaps call into question some of America's moral posturing." *Ibid.*, p. 234.

82 For this and other difficulties in a "goal model," see, Amitai Etzioni, *Modern Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 5-19.

83 *Conditions of Administrative Development: Exploring Administrative Culture and Behavior in the Philippines* (Bloomington: Comparative Administration Group, 1966), pp. 54-55, quoted in Milne, "Mechanistic and Organic Models of Public Administration in Developing Countries," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, XV (1970), pp. 63-64.

84 For Riggsian analysis of Philippines as a prismatic society, see *Ecology*, pp. 98-143.

85 An example of this Riggsian viewpoint can be cited by referring to his analysis of the consequences of "exogenous" change in a developing society. Riggs has remarked that the exogenous change "accounts both for the more rapid course of transformation [and for] the higher *danger* of formalism and heterogeneity." *Ecology*, p. 143. Emphasis added to underscore Riggs's assumption that formalism *is* dangerous.

86 E.H. Valsan, "Positive Formalism: A Desideration for Development," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. XII (1968), pp. 3-6.

⁸⁷ "Negative development" refers to situations when "undesired" changes occur in the areas of economic productivity, economic security, distribution of wealth, and non-economic values (such as social welfare). When "desired" changes take place in these areas, it implies "positive development". Riggs, *Administration,* p. 42.

⁸⁸ Valsan, "Positive Formalism," p. 6.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Milne, "Formalism Reconsidered," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration,* XIV (1970), p. 30. Emphasis added.

⁹¹ *Administration,* p. 419.

⁹² *Ibid.,* pp. 421-22.

⁹³ Martin Landau has identified the concept of development with that of differentiation: "the more developed the system, the greater the degree of specialization." "On the Use of Functional Analysis in American Political Science," *Social Research,* XXXV (1968), p. 57.

⁹⁴ *Administration,* pp. 253-55.

⁹⁵ *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1966), p. 376.

⁹⁶ The concept of "administrative development" is introduced in Chapter VI.

⁹⁷ "Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept," in J. D. Montgomery and W. J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration, and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 239. Milne has also underscored the inseparability of the elements of performance and differentiation in any concept of administrative development. See, "Differentiation and Administrative Development," pp. 213-33.

⁹⁸ For suggestions to include psychological-cognitive, geographical, and ideological factors in ecological models, see Milne, *Concepts and Models in Public Administration,* pp. 16-8.

⁹⁹ Some works having an ecological approach in comparative public administration are: William J. Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development* (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1966); Nghiem Dang, *Vietnam: Politics and Public Administration* (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1966); and Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity.*

For an application of the prismatic-sala model to Japan, see, James R. Brady, "Japanese Administrative Behavior and the 'Sala' Model," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, VIII (1964), pp. 314-26.

[100] *Administration*, p. 30. The assumption behind such a statement is that in any society, it is possible to find data on the degree of structural differentiation by studying the extent to which various organizational roles were exclusive or were permitted participation in other organizations in the same society.

[101] Other terms used by Riggs include: "extremely fused," "somewhat fused," "quite diffracted," "relatively fused," "relatively diffracted," and "highly diffracted."

Development Administration

STUDENTS of comparative public administration have been engaged in a continuous search for new concepts in order to understand and respond to rapid change in the diverse administrative systems of the contemporary world. Their dominant interest, then, has concerned the problems of public administration in rapidly changing or "developing" societies. On this score, they have found the American (traditional) administrative theory wanting. Most importantly, the implicit premises of Western, and particularly American, administrative thought have been considered as "non-ecological" and "static". Such premises, as Fred Riggs has observed: " . . . have been non-ecological in so far as they failed to relate administrative behavior to its environment. They have been static in so far as they took the basic institutional patterns of social structures for granted, failing to examine the conditions which brought these patterns into existence, which maintained them, or which caused them to change."[1] These and other criticisms should be related to the environmental context in which American administrative theory developed. With a developmental perspective, one must give credit to the contributions of American administrative theory to comparative public administration in the establishment of a base for the latter. Thus, the purpose here in considering the limitations of American administrative thought is only to stress that, for various reasons, scholars have to go beyond existing concepts, as they attempt to explain newly emergent phenomena or newly recognized problems. In some ways, each period of analysis exhibits limitations in regard to the analysis of problems addressed in a later stage of research.

Alfred Diamant has concluded that most of the conceptual constructs in administrative and organization theory have a "steady state" or "equilibrium bias".[2] The writings of Mary Parker Follet, Henry Fayol, Luther Gulick, James Mooney and

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Lyndall Urwick show that these writers were not basically concerned with the problem of organizational change, but that they primarily wished to assure, in one form or another, that the stated tasks or goals of the organization were carried out effectively. Nevertheless, in the works of Follet and Gulick relatively less "orthodoxy" of this type is found. Even though Follet stressed the role of co-ordination in organization, she was critical of the concept of control as used in the Urwick-Mooney sense. Likewise, Gulick, although identified essentially with POSDCORB, was conscious of the adaptation processes in organization, and he concluded that a principle of organization appropriate at one stage may not be appropriate at a succeeding stage.[8] However, such elements of change were not fully developed in the conceptualizations of Gulick and Follet.

Diamant, in his analysis of the writings of various "later" organization theorists, found that in the conceptual constructs of scholars, such as Elton Mayo, Chester Barnard, F. J. Roethlisberger, Herbert Simon, James March, Robert Presthus, Robert Merton, Philip Selznick, and Talcott Parsons, "change is assumed to take place in such a way that the system (or organization) which was in balance before change was initiated will return to its equilibrium-position at the end of the change process".[4] Conversely, the constructs of Chris Agyris, William Gore, and Bertram Gross, among others, are essentially of a "nonequilibrium" variety. The cybernetics models of Karl Deutsch and David Easton also belong to this non-equilibrium category; such models have relevance to administrative theory, since communication models "lend themselves to the handling of discontinuous change at the level of sub-systems of various sizes".[5]

Some major conceptual constructs in the field of comparative public administration neglected or understated the dynamic elements. Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy model is essentially a "steady state system". Likewise, Riggs's dominant emphasis has been on the balance between the bureaucracy and the political system, although he has recognized the possible disruption of this balance.[6] In other words, Weber's and Riggs's models handle social change in a "conservative" way, i.e., "within the concept of a self-sustaining system of equilibrium theory".[7] These models have inadequate mechanisms to explain the dynamism of rapidly

changing administrative systems in a changing environment. It is easy to understand why Weber's bureaucratic model, designed to describe the characteristics of an ideal-type bureaucracy working in a relatively stable environment, lacks such dynamic elements, but it is hard to defend the equilibrium-oriented prismatic model of Riggs, which in essence is intended to explain the administration of developing countries. However, it should not be implied that dynamic elements are altogether missing in Riggs's prismatic model; they exist, but not in a highly developed form.

On the other hand, some elements of administrative change or "reform" have long been present in American administrative theory and practice. Since the late nineteenth century, scores of small and large-scale reforms have taken place in American public administrative institutions. Such reforms have been primarily in the spheres of personnel and financial administration and in institutional reorganization. In the academic field writings on administrative change have largely emphasized principles of administration which promote economy and efficiency. Thus, the dominant concern in such reform efforts has been with the "means" of administering in the "best" possible manner. In this process the analysis of "ends" or "goals" has not been given equal attention. In a way, ends have been generally assumed as given, and often have been identified with economy and efficiency. Thus, economy and efficiency have served as both ends and means. This blurring of means and ends did not pose serious problems so long as the administrative doctrines were applied to large-scale organizations engaged in "routine" administrative operations or in activities of a non-developmental character. Even in the writings of Max Weber—the major forerunner of comparative public administration—the concept of rationality in organizational behaviour is not well integrated with the complex processes of goal-setting and goal-achievement. It is in the context of an underemphasis on the study of goals in earlier public administration studies that Edward Weidner has commented: "Public administration has glorified the means and forgotten the ends. Good administration and good human relations have become ends in themselves, quite apart from the achievement of other values that they may or may not facilitate."[8]

With an intent to fill such a gap in administrative theory, the concept of development administration was "introduced" by Weidner, and stressed by Riggs, among others. The concept is designed to study how public administration in different ecological settings operates and changes in order to achieve a set of social goals. In this broad perspective, there have been a variety of interpretations associated with the term "development administration". Some of them will be introduced in the following pages. But first, a consideration of the term "development", as used by some development administration theorists, is in order.

Dictionary meanings of "development" are teleological, since they generally refer to it as the growth into a higher, fuller, and mature condition. Students of development administration, however, have tried to avoid this teleological bias, by viewing development as the dynamic change of a society from one state of being to another without positing a final mature condition. Development has been viewed as a "a state of mind, a tendency, a direction. Rather than a fixed goal, it is rate of change in a particular direction".[9] Development is further seen as "an aspect of change that is desirable, broadly predicted or planned, or at least influenced by governmental action".[10] Moreover, development can be measured in terms of "performance", and output or, in regard to "justice" and equality.[11] These different interpretations suggest that the concept of development, at least as it is found in the literature on development administration, is quite broad, value-based, and even elusive.

Riggs has defined development as "a process of increasing autonomy (discretion) of social systems, made possible by rising level of diffraction".[12] "Discretion," he has observed, is the "ability to choose among alternatives," while "diffraction" refers to the degree of differentiation and integration in a social system.[13] Riggs has considered diffraction as "the necessary and perhaps the sufficient condition for development, i.e., for increased discretion".[14]

The emphasis on "discretion" has enabled Riggs to view development as involving "the increased ability of human societies to shape their physical, human, and cultural environments".[15] A developed system, then, is capable of changing its environment to a greater degree than an "underdeveloped" system.[16]

Such capability may or may not be used to increase output, that is, a developed system could even have a low rate of output or growth, although in empirical situations such a case might occur only rarely. Likewise, a change in environment, such as a technological innovation or foreign aid, or a change in climate, might bring increase in output or growth of a system, even though the level of "discretion" of the system did not rise. In other words, there could be cases of "growth" without "development".[17]

A social system, in the process of increasing its "discretion," develops interdependence with other social systems which are members of its "nexus" or role-set. The system is required to co-ordinate its actions with the other members of its role-set. Such interdependence of a system with other members of its role-set has been termed by Riggs as "heterogeny", while the independence of a system in relation to other systems in its role-set is termed by him as "autogeny". Riggs has observed that development involves an increase in the degree of "discretion" of a social system, but a decrease in the degree of its "autogeny".[18] This analytical bifurcation of the environment of a social system into something like the distant and the proximate environment would be difficult to operationalize, owing to the problem of defining the boundary of each in empirical situations. Despite such a problem, Riggs's attempt is an important step in the direction of ecological conceptualization of development, and it probably has relevance to all types of social systems. The concept of development administration has also to be viewed from such an ecological angle.

As noted earlier, the Comparative Administration Group has had an overriding interest in the area of development administration.[19] Nimrod Raphaeli has discerned two major "motivational concerns" in the literature in comparative public administration: (1) theory-construction and (2) development administration. These two concerns are intertwined. Much theorizing in comparative public administration has been related to development, while work in development administration has been concerned with, and contributes to, theory.[20] Thus, the devlopment of theory and theory of development administration have moved together. This is understandable, since the field of comparative public administration is primarily concerned with

the comparison of administrative systems of different nations at varying stages of development. It has been recognized that because of its central concern, the study of development administration could be the meeting ground for almost all the approaches in comparative public administration.[21] This could be so, especially when the concept of development administration is considered broadly and not just restricted to the focus on what are popularly called "developing" nations. Interestingly, development administration can also be a meeting ground for portions of comparative public administration and the so-called "New" (American) public administration,[22] which includes considerable elements of action and goal-orientation. Furthermore, the concept of development administration, without replacing some older models in comparative public administration, can introduce some dynamic elements.

In the literature, the term "development administration" has been used in two interrelated senses. First, it "refers to the administration of development programs, to the methods used by large-scale organizations, notably governments, to implement policies and plans designed to meet their developmental objectives".[23] Second, it, "by implication, rather than directly, involves the strengthening of administrative capabilities".[24] These two aspects of development administration, i.e., the administration of development and the development of administration are intertwined in most definitions of the term.

Edward Weidner has viewed development administration in government as "the processes of guiding an organization toward the achievement of progressive political, economic, and social objectives that are authoritatively determined in one manner or another".[25] Similar views have been taken by Jose Abueva,[26] Inayatullah,[27] B.S. Khanna[23] and Hahn-Been Lee.[29] The major thrust of most of these definitions of development administration has been an "action-oriented, goal-oriented administrative system".[30] Students of development administration have recognized that the administration of development and development of administration are functionally interrelated to each other. As Riggs has argued: "The reciprocal relatedness of these two sides (of development administration) involves a chicken and egg type of causation. Administration cannot normally be improved

very much without changes in the environmental constraints (the infrastructure) that hampers its effectiveness, and the environment itself cannot be changed unless the administration of development programs is strengthened."[31] Thus in the study of development, governmental "capacity" must be taken into account. Generally, research on development administration considers the administrative system and changes within it as independent variables, while the developmental goals are treated as dependent variables.[32] Such a view, held by Fred Riggs, Edward Weidner, Joseph La Palombara, and Martin Landau"[33] is similar to that of several students of comparative politics who consider the political systems as independent and/or intervening variables in the study of political development. Among these political development theorists are Samuel Huntington, Karl Deutsch, Samuel Eisenstadt, Robert Holt, and John Turner.

Increasing the administrative capability to achieve developmental goals in an "efficient" manner is associated with the concept of planned development, which is based on the desire to achieve particular results within a given period of time and with minimum of cost. Of course, the concept of planning had an important place even in traditional public administration, particularly in the works of Henry Fayol and Luther Gulick. Today, development administration is concerned with the formulation and implementation of the four p's—plans, policies, programmes, and projects.[34] Associated with developmental models is an underlying assumption that "there are noticeable differences between the states of a system at different time series; that the succession of these states implies the system is heading somewhere; and that there are orderly processes which explain how the system gets from its present state . . . (to wherever) it is going".[35] Such directional change has been emphasized by several students as the main thrust of development administration. A scholar has identified development administration with "administration of planned change".[36] However, not all planning may be developmental, and not all development administration may be planned. Likewise, planned directional growth and "system change" may or may not move together.[37] Finally, it has been recognized that planning, like any other "rational" action, may have unintended as well as intended consequences.

The conceptualization of development administration involves the problems associated with the construction of any goal-oriented model. As Samuel Katz has observed, it is difficult to define goals for development action. It may be that existing goals are not being met or are not expected to be met in the future. Or, more often, these may be just anticipated objectives based upon observations of conditions somewhere else, e.g., when a developing nation attempts to emulate developed nations.[38] Goal identification is "never simple, and in complex developmental change situations it can be very elusive and difficult. Formal and informal, stated and unstated, intended and unintended, planned and not planned—and goals of whom—these are a few of the dimensions that need to be taken into account".[39] Not much research in comparative public administration has yet tackled these problems. Lack of clarity on important aspects of goal-orientation sometimes causes confusion about the true nature of "development" administration.

Developmental-Non-developmental Dichotomy

Since all organizations have at least some kinds of goals, they could, by virtue of having any goal-orientation, claim to come under the rubric of development administration. This eventually would pose the problem of distinguishing between the developmental and the non-developmental public organizations. It has been recognized that development administration is generally similar to the "traditional" (apparently non-developmental) public administration in so far as it is concerned with how rules, policies, and norms are implemented by government organizations. On the other hand, it is contended that a developmental administrative system differs from a non-developmental one in its objectives, scope, complexity, and degree of innovation in its operation.[40] In attempting to explain such differences, Irving Swerdlow has used examples of an urban renewal programme (apparently developmental) and the running of a city water department (apparently non-developmental). Swerdlow has remarked: "Perhaps the difference lies in the degree of difficulty encountered in executing these functions, the amount of 'pioneering' required, and the difficulties of finding adequate

procedures for moving people who are unwilling to move, for reconciling conflicting interests in redesigning a section of the city, for establishing new relationships which involve major changes in how people and governmental agencies customarily do business."[41] In reference to Swerdlow's comment above, Wood has argued that in a developing country, operating an urban renewal programme and running a city water department might present the same degrees of difficulty in meeting the requirements of innovation, resources, public support, and inter-organizational support.[42] In fact, running a city water department in an "emerging" nation might encounter greater problems than an urban renewal programme does in a developed country. Both types of programmes would be called "developmental" in a developing country. Using Swerdlow's general definition of developmental administration, one may thus recognize that differing *mixes* of administrative departments will be seen as developmental in different ecological settings.

A popular contention in developing nations appears to be that the developmental processes start only after political freedom has been achieved. Thus, distinctions are generally made between a colonial and a non-colonial bureaucracy.[43] Such distinctions generally overlook the fact that even in the colonial period a country may have had developmental programmes and plans, such as India had in the early 1940s, and that it is equally plausible that a country with self-government may be unable to initiate programmes which could truly be called "developmental". Thus, it would be an over-generalization to claim that a colonial administration is a "law and order" administration, while public administration under self-rule is a developmental administration. It has been well recognized that maintaining social order takes top priority in most emergent nations, while the development efforts generally suffer due to various reasons.

Often within an administrative system, some organizations are termed or treated as developmental, while others are not. Indeed, there could be certain structures, such as developmental planning units and development banks, which seem, by definition, to relate particularly to development programmes. However, this does not imply that there exist any purely non-developmental agencies. When rigid distinction is made between developmental

and non-developmental activities and some particular officials are designated as "development officials," there is a danger that the morale of other (non-developmental) officials could go down. Moreover, in allowing such a dichotomy to result in an emphasis on "new" institutions for development, planners may neglect the real adaptation of "existing" institutions to changing environmental conditions.[44] It is worth recognizing, for example, that the success of taxation and law and order institutions is fundamental to the success of developmental organizations and activities.

Another factor contributing to an apparent developmental-non-developmental dichotomy is a conception or impression that development administration is concerned solely with the administration of developing countries. Such assumption can only reduce the utility of the concept of development administration in its application to the comparative analysis of "developed" and "developing" countries. In fact, it is almost impossible to find totally developmental or single-purpose oriented bureaucracies in empirical situations, although some scholars have held that all programmes in developing countries have acquired a developmental thrust. Indeed, in the literature associated with the contemporary comparative public administration movement, there has been a heavy emphasis on the study of bureaucracies in "developing" nations, and relatively little attention has been given to bureaucracies in "developed" countries "except as this has been considered helpful in understanding the developing countries".[45]

A dominant emphasis on the administrative systems of "developing" countries is in consonance with the primary objectives of the Comparative Administration Group, but such an emphasis should not be viewed as prescribing any limitation on the future research in the field. With the social systems of "developed" countries passing through a period of turbulence, it is imperative that students of public administration study issues relevant to the need to enhance the capabilities of the administrative systems to withstand and direct social change. In the contemporary Western nations, continuing socio-economic and political development has thrown up new administrative problems. Consequently, an emerging focus on the developmental aspects of

public administration is already discernible in American administrative theory.[46] It is clear, then, that there could be no rigid dichotomy between the nature of administration in "developing" and "developed" societies, although it is fairly well recognized that the emerging nations have to face greater challenges of rapid societal change.

Some scholars have identified development administration with a high degree of innovation in administrative system, which in turn is expected to encourage innovations in non-administrative areas. Weidner has stressed that: ". . . the problem of how to maximize the effectiveness of a bureaucracy so that it contributes to growth in the direction of modernity or nation-building and socio-economic progress is a problem of how to strengthen innovational forces in the bureaucracy."[47]

It has been stressed that development administration, by its very nature, is innovative.[48] However, this should not imply that there are some administrative systems which lack innovation absolutely and, therefore, are entirely non-developmental. What this means essentially is that an administrative unit devoted to the attainment of developmental goals is likely to need greater innovation and creativity than the one engaged primarily in "routine" administrative activities. But again, what is "routine" in one environmental context may be developmental in another.

It should be clear, then, that neat distinctions between developmental and non-developmental administrations cannot be made. Too often a dichotomy which makes sense in ideal-type terms is assumed to be paralleled by absolute differences which are associated with specific concrete organizations. Like the politics-administration dichotomy, the error in making such distinctions lies in the attempt to dichotomize concretely where differences lie only in degree of emphasis—as with "warm" and "cold" in that what is "developmental" in one setting might not be so regarded in another. Nothing is either fully developmental or non-developmental "except as thinking makes it so". Nevertheless, as the term "development administration" is used in the literature, it refers to those administrative systems or organizations which are centrally concerned with the achievement of progressive socio-economic and political goals, and which are innovational in attitudes and operation. Furthermore, in general

terms, administrative systems of all "developing" nations are considered to be engaged in the dynamics of development administration.

The Empirical and the Normative Elements

Two further perspectives overlap in the writings on development administration. Some students are concerned primarily "with the normative questions, with the desirability of proposed courses of action, with prescriptions for the maximization of or optimization of selected values," while others have a dominant interest in "empirical questions, in the descriptions and analyses of existing practices and situations, and in the prediction of what is likely to happen under given sets of conditions".[49] These foci have been interdependent. Scholars interested in prescription generally seek help of empirically based knowledge, while students interested primarily in empirical studies often choose a subject of study for its probable policy relevance. The study of development administration has generally had a dominant normative concern with enhancement of administrative capabilities in "developing" nations particularly. (This concern was explicit in the objectives of the Ford Foundation in funding the Comparative Administration Group.) Thus, it is natural to find an emphasis on various normative questions in the field.

All policy sciences must have a paramount concern with the question of values. Thus, development administration has been viewed as "an aspect of public administration that is centrally concerned with one of the many values men seek and which varies in the strength and kind of allegiance it commands country to country, group to group, and person to person".[50] This focus has provided the whole area of public administration with a programmatic goal or value orientation. Development administration studies both the process of selecting values and the ways in which they influence administration in various ecological settings.[51]

Further, the concept of development administration helps in relating administrative means to administrative ends, and thus aids the process of selecting appropriate means for achievement of developmental goals in various cultural contexts. Such a

developmental focus can subtly reflect the parochial bias of what Dwight Waldo has called "ethnocentrism".[52] To guard against this, research must recognize the diversity of ecological settings in which development may occur. In addition, the study of development administration can assist the practitioners of public administration to identify conditions that maximize the rate of development in these various settings.[53]

The Ecology

Since development implies the ability of a social system to shape or reshape its environment, its study should naturally. be ecological in character. As Weidner has observed: "Environmental factors in general and cultural factors in particular are important to those who attempt to bring about major change in a society. Such factors condition the outcome of any governmental program or other innovation. Therefore, changes in man's culture and environment are among the goals of highest priority in the countries most committed to change."[54]

Within any society, political, economic, and socio-cultural developments interact with the administrative system, as all social systems (including the administrative systems) "enter into *transactions* with their environments, influencing and being influenced by them".[55] An administrative system is influenced significantly by demands and supports from its environment, which in turn are shaped and reshaped by the administrative system through its outputs. The social environment of administrative systems must be seen as both multifaceted and in dynamic interaction with these systems.

The primary emphasis in the literature on the ecology of development administration has been on the political dimensions of the environment,[56] while the economic context has received substantially less attention.

The Political Context

As the debate over balanced and unbalanced polities has been covered in the fourth chapter, the main concern here will be with the politico-administrative issues associated with technical assistance for development administration.

Supporting the goal of a balanced polity, the protagonists of what Warren Ilchman has called "balanced social growth"[57] have advocated technical assistance to bureaucracies in developing nations only to the extent that such assistance would help to achieve and maintain a balance between the bureaucracy and the political system. A leading theorist of the balanced social growth approach, Riggs, has explicated his philosophical premise behind such a position as follows: "My confidence in the self-restraint and integrity of any group is enhanced to the extent they are subjected to the discipline of countervailing powers."[58] Varying shades of this premise are found in the works of Henry Goodnow, Lucian Pye, Samuel Eisenstadt, and in the early writings of Joseph La Palombara. These scholars generally agree that a bureaucracy which controls the political system is likely to be more interested in enhancing its power than in increasing administrative effectiveness for developmental purposes. Such an equilibrium approach is not highly sensitive to the requirements of dynamic change in developing societies.[59]

Arguments for balanced social growth generally overlook the fact that "aid to the bureaucracy in generating growth in other institutional sectors of the social order may more than offset the risk of increased imbalance, since the bureaucracy may serve as a catalyst or as a diffusion source for modernizing norms and technology".[60] In other words, administrative development should stimulate other kinds of development in the society. In some developing countries, bureaucracies may be the only social institution capable of bringing about rapid socio-economic change. Moreover, to say that a bureaucracy which controls the political system will be more interested in politicking than in development administration is to overlook the possibility that with its stabilization a bureaucratic polity often develops its own somewhat distinct political and administrative wings, and that such diffraction brings about new kinds of checks and balances. Moreover, as noted already, a bureaucratic polity is not necessarily inefficient. To treat all bureaucracies in developing nations in a singular fashion is to overlook the subtle influencing of diverse ecological factors on bureaucratic polities operating in cross-national contexts.

Among scholars who do not believe that the approach of balanced social growth is an appropriate one for determining

the premises of technical assistance to developing nations are the advocates of what Heady has called "standard technical assistance approach,"[61] and that which Ilchman has referred to as "administrative system approach".[62] Among others, Merle Fainsod, Saul Katz, Jay B. Westcott, and A.H. Hanson belong to this category. These scholars generally base their views on the assumption that administrative improvement, or strengthening and upgrading of the bureaucracy is *ipso facto* desirable and that efficiency of bureaucracy should be promoted regardless of the nature of the political system in which it operates. To a degree, then, these scholars are as "guilty" as the "balanced growth" group, of developing a singular universal answer to developmental problems.

A relatively extreme position is taken by Ralph Braibanti and Milton Esman in their stress of an "unbalanced social growth strategy". Esman has viewed bureaucracy as "a powerful, indispensable and generally beneficent agency of public service especially under conditions of rapid change when social and economic progress depends in great measure on governmental performance". Therefore, he has advocated a strategy which "places higher priority on building its capabilities than containing its abuses".[63] Braibanti, too, has argued that "transitional inducement to administrative reforms as a stratagem must proceed as an autonomous action, irrespective of the rate of maturation of the larger political process".[64] He has argued further that in polities with a "low quality" of civic culture and the consequent lack of political participation, the administrative system needs to assume greater burdens of leadership and responsibility in a developing country than a developed one.[65]

Relatively less categorical presumptions have been offered by Joseph La Palombara and Edward Weidner. La Palombara has urged that technical assistance be provided to various nations, keeping in view the particular political environment in which development objectives have to be achieved.[66] He has also argued that all nations have to confront certain crises such as those of legitimacy, integration, identity, penetration, participation, and distribution, but that these crises do not occur in all countries in the same sequence, with the same intensity, or with the same strain on capacity. Developing nations face the

dilemma of closely spaced crisis management of problems that the older nations have faced over a much longer period of time. To handle these crises, he has argued, the civil and military bureaucracies must play an effective role in developing nations. Thus, administrative development should become an important priority in the face of rapid social change.

Likewise, Edward Weidner, although not explicitly critical of the balanced social growth approach, has asserted that "those responsible for technical assistance programs cannot wait for political systems, of whatever form, to mature before extending help".[67]

Even when the donor-nations want to increase the political development of aid-receiving nations, it is difficult to visualize what methods are effective for this purpose. Though Riggs has stressed the need for launching "soundly conceived programs for political development,"[68] he has not suggested clearly how this could be accomplished. In fact, Ralph Braibanti has argued strongly that "it is beyond the capacity of an aid-giving nation to directly and deliberately accelerate politicization".[69] The viewpoint of Braibanti and other scholars taking such a stand has been well expressed by Ferrel Heady: "The basic considerations to keep in mind in making judgments as to what is feasible . . . are these: (1) choices as to the direction of political development are primarily the business of domestic political decision-makers in the developing country; (2) participation in those choices by external aid-giving countries is at best secondary, peripheral, and limited; (3) therefore, acceptance of the objectives of aid programs by those wielding effective political power is a prerequisite to the success of such programs."[70] Heady's comments are indicative of a trend among many scholars toward the realization that in spite of an interdependence between the political and the administrative development, the two may not move together. Moreover, balance between them may not be necessarily an ideal for a rapidly changing social system. These considerations are important for technical assistance programmes designed to strengthen development administration in various ecological settings.

The Economic Context

Recently it has been recognized that public administration is an important dimension of the process of economic growth in developing countries.[71] Taking the Riggsian notion of development in terms of an increase in the capacity of a social system to shape or reshape its environment, it can be hypothesized that economic growth would generally accompany administrative development. Ilchman and Bhargava have also stressed the need to consider administrative capabilities as important variables in any model of economic growth.[72] The relationship between economic development and administrative reform has not paralleled that of developed (mainly Western) nations. In contemporary modernized States, economic growth preceded administrative reform, while in most of the developing countries it has been the opposite.

For faster economic development, economic planning has become an accepted strategy in most of the developing countries. As noted already, development administration in such countries generally revolves around the administration of planning. John Montgomery has observed that development administration connotes "carrying out planned change in the economy (in agriculture or industry, or the capital infrastructure supporting either of these) and, to a lesser extent, in the social services of the State (especially education and public health)".[73]

In a developing country, generally, the State acts as the dominant change-agent and therefore its capacity to carry out economic development programmes is an important determinant of outputs. The administrative system, in order to enhance its capacity to achieve developmental goals, usually has to adopt a new set of values. The programmatic values of the polity have to be expressed in terms of administrative values and institutional apparatus. Essentially, this implies that "changes and modifications in the structural and behavioural patterns may have to be brought in line with the functional content of development administration".[74] A lack of development-oriented structural and behavioural patterns has been a major cause of the low success of planning in most developing countries. For example, as Frank Sherwood has noted, public enterprises have proved to

be almost parasitic from the viewpoint of economic growth in several countries. Sherwood has demonstrated that, although public enterprises are justified in the emerging nations as instruments of public administration capable of promoting economic growth, in fact they cost more than they earn and survive because they are subsidized by the public treasury.[75] However, considering the growing importance of such economic administrative organizations in "developing" nations, due attention has not been given to their study in comparative public administration.

Limited economic resources of a country often put constraints on the ability of its administrative system to achieve developmental goals. A developing country may not be able to create an adequate salary system for the public officials, for the existence of a sound salary system depends "not only on the mobilization of funds by taxation and the distribution of wages through a responsible payroll system, but also on the existence of an economic base".[76] Some scholars have even emphasized the need to provide market-based economic incentives for public officials of the Communist nations.[77] This reflects a new trend of thought on the part of comparative administrative theorists. However, there has been a relative neglect of the public administrative systems of the Communist nations in the comparative public administration literature. Studies of public enterprises of such nations could provide certain hypotheses which might be tested in "developing" nations.

It is increasingly recognized that public officials in the emergent nations are generally dissatisfied with their low salaries, and such dissatisfaction is seen to be a prime cause of official corruption. Still, in spite of the importance of the subject of official corruption in the context of politico-administrative development, not much research has been done in this area. However, it can be hypothesized that depending on different ecological settings, official corruption may or may not prove dysfunctional to development administration. "Formalism" can, likewise, have positive consequences in certain situations.[78]

A low level of economic development also has an impact on the quality of human resources. Technical and managerial skills are scarce in the administrative institutions of developing countries,

while training facilities are often inadequate to overcome such obstacles. In turn, lower administrative capability generally reinforces a low level of goal-achievement in economic life. Despite the significance of this subject, students of development administration have not studied extensively the relationship between administrative development and economic growth.

The Socio-Cultural Context

Riggs has hypothesized that only in more advanced countries are formal or complex organizations (in the sense the term is used in sociological literature) created: "The less developed a social system, the more difficult it is for that system to create organizations; the fewer the organization in a society, the more difficult it is for that society to develop."[79] Riggs in his treatment of the interaction of the administrative system with other social structures has not specified the difference between the capabilities of complex administrative organizations and "non-organizations" to achieve developmental goals. Although the underlying objective of the study of comparative public administration has been to understand and explain the administrative systems in cross-cultural settings, not much study has been made of the interaction between development-oriented administrative systems and the cultural settings in which they work. It is recognized, however, that in institutionalizing administrative change, cultural factors need to be taken into serious consideration.

Riggs has observed that "every culture offers both points of support for and obstacles to change or development".[80] David Apter has described values supporting development as "instrumental" and those obstructing it as "consummatory".[81] Thus he has suggested that modernization is facilitated in a society having instrumental rather than consummatory values. However, no hypotheses have been advanced that the Western societies necessarily have more in the way of instrumental values or that non-Western societies have a more consummatory orientation. One theorist has gone so far as to argue that "genuine cultural hurdles to development are not very numerous in any particular region".[82]

Administrative behaviour is affected by the values cherished by the society in which it works. The extent of this influence would depend on "the relative strength of special values developed by the administrative structure *vis-a-vis* the values of surrounding society".[83] Thus, administrative culture is generally influenced by the society's value-structure. However, civil servants recruited at a young age and trained with some degree of isolation from the rest of the society can develop their own value system which is somewhat different from that of the parent society. Such a semi-autonomous value-structure of the administrative system may or may not aid the achievement of developmental goals in socio-economic spheres. Perhaps this would depend upon the extent to which an "instrumental orientation" became dominant in the administrative system.

In the study of the cultural context of development administration, no concrete attempts appear to have been made to relate the nature of religious values, languages, and other cultural components with development administration, and this situation is reflective of the nascent state of the study of the ecological dimensions of development administration.

Conclusion

Although the concept of development administration is becoming increasingly "fashionable" throughout the public administrative literature, its focus, at least in the foreseeable future, is expected to remain on the study of those governmental administrative systems (or organizations) which are engaged primarily in the task of bringing rapid socio-economic and political change. Further, the dominant concern of those using the concept is likely to be with the "emergent" nations which are facing the challenges of socio-administrative change. The field of development administration has the potentiality to become a point of convergence for the whole area of comparative public administration, and even of the "instrumental" dimensions of the "New" (American) public administration. Thus, a combination of the normative and the empirical foci in development administrative studies is likely to strengthen the "policy science" orientation of the study of public administration in general.

Nonetheless, to date certain aspects of the developmental focus have been only partially explored. In regard to the ecological context of development administration, the primary emphasis in the literature has been on the political dimensions. Here, the major concern has been largely with the question of creating balanced and unbalanced polities. Debate on this subject, however, has put little stress on the need to study particular socio-administrative conditions of particular societies. Likewise, there has not been much discussion of the "performance" of these balanced and unbalanced polities. In addition, not much research has been undertaken on the influences of the economic and the socio-cultural systems on the administrative system, nor has much attention been given to the capacity of an administration to bring about changes in its socio-cultural environment. To rectify the lack of emphasis on these important ecological aspects of development administration, the students of comparative public administration should increasingly adopt a truly inter-disciplinary focus involving cross-fertilization of the insights and evidence of public administration with other social sciences like economics, sociology and anthropology.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Fred W. Riggs, "The Idea of Development Administration," in Edward W. Weidner (ed.), *Development Administration in Asia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), hereafter cited as *Asia*, p. 25.

2 Alfred Diamant, "Temporal Dimensions in Models of Administration and Organization," in Dwight Waldo (ed.), *Temporal Dimensions in Development Administration* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 90-134.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 117-18.   4 *Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 123.   6 *Ibid.*, pp. 120-21.

7 Edward Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes (eds.), *Papers on Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962), p. 104.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 103.   9 *Ibid.*, p. 99.

10 John Montgomery, "A Royal Invitation: Variations on Three Classical Themes," in Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration, and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 259.

11 Riggs, "The Idea of Development Administration," p. 69.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 72. Earlier, Riggs had treated increasing autonomy (discretion) as a consequence of development, but recently he has recognized discretion as the essence of development. For the earlier conceptualization, see Riggs, "The Ecology of Development" (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1964), mimeo.

13 Riggs, "The Idea of Development Administration," pp. 27, 55.   14 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

15 Riggs, "The Context of Development Administration," in Riggs (ed.), *The Frontiers of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), hereafter cited as *Frontiers*, p. 74.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

17 Riggs, "The Idea of Development Administration,' pp. 37-8.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 36.

19 See, Milton J. Esman, "CAG and the Study of Public Administration," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers*, pp. 41-71.

20 "Comparative Public Administration: An Overview," in Raphaeli (ed.), *Readings in Comparative Public Administration* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), p. 5.

21 James Heaphey, "Comparative Public Administration: Comments on Current Characteristics," *Public Administration Review*, XXVIII (1968), pp. 242-49.

22 See, for example, Frank Marini (ed.), *Toward a New Public Administration* (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971); Dwight Waldo (ed.), *Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence* (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971).

23 Riggs, "Introduction," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers*, p. 6.

24 *Ibid.*

25 "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research," p. 98.

26 Abueva has viewed development administration as "the administration of development programs in the economic, social, and political spheres, including programs for improving the organization and management of the bureaucracy as a major instrument for national development", cited in Shou-Sheng Hsueh, "Technical Assistance Cooperation in Development Administration in South and Southeast Asia," in Weidner (ed.), *Asia*, p. 341.

27 Inayatullah has defined development administration as "the complex of organizational arrangements for the achievement of action through public authority in pursuance of (1) socioeconomic goals and (2) nation-building. "Local Administration in a Developing Country: The Pakistan Case," in *Ibid.*, p. 278.

28 Khanna has regarded development administration as "an administration geared to the tasks of economic, social, and political development, which has been induced by an increasing tempo, momentum, and diversity emanating from the elite and groups of people," cited in Shou-Sheng Hsueh, "Technical Cooperation . . .," p. 341.

[29] Lee has defined development administration as "the problems involved in so managing a government or an agency thereof that it acquires an increasing capability to adapt to and act upon new and continuing social changes with a view to achieving a sustained growth in political, economic, and social fields." Cited in Hsueh, *Ibid.*, pp. 341-42. Lee has defined administrative development in almost similar terms. Lee, "The Role of the Higher Civil Service under Rapid Social and Political Change," in Weidner (ed.), *Asia*, p. 108.

[30] Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research," p. 98.

[31] Riggs, "The Idea of Development Administration," pp. 32-3. Also see his, "The Context of Development Administration," p. 75.

[32] Here, the following comment by Weidner would be in order: "As for the scholar, development administration, as a part of the policy sciences, could legitimately focus on some of the end results of the policies or goals of the political and administrative systems, such as modernity, or nation-building and socio-economic progress. The programs or innovations introduced in developing countries would then be classified among the principal independent variables, the output or goal-accomplishment the ultimate dependent variables, system changes possible intermediate dependent variables, and environmental or cultural factors intervening or intermediate dependent variables. These would be tendencies and would not necessarily be true of every research project within development administration." "The Elements of Development Administration," in Weidner (ed.), *Asia*, p. 24.

[33] See, among others, Riggs, "Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept," in Montgomery and Siffin (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 225-55, and "The Idea of Development Administration," p. 29; Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research"; La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 3-61; Landau, "Development Administration and Decision Theory," in Weidner (ed.), *Asia*, pp. 73-103.

[34] Donald C. Stone in "Introduction" to *Education for Development*

Administration (Brussels: International Institute of Adminis-
trative Sciences, 1966), cited in W. Wood, "Development
Administration: An Objection," *Indian Journal of Public
Administration,* XIII (1967), p. 702.
One major focus of the Comparative Administration Group,
as identified by Milton Esman, has been the process of
development planning. See, Esman, "CAG and the Study of
Public Administration," pp. 52-58.

[35] Robert Chin, "Utility of System Models and Developmental
Models for Practitioner," in Warren Bennis, *et al.*, *The
Planning of Change* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1961), p. 208.

[36] V.A. Pai Panandiker, "Development Administration: An
Approach," *Indian Journal of Public Administration,* X (1964),
p. 35.

[37] For a discussion on this subject, see Weidner, "The Elements
of Development Administration," pp. 9-24.

[38] Saul M. Katz, "A Systems Approach to Development
Administration," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers,* p. 134.

[39] Weidner, "The Idea of Development Administration," p. 24.

[40] Katz, *op. cit.,* p. 120.

[41] "Introduction," in Swerdlow (ed.), *Development Administra-
tion: Concepts and Problems* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univer-
sity Press, 1963), p. x.   [42] Wood, *op. cit.,* p. 714.

[43] See, for example, S.C. Dube, "Bureaucracy and Nation
Building in Transitional Societies," *International Social Science
Journal,* XVI (1964), pp. 229-36.

[44] Wood, *op. cit.,* pp. 702-13.

[45] Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucracies in Developing Countries,"
in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers,* p. 459.

[46] See, Marini (ed.), *op. cit.*; Waldo (ed.), *Public Administration
in a Time of Turbulence.* In fact, projects such as the Tennessee
Valley Authority had made the students of public adminis-
tration aware of the distinction between developmental and
non-developmental aspects of an administrative system.

[47] Weidner, "Development and Innovational Roles," in his
(ed.), *Asia,* p. 421.

[48] Katz, *op. cit.,* p. 120. Victor Thompson has also observed that
developmental administration implies organizational ability

to innovate. See "Bureaucracy and Innovation," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IX (1965), pp. 1-20.

49 Riggs, "Introduction" in his (ed.), *Frontiers*, p. 8. Also, see, Heady, "Bureaucracies in Developing Countries," p. 459.

50 Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research," p. 100.

51 Heady has remarked, "Although work with a development administration emphasis need not be normative in the sense of a choice among development goals by the researcher, much of it does have a prescriptive coloration." *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 10.

52 Dwight Waldo, "Comparative Public Administration: Prologue, Performance, and Problems," in Preston Le Breton (ed.), *Comparative Administrative Theory* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), p. 137.

53 Nevertheless, such empirically based knowledge cannot wholly substitute for the practical wisdom of the practitioners. In this context, Riggs has made some frank comments: "No doubt the modern practitioners of standard public administration theory feel that their learning is more scientific and sound than that of the witch doctors and medicine men, but I question whether the new attempts to find a more scientific way to understand administrative behavior in cross-cultural contexts has yet produced any prescriptions for planned sociopolitical and administrative change more likely to achieve the desired goals than the proposals of experienced operators who, after all, have learned some trade secrets from extensive trial and error which cannot yet be claimed by the newer social scientists." *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 322.

51 Weidner, "The Elements of Development Administration," p. 8.

55 Riggs, "The Idea of Development Administration," p. 34. Emphasis original.

56 In fact, the study of the political dimensions of development administration has been a dominant focus of the CAG. See, Esman, "CAG and the Study of Public Administration," pp. 46-52.

[57] See, Warren Ilchman, "Rising Expectations and the Revolution in Development Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XXV (1965), pp. 314-28.

[58] "The Context of Development Administration," p. 81. For an extended treatment on this subject, see Riggs, "Relearning an Old Lesson: The Political Context of Development Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XXV (1965), pp. 70-79.

[59] See, Alfred Diamant, "Temporal Dimensions in Models of Administration and Organization," pp. 90-134.

[60] Ralph Braibanti's view cited by Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucracies in Developing Countries," p. 481.

[61] Heady, *Ibid.*, pp. 464-65.

[62] Ilchman, "Rising Expectations and the Revolution in Development Administration," in Heady, *Ibid.*, pp. 464-65.

[63] Esman, "CAG and the Study of Public Administration," p. 63.

[64] Ralph Braibanti, "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers*, p. 231.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

[66] See, La Palombara, "Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Nations," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers*, pp. 171-226. Also, La Palombara, "Public Administration and Political Change: A Theoretical Overview," in Charles Press and Alan Arian (eds.), *Empathy and Ideology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 99-104.

[67] *Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1964), p. 166.

[68] "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, p. 166.

[69] "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth," p. 229.

[70] "Bureaucracies in Developing Countries," p. 481.

[71] See, Riggs, "Public Administration: A Neglected Factor in Economic Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,* No. 305 (1966), pp. 70-80.

[72] Warren Ilchman and Ravindra Bhargava, "Balanced

Thought and Economic Growth," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers*, pp. 247-73.

73 "A Royal Invitation: Variations on Three Classical Themes," p. 259.

74 V. A. Pai Panandiker, "Development Administration: An Approach," p. 38.

75 Frank P. Sherwood, "The Problem of the Public Enterprise," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers*, pp. 348-72.

76 Riggs, "The Context of Development Administration," p. 84.

77 See, among others, Joseph S. Berliner, "Bureaucratic Conservatism and Creativity in the Soviet Economy," in Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers*, pp. 569-97.

78 Samuel Huntington, a political development theorist, has observed that corruption "tends to weaken or to perpetuate the weakness of the government bureaucracy," and, therefore, "it is incompatible with political development." But "in so far as the governmental bureaucracy is corrupted in the interest of the political parties, political development may be helped rather than hindered." *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 69.

79 "The Context of Development Administration," p. 87.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 106.

81 David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 81-122.

82 Agehananda Bharati, "Cultural Hurdles in Development Administration," in Swerdlow (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 68.

83 V. Subramaniam, "Hindu Values and Administrative Behaviour," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, XIII (1967), p. 695.

The Idea of Ecology and the Ecology of Ideas

TWO DOMINANT themes appear to have emerged in the course of the preceding discussion. First, it has been recognized that a cross-cultural analysis of public administration should be ecological in character, i.e., it should focus upon the interaction between an administrative system and its external environment, and also study the dynamics of socio-administrative change in the context of such interaction. Second, authors in the field should be seen as responding to problems which they have perceived in the environmental context of their studies. Thus the emergence of an ecological focus should be related to their perception of a new set of problems in their field. In other words, while evaluating the contribution of different phases in the development of administrative thought, one should consider the environment in which particular ideas developed, as a most significant variable. Thus, an historian of comparative public administration must be concerned with what might be called the "ecology of ideas," as well as with the emerging interest in the ecology of administration.

The nature of the environment with which public administration thinkers have dealt *and in which* they have worked has influenced the manner in which they have conceptualized their observations. Thus environment must be of central importance in any assessment of the evolution of administrative thought. Unfortunately, little attention appears to have been given to this subject, and, as a result, one finds largely disparaging or negative assessments of the contribution of the early administrative theorists to the field of comparative public administration. Such distorted evaluations can be rectified through an emphasis upon the ecology of ideas.

Early American administrative thought developed at a time when the industrial revolution was entering its age of maturity.

Large scale complex organizations were responding and adjusting to the demands for greater and better production in a rapidly moving competitive world. The goals of such organizations appeared to be survival and development in the changing and challenging environment. Thus, the purposes for which administrative units were created were assumed to be clearly agreed upon. The achievement of these purposes or goals depended largely on an organization's capacity (or more narrowly, productivity), and it was the building up of such capacity that became the focus of early American administrative theory. Concepts such as economy and efficiency also became prominent in administrative theory, primarily because of their tremendous relevance to the development of organizational capabilities.

With the industrial and commercial sectors of society providing ideals in the early twentieth century America, the values of economy and efficiency were adopted by the government organizations as well. Limited resources and growing demands for public services led to pressure for economical operations. With an implicit consensus among administrative theorists on the instrumental goals of carrying out legislative policy, much of the discussion on administrative theory centred around the more immediate means to achieve such goals. The emphasis on means was reflected in the dominant concern of scholars with the internal administrative environment of an organization and in their tendency to take the external environmental considerations for granted.

Early public administration theorists were also concerned with the question of the responsibility of public officials to the electorate. For example, the short ballot, the hierarchy under chief executive, and new forms of city government centralizing substantial administrative authority in a single administrator were designed to make the decision-makers *visible* and thereby subject to effective electoral control. These reforms were introduced primarily as a reaction against the boss rule which had thrived on long ballot, and against the practice of relatively unknown candidates being selected through caucus, etc.

The Human Relations Movement in the 1940's and 1950's developed largely because of the wide shortage of labour. Thus, it became necessary to devise new ways to increase the workers'

productivity in order to meet the growing demands of goods and service during and after World War II. However, the movement was concerned more with the study of means to achieve the goal of increased productivity than with the complexities associated with the processes of goal-setting and goal-modification. In other words, the human relationists focused on some newly recognized variables of the internal environment of organizations, but did not explore extensively those external environmental factors which stimulated modifications in the internal organizational setting. In fact, both the "classical" and the Human Relations schools assumed that the organizational objectives were "given" in the form of legislative decisions regarding policy, and that administrators would advise on policy. This interaction between the policy-makers and the policy-executioners became an important subject of discussion in the administrative literature of the New Deal period and after.

During the late 1930's and mid-1940's, with the introduction of "decisional" elements in the administrative theory by Chester Barnard, Edwin Stene, and Herbert Simon, the process of goal-setting was being recognized as problematic. But even then the study of goals was not clearly related to the external environmental structure of an organization. Briefly, then, the pre-Barnard American administrative theory responded to the management-oriented environment in which it developed. Thus it did not explore extensively the interaction between the administrative system and its social environment for this seemed unnecessary.

As regards the study of change, early American administrative theory appeared to be more concerned with required administrative changes in response to the societal modernization, with little or no concern for the administration of directed social change. Put differently, its primary concern seemed to be with "administrative development" rather than the "administration of development". For example, reform attempts, such as those in areas of municipal, financial, and personnel administration, were designed to increase administrative capacity to accomplish the assumed "goals" of economy and efficiency and of increasing public responsibility of government officials. However, there was little or no discussion of these "goals" in relation to broader

societal change (or "stability"). This situation remained until the beginning of the New Deal period in the 1930's.

The New Deal developed a rationale for massive politico-administrative intervention to correct economic problems and to stimulate economic growth. Public administration's widening horizons were stimulated by these new views. And all of this was in response to a phenomenal depression which destroyed the illusion that administrative development could be dealt with independently of policy decision-making. Thus, students of public administration developed an interest in the problems of policy development in relation to the needs of large-scale societal change. But the New Deal never developed a sophisticated analysis of social change; and administrative theory was still rather simple in this regard. However, "development administration" had its early beginnings in the managing of projects such as the Tennessee Valley Authority.

It may be recalled that during the last part of the nineteenth century, scholars, such as Dorman B. Eaton and Woodrow Wilson, had advocated the borrowing of certain European institutions and practices. Such general or specific prescriptions were not based upon any "rigorous" cross-national or cross-cultural analysis. They did reflect, however, an expanding American interest in the broader world—but one which was still quite weak. On the academic front it meant an early—still nascent—interest in the comparative study of administrative institutions.

American administrative theory in the 1920's and 1930's, despite its quest for and claims of universal generalizations, did not develop a cross-cultural character. This limitation should be seen in the context of continuing American isolation until the late 1930's. Predominantly, intellectual problems concerned the domestic scene itself. Consequently, the American political science continued to have its essentially non-comparative and primarily Western focus at least until the beginning of World War II. The parochial nature of the early American administrative theory was an outcome, among other factors, of such an academic environment.

In brief, the pre-World War II American administrative theory:

1. was only slightly ecological, in that the external relations of administration were not seen as problematic, for the most part;

Efficient and effective administration was *assumed* to be the proper response to environmental demands;

2. was goal-oriented to the extent that it studied administrative functioning in the framework of the public goals legislatively determined;

3. was somewhat developmental in the later years in so far as it became concerned with effecting socio-economic change under the New Deal; and

4. was comparative, to the extent that it was interested in constructing certain universal generalizations or "principles," and it showed awareness of the *possibility* of adapting certain European structures to American administration. In practice, research was applied essentially to the American scene.

With these "underdeveloped" dimensions, early American administrative theory might appear now to be inadequate for the immediate purposes of cross-cultural administrative analysis. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that today's "traditional" theory was "revolutionary" in its own times. It must be viewed as an important step even in the evolution of comparative public administration. It provided the students of comparative administrative analysis certain core concepts around which many new ones could be formed. At the same time, new problems made the students of public administration aware of what was lacking in the early thinking and what "new" was required for cross-cultural administrative analysis. A similar heuristic purpose was served by the writings of Max Weber.

Max Weber's Writings

Even though Weber's bureaucratic theory developed independently of the American administrative thought, it shared many of the premises with the latter. Weber worked on his analysis of bureaucracy at a time when bureaucracy was extremely influential in the German politico-administrative system, and its structure was characterized by considerable hierarchy, specialization, and careerism. This bureaucracy seemed to be a vast new base of social power to Weber. His analysis sought to capture the essence of its evident awesome capacity.

Like early public administrative theorists, Weber assumed that bureaucracy was a servant of the State, and, therefore, its

goals were the fulfilment of the State's policies. Thus, in his analysis, goals of public organizations were assumed as externally determined. Weber stressed the importance of rationality in administration in order to achieve the implicit goal of efficiency in the solution of complex and specialized problems. A combination of these elements of rationality, specialization, and efficiency appeared to fit appropriately Weber's concept of an administrative State.

Weber was far ahead of the early American administrative theorists in the area of cross-cultural analysis. His study of authority systems is full of insights drawn from a vast span of human history. Behind this approach was a vast background of European sociology and Weber's commitment to comparative social analysis in order to understand the causal elements of the lawful regularities in the social order. Thus, Weber's administrative analysis benefited from the "empirical" surveys of the social systems in the ancient and medieval kingdoms, and in modern societies.

A cross-cultural and cross-temporal approach made Weber's administrative analysis substantially ecological in character. Unlike the early American administrative theorists, he studied the socio-cultural and economic conditions which stimulated the growth of bureaucracy, particularly in the West. He also studied the nature of administrative staff in the context of the traditional and charismatic authority systems. Thus his analysis necessarily included *differing* environmental settings and their influence upon the structure of administration. Weber's discussion of bureaucracy also covered certain aspects of the interaction between the political system and its administrative sub-system. Like Wilson and Goodnow, Weber made an analytical distinction between the political system and the bureaucracy, and favoured a sort of balance between the two. Such a normative concern was in conformity with his well-known distaste for excesses of both the politicians and the bureaucrats in government. However, Weber was even less concerned than American administrative theories with bureaucracy's advice to political leaders on policy. Despite this, his analysis of the political context of bureaucracy was more extensive than those of economic and socio-cultural environmental factors of administration.

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He seemed to assume that in this realm, only the bureaucrats and the politicians had real direct influence.

Weber treated administrative systems as "steady state" systems. Although he studied the process of bureaucratization from a historical perspective and analysed some dimensions of the routinization of charisma, the element of change was not stressed in his analysis of bureaucracy. Such analysis seems more appropriate today for an administrative system operating in a stable rather than a dynamic environment. The primary reasons for this could be that when Weber wrote his ideas, European governments were expected to provide the stable environment within which industrial development could take place. Thus, stability was not seen to be problematic in his administrative analysis. Moreover, during that period, there were not many "developing" societies on the international scene. Stable empires and their more stable colonies did not provide the challenges of social change which the emerging nations provide today, and, unlike the present situation, government was not expected to initiate or lead the process of large-scale socio-economic development. Even in his historical analyses, Weber was not much interested in the problem of consciously stimulating development in a society. Consequently, his analysis has posed limitations for the comparative administrative analysis of the contemporary developing societies.

In brief, Weber's administrative analysis:

1. is ecological to the extent that it studies the socio-cultural and economic forces stimulating the growth of bureaucracy, and analyzes the interaction of the bureaucracy with the political system and to a lesser extent with the socio-cultural and economic systems;

2. is goal-oriented to the extent that it assumes the existence of certain societal goals which influence bureaucracy's broad objectives;

3. is concerned with the problem of modernization, but only from the perspective of the observer; Weber had no interest in the problem of directing social change; and

4. is cross-cultural in its methodology. However, the bureaucratic model, as noted earlier, is more appropriate for a diffracted society than for a prismatic social system.

considered administrative system as an independent variable and treated developmental goals as dependent variables. Such single factor modes of analysis could fall short of the ideals of an ecological approach, for, once again, the analysis would not be truly interactional as the reciprocal influences of the environments upon administration would be neglected.

Moreover, in the literature on development administration, writers have not discussed extensively the way an administrative system may affect the developmental process in society. Some attention, however, has been given to the problem of administrative reform, particularly its institutional aspects. It is clear that comparative administrative analysis requires dynamic models of change. Such models should contain a two-fold perspective, one which encompasses an analysis of the internal conditions that affect administrative innovation, and the ecological conditions which favour or frustrate such innovation. Such analysis must envision modal developmental sequences within diverse contexts. In a related area, the normative concern with a balance between the bureaucracy and the broader political system—a continuation of the Weberian tradition—must give way to constructs which are not biased against rapid social change stimulated primarily either by the bureaucracy or by the political leadership.

As far as the ecology of the contemporary scholarship in comparative public administration is concerned, the most significant variables seem to be associated with the complexities of modernization and diversity, which in turn are concerned with the dynamics of social change. These complexities involve the following fundamental questions:

1. What does modernization centrally involve?
2. How do societies differ in regard to the process of modernization?
3. Are there different processes of modernization?
4. How diverse are cultures which are compatible with the concept of modernity?

Administration, and particularly public administration, is intimately involved in the entire process of modernization. Thus, the above questions are of greatest concern to the students of comparative public administration. Only by treating public

administration with reference to all four dimensions suggested (ecological, goal-orientation, developmental, and cross-cultural comparability) can all of the above questions be dealt with. In other words, conceptual constructs in comparative public administration should have the following elements in order to respond to the challenges of modernization:

1. cross-cultural comparability: allowing broad comparisons among administrative systems in Western as well as different non-Western settings;

2. developmental dimensions: giving comparison a broad linkage with the question of modernization;

3. ecological perspective—studying the interactions between the administrative systems and their environment: an ecological perspective would suggest diverse developmental models rooted in particular sets of somewhat similar systems, and standing between discrete non-comparative approaches and those seeking universal comparative categories.

4. goal-orientation: stressing unique goals of particular cultures in relation to their administrative systems.

Incorporation of these elements in the conceptual constructs in comparative public administration would permit analyses of "comparable" as well as diverse administrative systems from the ecological-developmental and goal-orientation angles. In brief, then, the elements of ecology, development, goal-orientation, and cross-cultural comparability have to be tied together in comparative administrative analysis, as any one element stripped of others may prove to be less than meaningful.

Presently, comparative administrative analysis has developed, for the most part, on the macro and "middle range" levels. A collection of broad generalizations and hypotheses is developing, while the empirical testing of these propositions is being left for the future. Thus, in the area of empirical analysis, comparative public administration is far behind American public administration. Nevertheless, in some other areas the comparative theory can contribute to the American administrative theory, for example, by way of proving certain propositions like those dealing with prismatic elements in a diffracted society and with positive formalism. Likewise, comparative public administration can use the rich collection of propositions developed in recent

years by American administrative theory and test the extent to which such propositions are culture-bound. With the growth of large scale complex organizations in developing nations, it may be expected that in the future even the early American administrative theory could serve a heuristic purpose by suggesting certain propositions on the internal organizational operations in comparative context. The notions of economy and efficiency could be of great relevance to the emergent nations, which, out of necessity, are dedicated to the modernization tasks needing maximum results with severely limited resources. Similar relevance could hold true for writings on human relations.

As we move along the 1970's, "new" public administration in the United States is gaining favour among scholars. Concerned with phenomenological approach, conceptually, and with humanistic orientation, motivationally, the major thrust of the "new" public administration appears to be on enhancing the role and capacity of public administration to meet the challenges of, and to direct, social change. In addition, there is another new focus in organization theory. Students of "temporary society," such as Warren Bennis and Philip Slater, are talking of certain desirable changes in organizational structure and internal environment in response to the challenges of the changing social environment. Both of these foci—"new" public administration and of "temporary society"—are concerned with the problems relating to administration-environment interaction, and to socio-administrative change in this interactional context. In other words, both possess an ecological-developmental orientation, though with differing emphases. It appears, therefore, that comparative public administration and the contemporary American administrative theory share some common major concerns. In the foreseeable future, comparative public administration is likely to strengthen its own identity, although, eventually, a desirable course could be a gradual convergence of American public administration and its comparative counterpart.

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